ECOWAS : the case for political integration as a prelude to economic integration in West Africa by Enang, Donatus Etowa
ECOWAS: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
AS A PRELUDE TO 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA
bv
DONATUS E. ENANG
A thesis in partiai fulfiiment of the 




Faculty of International Development Studies 
Saint Mary's University 
Hailfax, Nova Scotia 
Canada
(e) Copyright 1994 
September 26, 1994
! ♦ ! National Library of Canada
Acquisitions and 
Bibliographic Services Branch





Direction des acquisitions et 
des services bibliographiques
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa (Ontario)
K tA 0N 4
The author has granted an 
irrevocable non-exclusive licence 
allowing the National Library of 
Canada to reproduce, loan, 
distribute or sell copies of 
his/her thesis by any means and 
in any form or format, making 
this thesis available to interested 
persons.
L’auteur a accordé une licence 
Irrévocable et non exclusive 
permettant à la Bibliothèque 
nationale du Canada de 
reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou 
vendre des copies de sa thèse 
de quelque manière et sous 
quoique forme que ce soit pour 
mettre des exemplaires de cette 
thèse à la disposition des 
personnes intéressées.
The author retains ownership of 
the copyright in his/her thesis. 
Neither the thesis nor substantial 
extracts from It may be printed or 
otherwise reproduced without 
his/her permission.
L’auteur conserve la propriété du 
droit d’auteur qui protège sa 
thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits 
substantiels de celle-ci ne 
doivent être imprimés ou




N a m e   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Diiitfiation Abstracts International is a rra n g e d  b y  brood , g en era l subject categories. Please select the one subject w hich  most 




fH I HUMANITIIS AND fO C lA i SCIINCIS
















Adult and Continuing................. 0516
Agriculturol.................................0517
Art .........................., ...........0273
Bilingual and Multicultural 0282
Businett...................................... 0688
Community College.................... 0275
Curriculum and Instruction 0727
Early Childfiood..........................0518
Elementary................................. 0524
finance  ............  0277
Guidance and Counseling 0 5 19
Heqilfi............................  0680
Higner .....................................0745
Mistoty o f ....................................0520
Home Economics........................0278
iriduslfiol  ............................. 0521
language and Literature.............0279
Momemotics............................... 02BO
Music..,, , ............................  0522
tmilosopny o l.............................. 0998
Msysicol.......................................0523





























Germanic..............................0 3 I I
Latin American......................0312
Middle Easte’ .....................0 3 15
Romance...............................03 13








History of . ......................... 0320
































African  ........., ............... 0331

















Criminology and Penology ...0627
Demogromy ........ 093B




Relations    ..........0629
Public and Social Welfare.... 0630 
Social Structure and
Developrnent .............  0700
Theory and Methods.............0344
Transportation............................ 0709
Urban and Regional Planning ....0999 
Women's Studies........................ 0453
fHI MliNCM AND iNDINiiMNO
s w u M K U X in a s
..................... oO T














   0306
Anatomy.............................. 0287
Biostotislics........................... 0308
s r . : : : ;  :::





ïûology.............., &  .  
liophysies
S X I



























Immunology..................... . 0 9 8 2
Nursing.................................0569
Nutrition  .......................0 5 /6
Obstetrics and Gynecology 0380 
Occupational Health ana
0 % & l o g y
















































Civil ..........  0543
Electronics and Electrical 0544
Heat arid Thermodynamics... 0348







f e . : : :   .














SAINT MARY’S UNIVERSITY 
FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the faculty of 
International Development Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled ECOWAS: 
THE CASE FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION AS A PRELUDE TO ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA submitted by DONATUS E. ENANG, in 












2.0 The Rationale and Ideological Framework for Analysis...................  14
2.1 The Rationale for This Thesis..............................................  14
2.2 Ideological Framework for Analysis......................................  19
2.3 African International Relations............................................  27
2.4 Summary...........................................................................  34
Chapter Three
3.0 The Theory of Economic Integration..........................................  37
3.1 The Traditional Theory of Economic Integration...................  37
3.2 Effects of Economic Integration.........................................  43
3.3 Summary.........................................................................  47
Chapter Four
4.0 The Evolution of Intra-Trade and ECOWAS.................................  48
4.1 Introduction...................................................................... 48
4.2 Evolution of Intra-Trade In West Africa................................ 49
4.3 The Emergence of ECOWAS............................................  62
4.4 The Old ECOWAS Fundamental Objectives....................................55
4.5 The Aims of the Revised Treaty................................................  59
4.6 The Objectives of the Treaty...................................................... 60
4.7 The Structure of ECOWAS......................................................... 64
4.8 Characteristics of ECOWAS Member-Countries’ Economies 66
a) Low Labour Productivity.......................................................  68
b) The Dominance of Agriculture in West A frica............................73
c) Capital Shortage and External Debt...........................................78
d) Limited Technical Progress...................................................... 81
e) High Population Growth Rate.................................................... 83
f) Foreign Trade-Oriented Economies........................................  86
g) Structural Adjustment Programs............................................. 92
4.9 Monetary Integration..................................................................  95
4.10 Summary................................................................................  96
Chapter Five
5.0 Military and Authoritarian Regimes, Ethnicity,
Political Instability and the Need for
Political Integration among ECOWAS States....................................... 98
5.1 Introduction...............................................................................  98
5.2 Military Coups and Internal Political
Instability in ECOWAS States.....................................................  103
5.3 Inter-State Political Quagmires................................................... 135
5.4 The Need for Political Cooperation Among ECOWAS 
Member-Countries...............................................................  142
5.5 Evolution of J m  Economic Integration 
Schemes: The European Community and the
Latin American Free Trade Association.................................  144
a) The European Community.................................................. 144
b) Latin American Free Trade Association............................. 148
5.6 Lessons for ECOWAS.......................................................... 153








1. ECOWAS Basic Economie Indicators as of 1990 ...................... 3
2. Co-operative Organizations in West A frica..............................  15
3. ECOWAS Member-Countries’ Gross Domestic Product
at Constant Market Prices....................................................... 67
4. Labour Force in Agriculture, 1975-1992 (percentage).............. 71
5. Major Agricultural Exports of Member-Countries.......................  74
6. Agricultural Food Production among Member-
Countries, 1983-1991 ............................................................. 75
7. Total External Debts of ECOWAS Member-
Countries, 1970-1991 ............................................................  81
8. ECOWAS Mid-Year Population Estimates (in millions)
1983-1991 ...............................................................................  85
9. Foreign Investors and their Area(s) of Operation
in West Africa from Colonial period to Independence.............88
10. ECOWAS Member-Countries Intra-Trade Against Trade
w/ith Industrialized Countries.................................................... 91
11. Member-Countries Successful/Attempted Coup d’etats
from Post-Independence to July 1994 .................................. 106
ECOWAS: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION AS A PRELUDE 
TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA
Donatus E. Enang 
September 26, 1994
Abstract
The formation of the Economic Community of West African States in 1975 
is nothing short of the realization of a long dream of the West African countries. 
In particular, the agreement by the Anglophone and Francophone countries to 
establish ECOWAS is a welcome development in itself in spite of their different 
colonial backgrounds. The aims, objectives, and protocols embodied in the 
ECOWAS Treaty are unique in the realization of their underdeveloped econo­
mies. These aims and objectives are only a fractional part of the economic inte­
gration process. Translating the aims and objectives into pragmatic terms, 
however, has been fraught with difficulties due to member-countries' ill-conceived 
macro-economic policies, the entrenchment of the subregion into the global 
economy, the proliferation of repressive military and authoritarian regimes most 
of which preclude democratic practices, inadequate use of productive resources, 
the debt crisis forcing ECOWAS states to restructure their economies through 
the IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs. Most states cannot even fulfil 
their avowed commitment to ECOWAS, thus impeding development initiatives 
envisaged. It is for these reasons, among others, that this thesis strongly 
advocate for political cooperation which will eventually lead to effective economic 
integration. After all, the establishment of the European Community and the 
Latin American Integration Association were both preceded by political 
cooperation which eventually evolved into economic integration respectively.
Il
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ECOWAS: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION AS A PRELUDE 
TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA
CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
In many West African countries, the weakness of the economy character­
ized by limited markets and low productivity, is widely known. Most countries 
cannot finance large-scale development programs which would result in large- 
scale economies. The majority of these countries fall within the Sahelian region 
and cannot afford the cost of financing gigantic dams or irrigation schemes 
without major outside help from the developed nations. Becoming independent 
in the 1960s did not necessarily mean severing ties with their respective 
European colonial powers. This is because, while these ties with the colonial 
powers, especially upon post-independence, provided some advantages for the 
newly independent nations, these advantages have diminished, and to some 
degree, turned disadvantageous as independence itself can be rightly claimed 
to have sowed the seed of subordination of former colonies to the imperial 
powers, which proved costly as the negative effects become more glaring 
particularly in the current economic climate of the 1990s.
Political independence across West Africa was welcomed with pomp and 
pageantry. Gaining political independence did not, however, mean severing 
economic ties with colonial masters and other Eastern and Western countries. 
In fact economic ties remained potent until a series of global recession set in, as
of the early 1970s. It was In light of this phenomenon that ways and means 
were sought to improve the economic conditions of countries of the subregion. 
One strategy was the formation of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) - a subregional economic unit forming a geographical area 
of 6.25 million square kilometres, stretching from Mauritania to Niger and 
covering all coastal countries as far as Nigeria (see Figure 1 below). This 
subregion is widely known to be relatively backward in terms of economic 
development compared to other developing countries outside the continent of 
Africa.
Figure 1, Maps of West Africa and Africa
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rm
• i V O M t
But white some of these countries have made modest progress since 
independence, others have lagged far behind. An indication of these countries'
backwardness is revealed from the fact that none of them fall within the high 
income bracket Indicated in the World Bank’s statistics. The subregion’s basic 


































Benin 4.7 113 360 1.9 50 77
Burkina Faso 7.5 274 330 4.5 48 82
Cape Verde 0,3 4 890 9.8 66
Gambia 0.8 11 260 13.8 44 73
Ghana 14.9 239 390 42.5 55 40
Guinea 5.7 246 440 «, 43 76
Guinea Bissau .9 36 180 54.4 39 64
ivory Coast 11.9 322 750 2.3 55 46
Liberia 2.6 111 54 61
Nlail 8.5 1240 270 3.0 48 68
Mauritania 2.0 1026 500 9.0 47
— ... .—  
66
Niger 7.7 1267 310 2.9 45 72
Nigeria 115.5* 824 290* 17.7 52 49
Senegal 7.4 197 710 6.7 47 62
Sierra Leone 4.1 72 240 58.1 42 79
Togo 3.6 57 410 4.8 54 54
source: The world ëank M s z) world oeveiooment Reoort isaz. oeveiooment and the
Envifonment. Oxford University Press, London, pp. 218 & 285. *lt should be noted here diet Nigeria's 
1981 official (and generally accepted) population census was put at 85.6 million people. There is no 
doubt this will have effect on its per capita Income.
As can be observed from Table 1, the gross national product (QNP) of
these countries range from the lowest level of U.S.$180 per capita for Guinea
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Bissau to the highest level of U.8.$890 per capita by mid-1990 for Cape Verde. 
Two other economies that have recorded progress, according to the above data, 
are both Ivory Coast and Senegal whose per capita income Is U.S.$750 and 
U.S.$710 respectively. Even some of the countries that were economically 
viable and promising In productive capacity and reached a point that placed 
them In the middle Income bracket, have in recent years, fallen to low-lncome 
economies. An example Is Nigeria whose GNP per capita has drastically fallen 
from what It was In 1985 - U.S.$970 - to a meagre level of U.S.$290. This could 
be attributed to Increasing population. On the other hand, the average annual 
inflation growth rate In percentage terms for the period 1980-1990 is more 
appalling for three countries - Ghana (42.5 percent), Guinea Bissau (54.4 
percent) and Sierra Leone, with the highest level of 56.1 percent. The country 
with the lowest Inflation rate Benin (1.9 percent). A word of caution Is necessary 
here. The above figures are for the period between 1980-1990. If current 
estimates are made for each country, we are bound to see a completely different 
picture, perhaps the reverse of what we have here. By 1992 only three West 
African countries’ economies - Cape Verde. Ivory Coast, and Senegal - fell in the 
middle Income bracket. This backwardness Is traceable to a number of factors, 
Including macro-economic problems that bedeviled most countries of the 
subregion In the last two decades, and the absorption of the Third World 
economies Into the global economy.
Large revenues received by governments from trade have in recent years
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tended to disrupt, rather than promote, real economic development. Income (for 
example in Nigeria) has been wastefully spent on white elephant projects that 
yield no revenues necessary for development. And, as we can learn from 
Nigeria’s experience, per capita income of most countries has dropped steeply 
from where it was high some years earlier. There are also distortions in the 
pricing system, coupled with declining prices of agricultural products, which have 
acted as a disincentive to large-scale investments in agriculture which, in the 
1960s' contributed more than 70% of each countries’ foreign exchange. This, to 
a large extent, has obstructed the development of agriculture and industrial 
growth. Effective development of these resources undoubtably could have, 
contributed to the subregion's economic growth, assuring countries financial 
security, thus placing a limit to external borrowing and consequently, avoiding 
or lessening the present economic strangulation faced by most ECOWAS 
member-countries.
Yet, with the exception of the Sahelian countries, most ECOWAS 
member-countries are well endowed with a wide range of resources such as 
minerals (including oil), arable land for the cultivation of agriculturai products for 
both domestic consumption and exports, and enormous human resources.
The formation of ECOWAS which was anticipated to bring about progress 
has made little impact on the economies of member-states because no serious 
commitment had been made to fuifii the ideals embodied in the ECOWAS' Treaty 
establishing the organization. As of 1993, a revised and expanded new Treaty
was put in place, the organization recognizing that the old Treaty did not meet 
the aspirations of member-states, or that member-states did not make the 
protocols embodied in the old treaty work.
Up to the mid-1970s’, the economies of most of the West African countries 
worsened. By the mid-1980s' the economic performance of most countries 
remained low, and by 1991, the real gross domestic product, on average grew 
by only 1.9 per annum versus an average population growth rate of 2.8 percent; 
and this downward process led to a decline in per capita income for most 
member-countries by 1992. This weak growth, apart from those mentioned 
above, and as will be seen later, can be attributed to the declining agricultural 
production throughout West Africa, particularly in the Sahelian countries; Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and 
Senegal where frequent drought affected farmers’ agricultural output. ̂
After independence, most of these countries depended largely on 
agricultural exports from which they derived considerable amount of foreign 
exchange, manufactured goods and services, and this spurred foreign investors 
to invest in agribusiness. By the 1980s, agricultural production drastically 
declined due in part to government policies and a foreign debt burden. Foreign 
investments dropped drastically. And in the absence of industrial development, 
agriculture was supposed to be an important source of economic growth, leading
Ît should be noticed here that nine of the countries identified as drought-stricken areas, are 
members of ECOWAS. See iBRDhThe World Bank (1Ô69) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth. The World Bank, Washington, D C, p. 220
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to a diversification of industry particularly In those countries where arable land 
is relatively abundant. In fact, the disorientation of priorities by governments in 
development policies, including ineffective agricultural policies, must have had 
an enormous impact on these countries. For example, the indigenization of 
foreign firms in 1983 hitherto involved in agribusiness in Nigeria brought about 
negative results in terms of food production. Nigeria's food Import bills rose 
dramatically. Over all, industrial development which agriculture could have 
played a major role had long-since become stalled in most ECOWAS member- 
states (See Chapter Four).
In terms of intra-trade which predominated the subregion from nationhood 
prior to colonization by European countries in the nineteenth century, this has 
dwindled to a low ebb before and after independence. Rather than increasing 
intra-trade, exports of cash crops have continued to be directed to their colonial 
masters in return for manufactured goods. This is because domestic industries 
are either inefficient or lack the necessary capital for large-scale investment in 
industries to both local demand or subregional intra-trade.
For some countries of the subregion, the only way out were both foreign 
loans and aid (whose genesis can be traced to the mid-1960s'). By mid-1970s' 
the spate of demands for loans and aid quadrupled due to that period's oil- 
shock. In fact, both loans and aid were anticipated to play a revamping role in 
ECOWAS countries’ already deteriorating economies. But receiving foreign 
loans inevitably meant becoming debtor nations. However, foreign loans - no
8
matter from which source they came - only offered temporary relief to some of 
the countries that received them, especially since some of the loans, particularly 
those from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank meant automatic 
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) - a program that seeks 
recipient governments to cut drastically or remove totally subsidies to state 
enterprises, social programs, the private sectors (including farmers), and the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. Foreign aid, on the other hand was tied 
in that the recipient country had to trade with the donor nation. Up until now, 
solutions to Africa's economic problems which started in the early 1970s 
continue to evade African leaders.
it was against this background that the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), encouraged by the United Nations Organization and the European 
Community, encouraged African countries to embark on (1) the formation of 
economic cooperation by African countries. This cooperation was to be in the 
form of economic integration at the subregional level with the ultimate objective 
of establishing an all-encompassing continental common market by the year 
2000. The time frame of the year 2000 has since been postponed til, *he year 
2035^ and (2) the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs, both as 
strategies for remedying the deterioration of Africa's economies and to bring
'A. Traore (ldS3) "Regional Integration" European Community, Afrlea-Caribbean-Paclflc atatei. 
The Courier. No. 142, November-December, 1993. p. 46.
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about enhanced economic development/ bearing in mind the cooperative 
process that had already been Instituted/
Although the Idea about the formation of an economic unit In West Africa 
dates back In the early 1960’s, it was the general economic climate of the 
subregion In the early 1970s' as well as the encouragement of international 
organizations, previously mentioned above, that propelled the countries to form 
ECOWAS In 1975. Since then, the development process In some of these 
countries has either stagnated or drastically slowed down, due to a number of 
factors, including Ineffective domestic economic policies, Internal political 
problems, absence of democratic government practices In some of these 
countries due to military dictatorship or single party government, endemic 
corruption,  ̂capital flight to the developed countries' private banks by either the 
present or past government functionaries, cross-border smuggling, and partly 
because of exogenous factors.
Another factor that led to the formation of ECOWAS was the recognition
It should be noticed here that the spate of demands for loans from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Funds by Sub-Saharan African countries increased tremendously in the mid- 
1970s following the 'oil shock' influenced by the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). See Terisa E. Turner (1990) The Polities of World Resource Development In the 1990s, 
International Oil WCrking Group. Massachusetts.
^A. Traore Op cit.. p. 48.
^See an article by George Mcody-Stuart, former President of the Group of Seven for European 
Private Sector Cooperation with the ACP (Afrioa-Carlbbean, and Pacific states). Although he did not 
go too far Moody-Stuart's research reveals several facets of corruption by top government 
kinotlonarles In countries of the Third World, citing many African countries (including some ECOWAS 
nations) as the most afflicted In the article, "Grand Corruption in Third World Development." The 
Courier. No 140. July-August 1993, pp. 89-91.
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that the subregion’s economies were not large enough to achieve economies of 
scale or specialization. It was also recognized that official intra-trade was 
infinitesimally low, whereas unofficial intra-trade in the form of smuggling across 
borders escalated to enormous proportions. The latter was more worrisome to 
some member-countries to the extent that law enforcement agencies were 
permanently placed on borders. An example is Nigeria which was forced to 
close its borders with Cameroon - its eastern neighbour - for over three years 
due to smuggling, currency trafficking, and other illicit dealings between nationals 
of the two countries.^ This was also the case with Nigeria’s western neighbour, 
Benin. There is also persistent internal crisis in most countries as well as intra- 
subregional political problems which will be explored later.
A few years before the formation of ECOWAS, the Francophone countries 
had led the way by establishing an economic integration, named the West 
African Economic Community (CEAO), and significant progress had been 
recorded, as will be shown later. Seeing this as a successful endeavour, Nigeria 
spearheaded the search for an economic integration that would embrace all the 
West African subregion through extensive consultations with both Francophone 
and Anglophone countries.^ The outcome of Nigeria’s efforts, supported by 
Togo, was the formation of ECOWAS which, as stated earlier, came Into
^West Africa, various Issuss from 1973 to 1993.
^8ee Sam Olofin (1978),"ECOWAS And the Lome Convention; An Experiment in 
Complementary or Conflicting Customs Union Arrangements?" in Journal of Common Market 
Studies. No. 16, 1977-78, pp, 64-55
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existence in 1975 with membership embracing all the fifteen countries, namely, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, 
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.® In 
1976, Cape Verde, located in an island on the west coast of the subregion later 
joined, thus becoming the sixteenth member-nation. Over eighteen years after 
its formation and subsequent ratification of the Treaty, the organization appears 
to remain in the gestation stage as progress has been limited for various 
reasons which will be discussed in this thesis later. Suffice it at this point to 
state that it is for the above-mentioned reasons that one would emphasize that 
if ECOWAS must become a viable integrative unit, then it is of paramount 
importance that political integration must, of necessity, precede economic 
integration.
In the introductory chapter, I have highlighted some of the problems facing 
the West African subregion. These, according to the opinion of the author, have 
played major roles in the chequered history of ECOWAS. A more detailed history 
of how ECOWAS evolved can be found in Chapter Four.
Chapter Two will provide the rationale and ideological framework for 
analysis. In doing this, the perception of ECOWAS as an integrative 
organization will be assessed. An attempt will also be made to look at other 
organizations within the subregion to discover whether ECOWAS’ successes or 
failures are dependent on these organizations. This chapter will also provide an
®lbld, p. 55,
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ideological framework with respect to the subordinate nature of member- 
countries to their former colonial powers and the relationship existing between 
them. Chapter Three will deal with the theoretical aspects of economic 
integration and will analyze, as well as interpret available data, to explain the 
theoretical aspects of economic integration. Chapter Four will focus on 
literature review with reference to the evolution of intra-trade and the subsequent 
evolution of ECOWAS as a subregional unit and its past glory and development 
efforts. This will provide the background for its emergence as an integrative unit, 
and a review of the implications of the relationship among member-countries. 
An attempt will also be made to deal with the mechanisms to fulfil the objectives 
of ECOWAS, its goals, achievements and failures. Chapter Five deals with the 
central theme of this thesis which impinges on the prevailing instability in most 
West African countries forming ECOWAS. This instability embraces social, 
political, economic, and institutional deficiencies and the underlying causes, the 
most significant being the political realities which predominate in the subregion 
where most governments are dictatoriai, some headed by self-installed military 
officers whiie others declare themselves heads of state for life. Evidence of this 
can be found in the absence of democratic rule in most countries of the region, 
especially with regard to Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso, and in particular 
Liberia, where there has been a long-standing civil war. Thus in a subregion 
where conflicting ideology exists among some of the countries, one would agree 
there is little room for these countries to commit themselves pragmatically to the
13
fulfilment of frequent resolutions passed in various ECOWAS member-states 
gatherings. Yet, they often talk of cooperation, self-reliance, and a desire to forge 
a politically unified front to face the challenge of economic development. This, 
in short, is in contradiction to their frequent rhetoric.
Chapter Five also deals with the experiences of integrative organizations 
such as the European Community (EC), and the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA), and some other regional integrative schemes, some of 
which graduated from political cooperation to subregional or regional integrative 
organizations to support the validity of the central argument of this thesis.
Several data are provided in support of arguments that are embodied in 
this thesis. It should be noted, however, that data provided here are by no 
means conclusive since most countries of the subregion tend to manipulate, and 
in most cases, exclude some important data that are vital in planning and 
implementation of development schemes. The reader should bear in mind that 
the author is writing from a lay-man's perspective rather than as an economist. 




THE RATIONALE AND IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
2.1 Rationale for this Thesis
In the last three decades numerous studies have been made of the 
economies of the West African subregion. Yet, the realities of the subregion 
have not been fully explored by analysts, particularly economists, political 
economists and political scientists, with regards to economic integration. At best, 
mention of ECOWAS’ integrative efforts has always been limited to the economic 
realm, and these analyses occasionally relate to an accumulating debt crisis, 
corrupt and dictatorial regimes, poverty among the majority in the rural sector of 
these countries, without making attempt to ask why things remain the way they 
are. The result of this analysis is to overshadow the political realities of the 
various regimes, be they democratic, military, or dictatorial in character. Hence 
people outside the subregion or Africa in general who would be interested in 
knowing political trends in the subregion tend to be less informed about the real 
issues with which the subregion is faced.
One fact that remains clear, however, is the general recognition that 
ECOWAS had emerged as an integrative organization. But let it be stated that 
ECOWAS is not the first cooperative organization established in the subregion. 
A cursory look at the following cooperative organizations and membership within 
the subregion wiil reveal that others existed prior to the formation of ECOWAS - 
the only exception being the Club of Sahel which was established in 1976.
Table 2: Cooperative Organizations in West Africa
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Nama of Organization Year of
Formation
Membership
Banque Cantraie da* Etats t'Afncaine 
dai'Ouest (Central Bantr ofWast Africa)
1955 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo
Banque Ouest-Africeine da Développement 
(West African Development Banir)
1973 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
Communauté Economique de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Wést Africa 
Economie Community)
1973 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast 
Mall, Mauritania, Niger.Senegal, 
Guinea, and Togo.
Comité Permanent Inter-etats de lutte 
contre la secheresse dans le Satiei 
(Permanent Inter-State Committee 
on Orougtit Control in ttie Satiei)
1973 Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, 
The (Sembla, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal.
Club of Satiei 1976 Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania 
Niger, and Senegal.
Economie Community of West African 
Slates
1975 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mall.Mauritania 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo.
Entente Council 1959 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast 
Niger, and Togo.
Liptako-Gourma Integrated Development 
Auttiority
1972 Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
Mano River Union 1977 Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone.
Niger Basin Authority 1964 Benin, Burkina Faso. Cameroon, 
Chad, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, 
Niger and Nigeria.
Source: New African Yearbook 1991-92 (1992), 1C Publication, London, pp. 10-14.
The above ten cooperative organizations are only some of the existing 
ones in West Africa. While there are also cooperative intergovernmental 
organizations between countries of the subregion, a combined number of 
cooperative organizations throughout Africa alone is said to be over 200.° The 
general goal of each of these organizations is strictiy economic and the 
development of their respective countries which made up each of these
See A. Traore, "Regional Integration", The Courier. No.142. Brussels, p,48.
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organizations. A cursory glance will reveal that most of the countries belong to 
two or more economic cooperative organizations. While some of these 
organizations may not be actively involved in real development efforts, others 
have the potential for economic viability at least in the long term. The Council 
of Entente, for example, has the objective of becoming an agent of integration, 
but according to Renninger, the mechanisms appropriate to fulfil such a task has 
never been developed.^®
Long before the formation of ECOWAS, these countries held, and 
continue to hold, a peripheral position in the global economy. To a large extent, 
this status imposes important limitations in terms of socio-economic growth of 
these countries. For example, all member-countries of ECOWAS are exporters 
of primary products, including minerals, through which they earn foreign 
exchange. This means they must continue to rely on the world market along 
with its concomitant fluctuations, particularly in mineral products. In the last 20 
years, for instance, a series of world recessions have occurred, the most deeply 
felt and most prolonged being that of 1980-82 which affected both the developed 
and developing nations, causing total real output in the industrialized countries 
to stagnate, brought about a fall in the production of manufactures in many of 
them to the levels of 1976-77 and productive capacity was consequently
®̂John P. Renninger (1982) 'The Future of Economic Cooperation Schemes in Africa, with 
Special Reference to ECOWAS," in Timothy M. Shaw (ed.). Alternative Futures for Africa. Westview 
Press, Boulder, p. 159.
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underutilized.’  ̂ In fact, unemployment in these countries, particularly severe 
among the young, reached the highest levels since the Second World War, the 
volume of world trade stagnated in 1981 and actually declined by two percent 
in 1982.’* As can be expected, any economic downturn at the world market 
inevitably affects the subregion just as it does to other Third World countries 
because of the absorption of the Third World into the global economy. And 
because of shortage of capital, attempts by member-countries to fix up their 
deteriorating economy in most cases, means seeking external loans either from 
the IMF or the World Bank or from private consortiums. It has been mentioned 
In the introduction that, receiving IMF or World Bank loans inevitably means the 
introduction of economic policies imposed on the recipient countries along with 
its negative effects. The negative effects of most of these programs and other 
socio-economic problems relating to the subregion have been subjected to 
critical analysis. One thing that is constantly overlooked is political variability 
which itself is a consequence of colonial legacy. To some degree, the political 
realities are Intertwined with ethnicity, culture and religion, as will be revealed 
later. This thesis recognizes that ECOWAS is an economic integration and not 
political integration. On the other hand, while some may claim that analysis of
” See for example, Luis Serven and Andres Sollmano (1993), "Debt Crisis, Adjustment Policies 
and Capital Formation in Developing Countries; Where Do We Stand?" World Deveiooment. Vol. 21, 
No l .p.  127,
'*G. K, Helieiner, et al, eds (1683) Towards a New Breton Woods: Challenges for the World 
Financial and Trading System: Report bv a Commonwealth Study Group. Commonwealth 
Secretariat, London, p. 2.
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political situations in ECOWAS member-countries is irrelevant, this thesis 
recognizes the importance of political conditions since these cannot be divorced 
from economics. It is for this reason that this thesis considers it imperative to 
look beyond economics by exploring the political realities of ECOWAS member- 
countries. It is hoped by so doing, an understanding of the present economic 
plight of the subregion will be gained. After all, Pierre Maillet once informed us 
that historically, apart from economic reasons, the construction of the European 
Community (EC) was motivated by a series of political and cultural considera­
tions. For Maillet, political reasons were motivated by the need (1) to give 
European continent the strength it needed to make its voice heard in the global 
dialogue along with other great powers; (2) to hold a political position at the 
international level sought by the European people; and (3) to play an effective 
part in the gradual construction of the world. Culturally, from Maillet’s view, most 
Europeans were of the opinion that the European heritage has intrinsic worth, 
and that without systematically taking a stand against other countries or 
continents, a specific European character should be preserved when confronted 
by the threat of domination by other cultures, be it from the East or from the 
West.’® While this argument may not hold in toto in the case of West African 
subregion, this may be rightly so considering its underdeveloped position -
p. Maillet (1977) The Construction of a Eufooian CQwrnunltv: Aehlevementa and Proepecte 
for the Future. Praeger, New York, 1977. p.x. See also Sidney Pollard (1985) The Integration, of the 
European Economy Since 181 S. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, pp. 12-17. R.F. Mikeeell 'The 
Movement Toward Regional Trading Groups In Latin America" In Albert 0 . Hirschman (1961) ed. 
Latin American Issues. The Twentieth Century Fund. New York, 1961, pp. 125-161.
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internal political instability, corruption among top government functionaries in 
most of these countries, and ethnic problems, all pose a stumbling block to 
progress. It has already been mentioned that economic analyses have tended 
to overshadow political analysis with regard to ECOWAS. It is the neglect by 
analysts to probe the political situations in these countries that compelled the 
author to focus his attention on political integration as a prelude to economic 
integration.
2.2 Ideological Framework for Analysis,
The experience of ECOWAS has never been satisfactory as one will 
expect, considering the rhetoric of member-countries concerning the 
organization. The community does not seem to have learned any lessons from 
the experience of the East African Community (EAC) which collapsed in 1975. 
For several reasons, the EAC once represented the hopes and optimistic 
expectations of many Africans for a viable inter-state economic cooperation. 
According to Nnoli, the common colonial experiences of the member-states, the 
long history of association in a common market, the high level of trade among 
them, and the degree of geographical mobility of their populations across their 
boundaries were positive assets to the consolidation of their inherited economic 
cooperation which was originally put in place in 1917, by the British which 
colonized the EAC’s member-countries; Kenya, Tanzania (then known as
20
Tanganyika), and Uganda between 1885 and 1890/^ In 1967, the EAC was 
established following a series of cooperative agreements in the operation of four 
long-established institutions, namely the East African Railways Corporation, the 
East African Harbours Corporation; the East African Posts and 
Telecommunication Corporation, and the East African Airways Corporation. All 
these institutions had been put in place by the British between 1920 and 1950 
with headquarters in Kenya. The Treaty for the East African Community sought 
to restructure these institutions.^^ For a few years, the Community worked well 
but Kenya's dominating role in the Community proved to be a signal for the 
collapse of the organization. Both Tanzania and Uganda had been experiencing 
increasingly trade deficits in intra-trade of the Community with the letter's 
position deteriorating faster over time. Attempts to correct this failed. Moreover, 
deliberate industrial location of large-scale industries in Kenya, and less location 
of industries in the other two countries tended to create strains among the three 
countries. These strains had been brought about by lack of adequate 
redistribution machinery for the benefits of integration. Due to ideological 
differences between these three countries, the integration scheme collapsed.^'’ 
In West Africa, the earlier hopes of economic integration degenerated in
^^See O. Nnoli (1985), "External Constraints of Pan>Afrlcan Economic Integration," in Economie 
Cooperation and Integration in Africa. Codesria Books, Dakar, pp. 126. D.A.K. Mbogoro, (1986), 
"Regional Grouping and Economic Development; Some Lessons from the East African Integration 
Scheme," in Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa. Codesria Books, Dakar, pp. 228-253.
^^Mbogoro, "Some Lessons from the East African Integration Scheme," p. 238.
p.247-48.
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a plea for even the most minimal economic cooperation. Despite the collapse 
of the EAC, ECOWAS was established In West Africa. Before and after It was 
put In place, the search for a viable economic Integration of the various states 
and regions of Africa has continued. And serious debates on an all African 
economic Integration has been on In the last few years.”  ̂But If one may ask, 
what are the prospects for ECOWAS success? Has it learned or can It learn 
lessons from the EAC’s experience? Have ECOWAS member-natlons developed 
effective strategy and put such In place with regard to political cooperation which 
this author consider Imperative. If they did, what of the constant frictions between 
some of the member-states?
While In a strict sense, a pre-requisite for success In any Integrative 
endeavour is the elimination of at least the major constraints on Inter-state 
transactions In West Africa, there Is also a need for peaceful co-exIstence 
between states. This means political cooperation must be placed as the 
forerunner. Given the present low level of these transactions, unless ECOWAS 
member-states are able to enter Into new political relations, trade, effective 
monetary exchanges and the transfer of capital, labour and technology among 
themselves, the momentum for economic integration Is most likely to be 
stultified. Many obstacles have hampered the development of new relations as 
we have witnessed In the past since ECOWAS treaty was established. Some
See several issues of West Africa. 1993, See also Tony Hawkins (1990), "Black Africa; From 
Aid Dependence to Self-Sustaining Growth," in Global Studies. Africa. Fourth Edition, The Oushkin 
Publishing Group, Guilford, pp. 170-2, and several articles In The Courier between 1991 and 1994.
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of them emanate from within the internal environment of the West Africa 
subregion while others are external in character. It is imperative to deal with 
these internal and external environments.
At the internal level, the expectations of ECOWAS leaders of economic 
cooperation are occasionally politicized. As a result, it is difficult for them to 
ĝ gree on even the relatively non-controversial shared objectives. The limited 
nature of the resources, relative to its growing population, hampers bargaining 
for reciprocal benefits especially where payoffs have to be deferred. More­
over, ideological cleavages have been quite divisive especially between the 
Anglophone and Francophone countries of the community. Added to this is the 
fact that the social and political instability of most member-states impedes efforts 
aimed at integration. This is perhaps, the reason Haas rightly concluded that 
poorly integrated countries are usually poor partners of economic cooperation 
since they cannot be relied upon to make the vital decisions which they fear 
might further undermine their control at home.’® Looked from exogenous 
perspective, it is important to recognize that one of the major factors constraining 
economic integration is associated with the penetration of African societies by 
external forces through the phenomenon of imperialism. The task of imperialism 
is to look for surplus value wherever it can be extracted. It must expand, export
’®See Ernst B. Haas (1973) "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and 
Anguish of Pretheorizing" in Richard Falk and Saul H. Mendlowitz, eds. Regional Politics and World 
Order. Freeman and Co., San Francisco, p. 111.
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capital, procure raw materials, establish markets for manufactured goods, and 
exploit cheap labour. This statement is the conclusion of Lenin who put It as 
follows;
Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism (which) 
consists In the striving of every industrial capitalist nation to subjugate and 
annex ever larger agrarian territories, irrespective of the nations that 
inhabit them.“
Pursuant to these objectives, the developed capitalist countries of Europe 
subjugated and dominated the nations of Africa for decades, African economies 
were transformed and geared toward the export of raw materials and the import 
of manufactured goods. Along with the dominance of foreign ownership of 
private enterprises, norms and procedures in the social, political and economic 
infrastructure which supported these activities, this transformation created 
national economies which became oriented to foreign trade.^^ Thus the West 
African and other Sub-Saharan African economies became outward oriented 
even before the local capitalist market and forces had become fully developed. 
According to Amin, the outcome of this colonial pattern of economic activities, 
was the integration of African countries' economies into their respective colonial 
masters' economies in particular, and the global community of capitalist states 
in general, but as dependent and peripheral units. Directly linked with this 
process was the import-export sector, with its supporting commercial.
Lenin, "Impeiialism and the Split in Socialism" in K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. Lenin (1974) 
On Historical Materialism: A Collection. International Publishers, New York, p. 503,
*^0, Nnoli, Co cit. p. 128. See S. Amin (1976) Accumulation on a World Scale. Vol. 2. Monthly 
Review, New York; S. Amin (1976), Unequal Development. Monthly Review, New York, pp. 198-293; 
and Clive Thomas (1974), "Dependence and Transformation," Monthly Review, pp. 26*41.
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construction and administrative activities which was less directly integrated. But 
even the subsistence sector, by acting as a reservoir of labour for, and through 
its supply of raw materials to these other sectors was indirectly connected to the 
developed and the external world of capitaiism.^^
This integration of African nations into the world economy was established 
within the context of externally dominated international division of labour which 
placed African countries in an inferior status, and constrained their ability to 
reorganize their economies in ways they deem fit, including the establishment 
of lateral relations with other African States, other Third World states, and the 
now defunct socialist states. Changes in the African economies were forced on 
them to conform to changes in the terms of this externally imposed international 
division of labour. Following the end of Second World War changes within 
the advanced capitalist countries forced them to shift emphasis to the 
manufacture of capital goods, light import substitution industries began to be 
established in the African states, ensuring a market there for capital goods from 
the metropolitan states. With slight modifications, this pattern of economic 
relations has persisted in the post-coionial independence period. According to 
Nnoli, the emergence of those dependent and external directed African 
economies occurred at the time of intense inter-imperialist rivalries. This was 
preceded by the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 which balkanized Africa into
22S.Amin. Accumulation on a World Scale. Vol. Monthly Review, New York, 1, pp. 170-222. 
*^0. Nnoli, "External Conatrainte of Economic Integration." p. 129.
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territorial compartments of domination by the rival Imperialist powers which 
represented the most notorious expression of that rivalry. Thus the direction of 
trade of an African country was not determined by the nature of its trade 
balance. Instead, it was decisively Influenced by the Interest of the respective 
colonial powers. So long as trade was favourable to the metropolitan powers, the 
direction of trade was maintained In spite of the consequent adverse balance of 
trade for the African country.^^
Similarly, colonial enterprises predominated In the subregion prior to 
decolonization, and most were Involved In direct Investment activities In the 
colonies, the colonial currency monopolized monetary transactions, the colonies' 
external reserves were invested at the centre, and foreign aid flowed over­
whelmingly from there. Even the colonial language prevailed In each of the 
colonies as the basis for education, commerce and political discourse. As if he 
was writing on behalf of other imperial powers, Lenin lamented:
For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must 
capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories 
whose population speak a single language, with all obstacle to the 
development of that language and Its consolidation In the literature 
eliminated.*®
Despite the post World War II multilaterlzation of Imperialism, Inter- 
Imperialist rivalry has persisted. In our present day, this Is reflected In the
P 130. See Table 3 In 0 . Nnoli (1978) Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy In Tanzania. 
NOK, New York. p. 23.
**V. Lenin (1974) "The Right of Nations to Self Determination," in Collected Works. Progress, 
Vol. 20. p. 396.
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competition between the European Community (EC) and the United States, 
between the EC and Japan, and currently the present two major economic 
powers • the United States and Japan are getting cioser to a trade war. The 
former, currentiy faced with trade deficit with Japan, is putting pressure on the 
iatter to accept more of its exports of manufactures while Japan is reiuctant to 
agree to terms dictated by Washington
Within the EC itself, there was a bitter rivairy among the former coloniai 
powers. This was evident during the negotiations for the Lome Convention 
between the EC and Caribbean, African and Pacific states, and between the EC 
and some mediterranean states, notabiy Tunisia, Turkey, Greece and 
Portugal. Another reflection of inter-imperiaiist rivalry is further reflected in the 
attempts by the former colonial powers to maintain in positions of power and 
governmental authority African leaders who are not just favourably disposed to 
imperialist capital in general but the capital of particular capitalist powers. An 
example of this, is the Franco-Belgian animosity over Zaire.*
Thus the continuing dependence of African states on the imperialist 
powers' rivalry in Africa have adverse consequences for African economic
^®See Globe and Mall. February 3,1093, p. A.1
‘ ^See Ernest Mandai (1970), Europe Versus America. Monthly Review, New York, p. 237; 0  
OJwok (1977), 'The New International Economic Order and Transfer of Technology," a paper 
presented at the biennial conference of the African Association of Political Science, Rabat, Morocco, 
September 1977. p. 14.
*S e e  for example, George M. Houser (1989) No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses of AfMcala, 
Liberation Struggles. Pilgrim Press, New York, p. 39.
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Integration. With respect to ECOWAS member-countries, the former colonial 
rulers are hegemonic powers. They use their payoff capacity to undermine the 
will of the member-states to Integrate.*® Individual powers may, thus be 
reluctant to encourage the subregion’s economic integration which will cause 
them to lose special privileges and preferences which they had exacted during 
their heyday of colonial rule and subsequent post-independence economic ties. 
Or they may arrange such attractive preferences for the exports of member- 
states to their former colonial masters so that member-states would be reluctant 
to play effective role in the subregion's economic grouping. In the last ten years, 
however, the imperialist grip on individual member-states has been relaxed due 
to global economic problems, debt crisis, structural adjustment, and so forth, but 
this does not mean that ties with the capitalist states have been severed.
2.3 African International Relations
According to Shaw, the differences and complexity in African international 
relations have led to two important phenomenon: the first is the search for 
alternative development strategies, and second, an alternative modes of analysis
France, for example, has continued to maintain cioser ties with its former colonies. A biennial 
Franco-Afocan summit is held in Afoca, and the last one was hosted by Libreville, Gabon. See West 
Africa. 6-11 October, 1992. Besides this, France is a frequent participant at most CEAO meetings, 
the Francophone equivalent of ECOWAS, it also makes yearly contribution to CEAO's Funds to 
supplement member-countries' annual dues. There is no doubt this is one strategy of influencing 
the continuity of member-countries economic relations, thus an indirect way of maintaining 
domination over the helpless and powerless member-nations of ECOWAS. This is also the case 
with other Francophone economic cooperative organizations. See West Africa. 26 October-1 
November, 1992. p. 1836.
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among scholars/"' Within the populace, there is resistance to new policies and 
perspectives as well as persistent advocacy of these policies from radicals as 
well as reactionaries, Thus the old orthodoxy and new alternatives have 
co-existed in Africa up to the present time. The old strategies and approaches, 
non-alignment, integration and modernization, not only failed over the past 25 
years or so, but are increasingly inappropriate for the already transformed world 
in economic terms. It was the economic plight that confronted Africa, partly due 
to the failure of the orthodox theory of modernization, and partly due to the 
global economic crisis of the 1970s, that led to the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
in 1981 and consequently the 1986 Addis Ababa Declaration, prepared for the 
Special United Nations General Assembly mid-1986 which recognized the 
following factors as being the main source of their problems;
1) Africa's reluctant recognition that contemporary rates of development 
were either unsatisfactory or negative;
2) A belated appreciation that global recovery would not necessarily 
help Africa and that n jny external agencies had only a temporary 
interest in continental development;
3) The recognition that international recommendations were not always 
appropriate, so Africa had to design its own strategy;
4) The agreement that continental balkanization had to be overcome to 
provide the basis for sustained recovery;
5) The insistence that indigenous interests, exchange and policies should 
be primary so that both South-South and South-North negotiations
Timothy M. Shaw. "Introduction: Marginalisation, Differentiation and Redefinition," in Ralph I. 
Onwuka and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.) Africa In World Politics: Into the 1990s. The MacMillan Press 
Ltd, London, 1989. p. xlv.
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could proceed from a position of cohesion rather than division; and
6) The consensus that Africa needs self-confidence as well as
self-reliance and self-sustainment to advance towards redevelopment, 
redirection and a continental country by the end of the century. ^
As Shaw had pointed out, it is the failure of national economies, regional
integration, South-South relations and North-South redistribution, combined with
inflation, recession, desertification, regional conflicts and debt rescheduling that
forced Africa to re-evaluate its development directions rapidly and critically. The
process which led to the formulation of the Lagos Plan of Action has already
been alluded to. I have also pointed out that the long-term aim of this process
is the formation of an all Africa common market or economic integration by the
year 2000. Some of the goals embodied in the LPA, according to Adedeji, the
former Secretary General of EGA,
called for the strengthening of existing regional economic communities 
and for establishing new ones so as to cover the continent as a whole; for 
the strengthening of sectoral integration at the continental level; and for 
promoting coordination and harmonization among existing and future 
economic groups. And during the decade of the 1990s, the declaration 
also call for sectoral integration.^^
Adedeji then added that:
Excessive openness and external dependence of African economies are 
inimical to the achievement not only of national but also of collective
^^See Timothy M. Shaw. "The Revival of Regionalism; Cure for Crisis or Prescription for 
Conflict?,"in Onwuka and Shaw. AfHca in World Politics. See Richard SandbrooK (1985), The Politics 
of Africa’s Economic Stagnation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
^^Adebayo Adedeji, "lnter>African Economic Cooperation in Light of the Final Act of Lagos," In 
Adebayo and Timothy M. Shaw, eds.(1986). Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on 
Development Problems and Potentials. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, p. 66.
30
self-reliance so that progressive inter-African economic penetration is a 
sine qua non for the achievement of national and collective 
self-reliance.^®
The achievement of national and collective self-reliance, however, involve 
using the developed institutions such as ECOWAS, WAEC, Preferential Trade 
Area (PTA), and others, including their subsidiary organizations, as the main 
instruments for achieving the collective self-reliance.®^
Adedeji's argument has been rightly questioned by Shaw who contended 
that the developments of these institutions has occurred in a continent 
characterized not only by cyclical droughts but also by declines and inequalities 
in a world system preoccupied by a new international division of labour rather 
than a new international economic order. According to Shaw, to increase the 
pace of development, let alone cooperation, changes must take place in the 
character of production, relations and institutions within and between African 
political economies. And such changes, he argued, are a function of history as 
well as of ideology and diplomacy. All these determine whether the continent 
can proceed from old to new forms of regionalism, from extroversion to 
self-reliance, and from orthodox to radical analysis.®^
Africa is, however, faced by a number of limitations. It is not only the 
largest regional sub-system given its territorial size and number of states; It is
®®!bld. p. 74,
®^M. p. 74.
®®Adedeji and Shaw, Economic Crisis In Africa, p. 102
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also the least industrialized of all the regions of the Third World countries, and 
one characterized by deep-rooted inequality. Its colonial legacy, evidenced in 
its dualistic economies, authoritarian regimes and high levels of ethnic 
consciousness, low level of infrastructural development, all combine to place 
African States In a disadvantageous position. In fact, Renninger once argued 
that If current projections materialize with regard to both Africa’s continued 
inability to meet basic human needs (BHN) and narrow the gab of growing 
Inequalities, Its future prospects are rather gloomy.®® In spite of all these, 
however, Africa’s Inheritance and mixed performance, it has emerged as an 
Important contributor In the present arena of world politics with Its ambiguous 
and contradictory position which characterize its political economy In the past 
and present.®̂
The re-emergence of the orthodox ideology in Africa, as Shaw contended, 
is one aspect of a broader trend towards divergent political economies caused 
by the highly uneven Impact of incorporation into the world system. And the 
emergence of a few leading powers on the continent according to Shaw, is 
forcing a reassessment in both perception and policy. The similarity of policy 
orientation can be located partly in the integrative efforts of various countries of 
Africa, and partly in Individual countries’ economic policies. This perhaps
®®John P. Renninger (1982), "The Future of Economic Cooperation Schemes in Africa, with 
Special Reference to ECOWAS," In Timothy fifl, Shaw (ed.) Alternative Future», p. 166.
®^Shaw. 00 cit, p. 109.
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explains why the orthodox school clings to the assumption that the West African 
subregion consists of essentially equal and similar actors, while the radical 
perspective attempts to relate the concept of integration as that of 'sub- 
imperialism' to changes in the subregion's position in the world economic 
order.®® From this, it is easy to note a division between the orthodox and 
radical modes of analysis in terms of theory and practical policies with particular 
emphasis on Africa’s role in the world system and the analysis of regionalism.
The orthodox analysis, for example, views regional integration, particularly 
in Africa as part of a diplomatic strategy to strike a balance between the 
continent and the rest of the world. Their approach has been to look at regional 
integration, not as a development strategy, but as a diplomatic strategy to 
enhance Africa’s position in the global system through a collective form of 
decolonization. The orthodox paradigm, consequently focuses on the form of 
regional constitutions and institutions, on mediation and liberation, rather than on 
structural transformation. This is perhaps what prompted, James Mayall to state 
the following:
From the start, the existence of the OAU (the Organization of African 
Unity) has been far more important to African states-men and politicians 
than any functional role it may perform in promoting economic cooperation 
or even the alignment of foreign policies. By merely being there, the OAU 
does indeed perform one vital role in African diplomacy - it bestows 
legitimacy on its members and on the movements and causes which they 
choose to recognize.®®
®®M' P 103.
®®James Mayall. "The OAU and the African Criais," Optima. Vol. 27, No. 2.1977, p 86.
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John Ravenhill, arguing from the orthodox perspective, stressed that any 
integrative process in Africa is a reaction to colonialism and "does not go beyond 
the re-Africanization of the continent as an objective." For him, the orthodoxy 
still has faith In its theories of convergence and 'trickle-down* development and 
"extroverted strategies of growth."̂ "
From the foregoing, It is worthy of note that the orthodox perspective 
recognized the persistent Inequalities in Africa, perceiving these as a 
phenomenon that can be eliminated. Zartman for instance, perceives the 
well-to-do nations as merely centres of momentary conflicts, Identifying three 
major features of the leading African States; (1) those whose initiatives on 
regional level are often temporary, (2) delicate positions of dominance within a 
subregion, and (3) inadequate resources which would have provided a basis of 
influence and power.̂ ’
in contrast to the orthodox view of regional powers through integrative 
process, the radical mode perceives regional powers as being less transitional, 
not restricted to strategic issues alone and more structurally defined. Their 
approach has been to relegate the orthodox assumptions and remedies and 
replaced them with a more introverted and self-reliant development strategies, 
based on the International division of labour as it affects Africa. For the radicals,
”̂john Ravenhill (ed,) (1986), Adica In Economic Criais. MacMillan Preaa, London, pp. 1-ir.
^'l. William Zartman. "Africa ai a Subordinate State System In International Relatione," 
International Organization. Vol. 2, No. 3,1967. p. 574. See alao I. William Zartman, and Yaaain El- 
Ayouty, (eda.) (1983) The OAU after Twenty Veara. Praeger, New York. p. 22-37.
34
the internationalization of production does not mean internationalization of 
control, Rather, the centre is able to secure favourable terms by offering some 
limited degree of semi-industrialization to co-operative regimes or countries with 
particularly valuable natural or organizational resources. Immanuel Wallerstein 
stated this more forcefully when he observed that some African countries, either 
by invitation or by accident, will come to enjoy upward mobility in the 
international hierarchy, while the majority will continue to stagnate and remain 
underdeveloped In the periphery/' But the orthodoxy insists that integration 
takes time and that, given Africa's colonial inheritance, its post-independence 
performance "is quite promising."*' The rationale for this conclusion is yet to 
be revealed given the current Africa's conditions; poverty, inadequate resources, 
especially technology, capital, and the constantly rising debt burdens. The 
phrase, "quite promising," therefore needs some qualification or some 
explanation as to how this will occur in the long term given the dependency 
nature of African countries.
One thing is obvious. The trauma of decolonization remains active given 
Africa's present realities, and some people in these countries would probably 
had wished they had not been extricated from colonialism. It is for various 
reasons outlined above, including economic, social, among others, that gave the
*'lmmanuel Walleriteln. "Dependence in an interdependent World: the Limited Poieibilitiee of 
Transformation with the Capitalist World Economy." African Studies Review. Vol. 17. No. 1, April 
1974, pp. 1*26.
*'Shaw, OP cit. p. 106.
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impetus for the formation of integrative units in Africa with the probable hope that 
economic integration would create an expanded market, greater scope of 
opportunities in intra-regional trade enabling countries to increase exports of 
goods and services, increased employment of labour, factor movement, industrial 
expansion, leading to over-all development in each of the countries involved in 
the integrative process. Development thus becomes an important goal of any 
integrative process.
2.4 Summary
That the West African subregion was able to come together to form a 
collective unit toward self-reliance is an achievement in itself. The current 
economic crises the subregion is facing is a normal process which must be 
overcome, at least, in the long run, for no country in history has evolved to a 
viable economic status without one form of economic problem or another. The 
major problem which most countries have not recognized, perhaps, is that 
gaining political independence without economic independence is the most 
problematic thing. While economic independence is not totally desirable, 
countries must maintain relationships with their colonial masters and other 
developed countries. This is so because, as economically backward subregion, 
these countries cannot, at this point, depend on their own so long as 
development process is important. They lack every kind of technology which 
can easily be acquired from the developed nations, but this cannot be done
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unless cordial relationship exists between them. At least direct control by their 
former imperial powers has been lessened. This explains why ECOWAS 
member-countries have established an economic relationship with several 
developed nations. Through this relationship, exports have been directed, and 
will continue to be directed to, different developed nations. The imports which 
exports will eventually attract in the long term will no doubt solidify the 
groundwork for industrial growth which will lead to diversification of industries 
and industrialization - the greatest aspiration of ECOWAS nations.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Theory of Economic Integration
3.1 The Traditional Theory of Economic Integration
From the onset, it should be noted that the theory of 'customs union’ is the 
traditional title for the theory of 'economic integration.’ ^̂  These two titles will, 
therefore, be used interchangeably. Before proceeding, it Is important to define 
the concept of economic integration. By doing this, it is necessary to distinguish 
four types of economic integration. According to Belassa, the first is a free trade 
area involving the abolition of internal tariffs and quantitative restrictions among 
member-countries, while maintaining restrictions against non-member countries. 
The second aspect is a customs union, which involve the complete abolition of 
internal tariffs and the complete suppression of discrimination against the 
movement of goods within member-countries. It also involves the adoption of 
a common external tariffs against non-member countries. The third is the 
common market considered to be the advanced form of economic integration 
and goes beyond the removal of tariffs and discriminatory practices against other 
non-member nations. The common market also Involves all factors common to 
other forms of economic integration. In addition, there are common rules to
should be noted that the first major study on Customs Union was done by Jacob Viner in 
1850. Since then, this theory propounded by him has become the starting point In the analysis of 
economic integration. See Jacob Viner (1950) The Customs Union Issue. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, New York. See also J.E. Meade (1955), The Theory of Customs Union. 
North Holland, Amsterdam, Bela Balassa (1965), Economic Development and Integration. Orafica 
Panamericana, Mexico. Richard Lipsey (1960) 'The Theory of Customs Unions; A General Survey," 
Economic Journal. No. 70. Barry Bracewell-Milnes (1976) Economic Integration In East and West. 
Croon) Heim Ltd, London, p. 56.
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ensure competition and free factor movements. The fourth is economic union, 
considered to be the most advanced stage of economic integration. At this 
stage, the harmonization of both social and economic policies among member- 
countries is vital.^^ A common market can be carried to such a stage. 
Economic integration, as can be seen, embraces all these four dimensions of 
economic cooperation by participating countries.
The original argument for economic integration by neo-classical theorists 
is rooted In the theory of international trade and comparative advantage. 
Thus the orthodox arguments advanced by neo-classical economists for 
international trade were a number of natural resource endowment and the 
advantages offered by specialization. But countries are not equally blessed, 
especially in the production of goods. Even where there are no disparity in 
natural resource endowments, it would still be profitable to specialize in particular 
activities because of the economies of scale made possible by the division of 
labour. Each person and each country should therefore specialize in the 
activities in which he, or the country has the greatest comparative advantage. 
This was the original thesis of Adam Smith and Ricardo. In recent decades, 
emphasis have been laid on increasing returns to scale - an idea which was
^®See Bela Balassa, (1981) The Theory of Economic Integration. Richard D. Irwin. Illinois, pp,
1-2.
^^See Imre Vadja (1971), "Integration, Economic Union, and the Nation State," In I Vadja and 
M. Simai, (eds.), Foreign Trade in a Planned Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
W.Q.C. Haack, (1983) "The Selectivity of Economic Integration Theories: A Comparison of Some 
Traditional and Marxist Approaches," Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 21, No. 4.
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foreign to Ricardo who was preoccupied with agriculture/^ But in agriculture, 
the relationship was at the opposite pole because as output increases, marginal 
returns, due to less fertile land, must be brought into production at increasing 
costs or intra-marginal land must be worked more intensively. Either process 
causes costs to increase. Increasing returns to scale is, therefore, one important 
argument for the removal of trade barriers If domestic economy is Inadequate to 
utilize the scope for reducing costs by increasing production; and an increasing 
number of industries have been used to support the argument for economic 
integration. '̂ The main emphasis behind this process was on exports oriented 
economies based on orthodox theory of international trade. This had little impact 
on the economies of the West African subregion. Anxious to bring about 
development which was equated with industrialization, most West African 
countries (as did other Third World countries) whose earlier emphasis was 
directed toward international trade, decided it was time to replace that process 
by 'import substitution industrialization' - a process which encouraged local 
production of goods which were hitherto imported through diversification of 
industries with eventual increase of exports of not only agricultural products but 
also the export of manufactured goods at least In the long term. '̂ This too
*'.L. B. M. Mennes, Planning Economic Integration, p. 16.
^'ibid. p. 13; See also Richard E. Caves, Ronald W. Jones, and Jeffrey A. Frankel (1990), World
Trade and Payments. Scott, Foresman and Co., New York. p. 323.
^®See W.C. Baum and S.M. Tolbert (1986), lnv<
Experience. Oxford University Press, London, p. 35,
5 I esting In Development: Lessons of World Bank
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failed due to the proliferation of inefficient industries; it also aggravated 
inequalities in income distribution by raising the prices of locally manufactured 
goods relative to agricultural goods and by favouring profits over wages.**
Speaking strictly in integrative terms, the market system with regards to 
consumption, is based on the principle that the same goods have different 
values for different consumers at different times. As Bracewell-Milnes analysis 
shows, the advantages of integration may be over-estimated or underestimated 
if the economics of consumption is not taken into consideration. They are 
overestimated if the calculations of the benefits from specialization ignore a 
weakness of demand in one or more of the countries concerned; and, they are 
underestimated if the calculations ignore effective demand that was not 
economically effective prior to integration. Some of the reasons for an economic 
integration may, in principle, therefore include any of the aims of domestic 
economic policy such as improvement in resource allocation, employment of 
resources, rate of growth and income distribution. Some of other reasons for 
economic integration will be dealt with shortly. In the interim, it is necessary to 
note that the traditional theory of economic integration revolves around tariffs, 
quotas and other quantitative restrictions or prohibitions, to the exclusion of other 
forms of non-tariff barriers to trade, in recent years analysts within the field have 
brought forth other arguments to justify the necessity for economic integration as
**R.G. Llpsey, et al (1985) Economice. Harper and Row, Publlehere, New York p. 396*97 
*^Bracewell*mllnes, Qp.clt. p. 13.
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will be seen later.
Theoretically the key concepts of economic integration stand out; trade 
creation, and trade diversion. Originally made popular through the work of Jacob 
Viner," the major characteristics of economic Integration is a complete removal 
of tariff barriers between member countries whose aim is to move towards free 
trade within a regional bloc. It is also characterized by the imposition of a 
common external tariffs on imports from the rest of the world. The higher the 
tariffs, the more their impact Is felt by countries outside the regional economic 
bloc. One thing is obvious however. Whether economic integration is beneficial 
or not depends, among other things, on the above-mentioned concepts of trade 
creation and trade diversion. These two concepts are central to economic 
Integration, according to the analysis of Jeffery Harrop.̂  ̂ The question which 
arises, therefore, is what Is meant by the concepts of trade creation and trade 
diversion? A look at Viner’s analysis is in order In understanding these 
concepts. According to VIner, trade creation occurs when a country in the 
customs union area finds it cheaper to import from a member country. Rather
Up to 1993, Viner'8 exposition continues to generate what seems to me as 'hot' debates 
among scholars on the effects of both trade creation and diversion. See for example, RichaiJ 
Pomfret 11993), "Measuring the Effects of Economic Integration on Third Countries: A Comment 
on Plummer," in World Development. Vol. 21, No. 9, pp. 143B-1437. Mordechal E. Kreinln and 
Michael Q. Plummer 11993), "A Reply to Richard Pomfret's Comment, In World Development. Vol. 
21, No. 9. Jacob VIner, The Customs Union Issue. See also Bela Balaasa who elaborated the theory 
in his The Theory of Economic Integration. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Illinois, 1961, Bela Balassa led.), 
European Economic Integration. North-Holland Publishing Co. Amsterdam, 197S, Nell Vousden, 
The Economics of Trade Protection. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. See also 
Richard E. Caves, et al. World Trade and Payments. Scott, Foresman and Co. 1990.
Jeffery Harrop (1989), The Political Economy of Integration, pp, 42-47.
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than produce domestically, It derives Its supply from a member country which 
has a lower price since the Intra-tarlff has been removed. VIner stated further 
that If, prior to the formation of the customs union, potential member-countrles 
were producing a commodity behind tariff walls where, after the formation of the 
union, one of the union partners becomes the complete supplier for the un on, 
trade is created, Contrary to trade creation, VIner added, trade diversion occurs 
If one of the member-countrles was producing the commodity before formation 
of the customs union Inefficiently > as a high cost producer - due to its protection 
behind a tariff wall; on the formation of the union, this country now captures the 
whole of the union market.®'*
It Is worthwhile to ask to what extent the degree of diversion will be. In 
his analysis, Bracewell-Mllnes provided the answer, as did Harrop. Both authors 
demonstrated that empirically, trade diversion Is not widespread as one could be 
tempted to assume. As they pointed out, economic integration has contributed 
to rising Internal incomes within the integration unit and outside countries have 
equally benefitted through the supply of complementary products, especially 
where the common external tariff has been set at a low level. Moreover, where 
the integration embraces a larger number of countries, the better it will be since 
It tends to reduce the likelihood of the lowest cost producer being excluded. And 
where the union partners have contributed to rising Internal Incomes, outside 
countries are usually able to supply complementary products with beneficial
®^Jacob VIner, The Customs Union Issue. See especially Chapter 4.
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effects especially where common external tariff has been set at a low level. 
Hence, the consensus Is for the retention of economic integration or customs 
union wherever this process has been put in place.^^
3.2 Effects of Economic Integration
The subject of economic Integration have, over the years, attracted 
attention from academics. Needless, therefore, to say the following survey Is by 
no means exhaustive. Viner’s penetrating study of the subject has already been 
mentioned. His central thesis revolves around trade creation defined as a shift 
from high-cost to low-cost source of supply within the Integration area, and trade 
diversion, defined as a shift from a low-cost source of supply outside the 
Integration area to a high-cost producer within It. Besides Viner’s analysis, 
however, other parameters have been Introduced into the analysis of economic 
integration through the work of Meade, and LIpsey. The general conclusion 
which can be drawn from their analysis Is that it Is impossible to make any 
theoretical generalizations about the effects of customs union or economic 
Integration, other than that it may be either beneficial or harmful. To some 
extent, therefore, most authors are In agreement with this particular thread of 
Viner’s analysis. Their argument are essentially an extension of Viner’s 
exposition. Meade, for example, using the same analytical framework, 
Introduced additional parameters, pushing the argument farther than VIner did.
®®Barry Bracewell-Mllnes, (1976), Economic Integration In East and West. Croom Helm Limited, 
London, pp. 13-16; Harrop, Qp. CIt. p. 42-46; See also Caves, at al. World Trade, pp. 316-322.
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Thus while VIner was concerned with the effects of customs union on trade in 
particular commodities, Meade considered the effect on total world trade in terms 
of primary, secondary and tertiary effects that emerge from the removal of 
barriers on intra-trade and the creation of barriers on trade with third countries. 
These effects according to Meade, must be measured not only in terms of gains 
and loses to world trade but also in terms of the utilization of resources. Certain 
situations might arise in which the impact of customs unions might be harmful 
to the trade in particular commodities, but beneficial to world trade generally and 
to the use of resources. The higher the initial duties on each other's products 
which the partners seek to remove, the more likely is the effect to be a rise in 
economic welfare. The removal of duties may not, however, yield positive result 
if there are other and more vigorous obstacles to trade such as quantitative 
restrictions; restrictive commercial and fiscal policies such as discriminatory 
freight rates, subsidies, guarantees, or differential credit systems. For Meade, 
a customs union that stops at tariff reductions without harmonization of policies 
may not produce one result or the other. Each case must be evaluated in light 
of how far the union is prepared to go in terms of co-ordinating, harmonizing and 
integrating policies.^^
Lipsey’s theoretical position, on the other hand, dealt with two key issues 
with emphasis on consumption effects. His first argument is that given a 
country’s volume of international trade, a customs union is more likely to raise
Meade (1956), The Theory of Customs Union, pp. 45-47.
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welfare the higher the proportion of trade with the outside world. His second 
conclusion is that a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the lower the 
total volume of foreign trade relative to domestic purchases prior to the formation 
of the customs union.®̂
In spite of Viner’s classic analysis, he has been challenged by other 
neo-classical economists. For example, liberal economists such as Balassa, 
Mikesell, Linder and Hazlewood, all argued that Viner’s exposition of neo­
classical customs union's theory was inappropriate to less developed 
countries.®® While his argument has not been totally rejected, his analysis has 
been extended and developed further by Cooper and Massell (1980). Both are 
in agreement with Viner’s basic theory of customs union as a basis for 
evaluating economic integration. They, however, demonstrated that a country, 
by formulating appropriate policy of non-preferential tariff reductions, can reap 
the benefits of customs unions through trade creation, without incurring negative 
losses, through trade diversion. For these authors, tariffs may be legitimately
®^R.G. LIpsey (1970), The Theory of Customs Union: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, pp. 198-201
See Bela Balassa (1967), Economic Development and Integration p. 19; R.F, Mikessell, "The 
Theory of Common Markets As Applied to Regional Arrangements Among Developing Countries," 
In R. Harrod and D. Hague, eds. (1964), International Trade Theory In a DeveloDlna World. 
Macmillan, London, pp. 205-229; A. Hazlewood, ed.(1967), African Integration and Disintegration: 
Case Studies In Economic and Political Union. Oxford University Press, London; S.B. Linder, 
"Customs Union and Economic Development," In M.S. Wionczcek, ed.(1986), Latin American Econ­
omic Integration. Praeger, London; C.A. Cooper and B.F. Massell (1965) 'Toward a General Theory 
of Customs Union for Developing Countries," Journal of Political Economy. No.73, pp.461-76.
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non-economic for reasons of prestige or of national defence.®® Very recently, 
Vousden (1990) also deflected Viner’s argument on trade diversion. He pointed 
out that while the formation of a customs union may result In an overall welfare 
gains If the cost reduction effect outweighs the trade diversion, the possibility of 
country A bribing country B to join such a union In the hope that transfers would 
be possible cannot be ruled out. When these transfers are absent, country B Is 
worse off as a result of lowering Its tariff on Imports from country A. Even then, 
the two countries may agree to form a union If country 6 also has a decreasing 
cost Industry which can expand Its sales to country A when tariffs are removed. 
This would be the case for example, If there Is intra-industry trade in different­
iated products, and this Is a possibility In any situation In which both union 
partners have potential export Industries exhibiting economies of scale. So. 
whether a particular country decides to join the union would depend on whether 
the Increase in Its rents from exporting to its partner was sufficient to offset the 
loss of tariff revenue on Its diverted Imports.®® In like manner, Pearson and 
Ingram’s 1980 study arrived at the same conclusion with reference to Ghana and 
Ivory Coast. Using a variant of the Corden model which allows for a significant 
domestic distortions In each country’s goods and factor markets, they estimated 
that both countries would reap significant welfare gains from such a union, thus
®®C.A. Cooper and B.F. Massell (1980), "A New Look at Customs Union Ttieory," economic
Journal. Vol. 77, December, pp. 742-747.
®°Neil Vousden (19 
Cambridge, pp. 245-246,
90), The Economics of Trade Protection. Cambridge University Press,
47
enabling a welfare gain for Ghana of about 33 percent of its Gross National 
Product (GNP) and a welfare gain of 22 per cent of Ivory Coast's GNP.®’
3.3 Summary
It is important to note that Viner's indepth study on customs union laid the 
ground work for academic debate on the subject and the debate has continued 
to the 1990s. While his analysis may not be accepted In toto by other intellect­
uals, his exposition has inspired others to scrutinize his work. The result of his 
work has, at least, generated interest, criticisms and further analyses on 
economic integration. The fact is that ideas generate criticisms which, in turn 
lead to Interest. From this exposition, it is expedient to turn the evolution of 
trade and subsequent emergence of ECOWAS and the practical implication of 
the theory of economic integration.
8.R. Pearson and W.D. Ingram (1880), "Economics of Scale, Domestic Divergences and 
Potential Gains from Economic Integration In Ghana and Ivory Coast," in Journal of Political 
Economy. No. 88, pp. 894-1008.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Historical Evolution of Intra-Trade and ECOWAS
4.1 Introduction
Trade among West African countries had been in existence for several 
centuries.°^ To understand the realities surrounding the evolution of ECOWAS, 
it is important, therefore, to understand the past if the present must be 
appreciated in as much as intra-trade was fundamental in the establishment of 
the community. In that way, a coherent interpretation can be made about the 
current situation. Moreover, ECOWAS is about economic integration which, in 
itself, presupposes trade among member-states.
It is imperative to emphasize that historically West African peoples have 
never been united as members of a single political unit. Yet some of the pre­
colonial kingdoms that expanded across the subregion have great symbolic 
importance for those seeking to enhance interstate co-operation through trade. 
For example, from the Mali empire of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, the 
Songhai empire of the sixteenth century, and the nineteenth-century Fulani 
caliphate of Sokoto in Nigeria all based in the savanna, are widely remembered 
as examples of past supranational glory.^^ The kingdoms of the southern
^^JefTeries Ramsay (1991), 'West Africa; Seeking Unity in Diversity, the Link of History and 
Trade." Global Studies: Africa. The Pushkin Publishing Group, Guilford, pp. 17-18. See especially 




forests, such as the Asante Confederation, the Dahomey kingdom, and the 
Yoruba city-states, were smaller than the greater savanna empires to their north. 
All these city-states and kingdoms, although generally different in origin and 
character, were nevertheless, also sources of greater regional identity.^^
4.2 Evolution of Intra-Trade in West Africa
Over the centuries, there has been inter-border^^ trade which, in our 
present time can be regarded as Interstate trade among the West African 
subregion. For example, Sagay and Wilson's analysis**” has shown how farmer 
-traders in Katsina (northern Nigeria) used to take donkey loads of tobacco as 
far as 250 miles north Into what is now Niger, and used the proceeds to buy 
stocks down to southern Nigeria, and then buy kola nuts to take back to the 
north again. In pursuance of trade, cattle herdsmen and traders established 
routes which took no account of modern frontiers - which never existed before 
the arrival of Europeans in West Africa. The trans-Saharan caravan trade to 
West Africa was of great importance. Although this was antiquated methods of 
trade, it stimulated the introduction of the use of the camel which became the
p.i8
””The type of trade being referred to here le one that was carried out between nations and tribes 
having geographical proximity as there was no such thing known as country' or boundary before the 
arrival and subsequent partitioning of the various nations and territories of West Africa peoples. As 
a result of this there was free and frequent movement of peoples to and from the then nations. See 
J.O. Omer-Cooper, et al. (1968) The Growth of African Civilization: The Making of Modem Africa. 
Vol. 1, Longman, pp. 117-118.
”*J.Sagay and D A. Wilson (1978) West Africa: A History of Caravan Trade. Evans Brothers Ltd, 
See especially Chapter 3, pp. 131-37.
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’vehicle’ for transportation, even in the first century A.D.®̂  Within a period of 
several centuries a network of routes had been established. But whatever their 
vicissitudes, however, the route terminals in West Africa served as distribution 
points for all the areas to the south. Although trade flourished and reached Its 
peak between the 15th and 16th centuries, it had dwindled to a low ebb after the 
16th century.®®
The precolonial states of West Africa gave rise to great urban centres, 
which were interlinked through extensive trade networks. According to West 
Africa, this development was the result of the area's agricultural productivity, 
which supported a relatively high population density from the early times.®® 
From the above, it is easy for one to note that trade among West African 
countries is not a new phenomenon. In his penetrating analysis, Igwebe pointed 
out that the process had existed prior to the advent of colonialism which 
occasioned the compartmentalization in 1887 of West African subregion in 
particular and the rest of African territories in general after the Berlin Conference 
of 1884-85 by the now highly developed imperial powers.̂ ® He further indicated 
that this trade flourished, but was unrecorded. Therefore, it was unofficial in the
®^See In particular, "Roots of the West African Community," West Africa. 30, June, 1975, p. 738, 
®®m p. 738.
®®ibM. p. 738,
^®E.B. Igwebe (1993), "Tide of Regionalism," In West AfHca. 19-25 July, pp. 1244-45. See also 
William R. Kellor (1984), The Twentieth Century World: An International History, Oxford University 
Press, London, p. 33.
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real sense. People on both sides of each territory’s border have continued to 
trade In spiW of the official demarcations for the common reason of ethnic 
loyalty, thereby ignoring the use of procedures of International political 
boundaries.̂ ' Even In our present situation, conventional economic analysis 
or estimates put intra-African trade as at 1991 at 3.6 percent. Within the 
subregion itself, Igwebe alluded to the fact that most states would not survive 
economically without this form of trade. For example, Niger and Benin both of 
which share borders with Nigeria, are totally dependent on the latter for their 
economic survival, and this is a consequence of the artificially created 
boundaries by the colonial powers among hitherto good neighbours, causing the 
fragmentation of Africa and imposing colonial languages, cultures and 
economies." While it is not the intention of the author to make a detailed 
analysis on the evolution of trade in West Africa, the main intention here Is 
strictly to show that intra-trade within the subregion had been In existence 
several centuries prior to the creation of ECOWAS. The fact that several routes 
were established and secret routes continue to be established In our present
^'West Africa, "Roots of the West Africa Community," 30 June, 1975, p. 738. See also for 
example Basil Davidson's analysis of trade prior to European colonization of Africa In his Africa in 
Modem History: The Search for a New Society. Penguin Books Ltd. London, 1978. pp, 57-61.
"por statistical analysis, see African Development Bank (1993), Africa In the World Economy: 
Economic Integration and Structural Adlustment In Africa.
Abidjan, p, 7,
"igwebe, Qp cit. p. 1246
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time/^ can support one’s assumption that the present large-scale smuggling 
can partly be attributed to the long existed intra-border trading, and partly due 
to economic reasons, and this has become a way of life for most individuals and 
small businesses. Combined with this, is black-markets which dominated, and 
continue to dominate, the economies of most of the West African countries both 
before and after the creation of ECOWAS. In fact, smuggling, accompanied by 
black-market activities, can be closely equated to the past glory of unrecorded 
trade, and one major negative effect of smuggling is that it deprives governments 
of the conventional process of taxation which, if well calculated, could runs into 
millions of dollars per year.
4.3 The Emergence of ECOWAS
The movement toward economic integration dates back to the early 1960s 
with efforts to Institutionalize the concept of Pan-Africanism. The proposal to 
institutionalize this concept was conceived by Africa’s well-known nationalist, 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, whose goal was the establishment of a Continental Union 
Government, or at least, a political union of West African States. According 
to Ojo, this proposal failed primarily because Nigeria opposed It, while
^^See Jones Ekanem (1975) "Evolution of Trade, Smuggling and Economic Integration in West 
Africa," In West Africa, 5 June, 1975.
‘̂̂ This concept of continental union was to represent Gtiana-Guinea Bissau Union; Ghana- 
Guinea Bissau-Mali Union; and Ghana-Congo Union, of which each was to form a nucleus of a 
"continental union." For a detailed advocacy of this union, see Kwame Nkrumah’s Africa Must Unite 
(1960), Mercury Books, London, 
pp. 150-152.
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succeeding in getting a coalition of African States to support its stand/^ Ojo 
further revealed Nigeria's position as being that economic integration should 
precede political union and that economic union must itself begin at the sub­
regional level and proceed in stages beginning with functional cooperation and 
coordination leading to an African common market. Nigeria’s stand was based 
on ideological belief and commitment to engage in policies of regional integration 
which presupposes some notion among the participants as to their inter­
dependence, a shared conception of how and why they need one another.
In the early 1960s, the notion of economic integration was vague for 
practical purposes in West Africa. The Francophone states saw themselves as 
a world apart from the Anglophone states and vice-versa.^' Within the latter 
existed a rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana for a continental leadership. Thus 
Ghana’s withdrawal from the West African Currency Board and the West African 
Ainvays (now defunct) was based on grounds of having achieved independence. 
It could, therefore, no longer associate with any of these and other common 
institutions, in addition to Ghana’s struggles for leadership. Alt these brought
^®See Olatunde J.B. Ojo (1974), NIaerla'a Foreign Policy. 1960-66: Politics. Economics and the 
Stfuaale for African Leadership. University of Connecticut Press, Connecticut, p. 210.
Ojo (1980) "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS" in International Organization. No. 
34, Vol. 4, University of Wisconsin Press, p, 571.
^'One area of noting the distinction between the Francophone and Anglophone separate 
Ideological stance manifests in economic cooperations by the former in several areas. A close look 
at existing cooperative organizations in West Africa reveals that seven of these organizations are 
predominantly composed of mainly Francophone countries, whereas Anglophone countries such as 
the Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria belong to only three, namely, the Mano River Union, 
Niger Basin Authority, and the Interstate on Committee on Drought. See Table 2 in Chapter Two 
of this Thesis.
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about divergent Ideologies and views on the form and scope of African unity/" 
Another reason for Nigeria’s stand might have been Its desire to become the 
industrial heartland of Africa - a wish it hoped to realize within a West African 
subregional integration scheme that would be implemented at a pace that would 
not outstrip Nigeria's ability to develop the productive capacity needed to make 
it the centre of industrial growth. As Ojo pointed out, Nigeria’s First National 
Development Plan 1962-68, was designed as a strategy to enhance that capaci­
ty to make Nigeria "the industrial heartland of an African common market."
However, the need for economic Integration within the subregion 
intensified following the United Nations General Assembly’s evaluation of 
progress made over the second development decade in which it encouraged the 
Third World to "take further and vigorous steps to expand cooperation among 
themselves at regional, sub-regional, and inter-regional levels.""^ The reasons 
for this encouragement include, among others, the creation of opportunities for 
investment, a better allocation and utilization of resources, internal and external 
economies of scale. Increased efficiency resulting from specialization, the 
development of new industries, greater diversification of domestic and export 
sectors, a reduction of external economic dependence, a strong bargaining
"̂ibid. p. 673. See also 0 . Aluko (1976) Ghana and Nigeria. 1957-70, A Study in lnter-Aff)ca_n 
Discord. Rex Collins, London, See especially pages 72-121 in which Aluko made an in depth 
analysis of the Ghana-Nlgeria rivalry and the struggle for leadership.
""O.J.B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS," p. 573.
"^Renninger, Op Cit, p. 154,
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position, and the industrial transformation of the economies of countries which
undertake to form such a cooperation.®^
It was against the prevailing economic conditions, coupled with the United
Nations (UN) encouragement that West African countries, under the persuasion
of Nigeria’s then President, General Yakubu Gowon, and Togo's President
Gnassingbe Eyadema, came together on 27 May 1975, to officially establish
ECOWAS, Efforts toward this goal was initiated between these two presidents
in 1971 and before May 1975, contacts had been made with all other West
African countries.®® The general aim of the original Treaty establishing
ECOWAS in 1975 was:
To promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic 
activity,particularly In all fields of Industry, transportation, 
telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural sciences, commerce, 
monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for 
the purpose of raising the standard of living of the peoples, of Increasing 
and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among 
its members, and of contributing to progress and development of the 
African continent.®^
4.4 The Old ECOWAS Fundamental Objectives
For comparative purposes, it is important to put in perspective the 
objectives of the 1975 Treaty in order to judge and appreciate the work done by
®̂ lbld. p. 162.
®®Se« an interview on ECOWAS by Paxton Idowu with General Yakubu Gowon, "Change is 
Necessary," West Africa. 27 July-2 August, 1982. pp. 1340-43.
®^Ouoted by Renninger from ECOWAS Treaty and Communique. Article 2. Federal Government 
Press, Lagos, Nigeria, 1975. Qd cit. p. 155.
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the Committee of Eminent Persons on ECOWAS established In 1990 to revise 
the Treaty. The general objectives spelt out by the 1975 Treaty Include;
1 ) To reduce dependence of member-countrles on the external forces
that seek to Influence the economic policies and direction of 
African States;
2) To help to Improve the bargaining position of member-countrles, 
thus contributing to their development potentials through the 
broader strategy for promoting the New International Economic 
Order (NIEO); and
3) To co-ordinate the development programs In different sectors and 
sub-sectors as a means of accelerating the rate of economic 
growth and development.
In addition to the general objectives, specific objectives were also outlined 
and they Include the following:
1) the elimination between member-states, of customs duties and 
other Imports and export duties;
2) the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade 
among member-states;
3) the establishment of a common tariff and a common commercial 
policy towards third countries;
4) the abolition between member-states of obstacles to free move­
ment of persons, services, and capital;
5) the harmonization of agricultural policies and the promotion of 
common projects In the member-states, notably In the fields of 
marketing, research, and agro-industrial enterprises;
6) the Implementation of schemes for the joint development of 
transportation, communication, energy, and other Infrastructural 
facilities, as well as the evolution of a common policy In these 
fields;
7) the harmonization of economic and Industrial policies of member- 
states;
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8) the establishment of a fund for co-operation, compensation and 
development;
9) the harmonization of the economic and Industrial policies of the 
member-states and the elimination of disparities In the level of their 
development; and
10) other activities calculated to further the aims of the community as
the member-states may from time to time undertake in common.
The Treaty entrenched three provisions which were to be achieved in 
phases: Phase 1 - the Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa - 1980-85; Phase 2 
- the Right of Residence to be achieved by 1985-90; and Phase 3 - the Right of 
Establishment which was to be achieved between 1990 and 1995. Transition 
from one phase to another in the above schedule was not automatic.
The institutions established by the Community to achieve its objectives 
include (1) the Authority of Heads of State and Government, which is the highest 
authority; (2) the Council of Ministers; (3) the Executive Secretariat, headed by 
an Executive Secretary; (4) a Tribunal, and other specialized Committees and 
Commissions, Including the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and 
Development. Of all these Institutions, the three most important are the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Secretariat, and the Fund for 
Cooperation, Compensation, and Development. The Treaty had a total of 65 
Articles.®®
In 1990 the General Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
See Weet Africa. 5 June, 1975. See also Ibrahim Gambari (1991), Political Comparative 
Dimeneiona of Regional integration: The Caee of ECOWAS. Humanities Press International, New 
Jersey, p. 193.
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unanimously decided it was imperative to revise the 1975 Treaty due to 
inadequacies inherent in the protocols and in the light of previous years' 
experience. According to the outgoing Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Abass 
Bundu, who gave more specific reasons for the Treaty’s revision, this decision 
was taken due, in part, to economic and political crises within the subregion in 
the last decade and in part because of lack of progress necessitated by 
structural adjustment programs embarked upon by all countries of the subregion 
which significantly slowed down the pace of each country's economic initiatives 
and which, in turn, affected each country's ability to contribute to the realization 
of ECOWAS immediate objectives.®® Combined with these were three major 
factors: (1) the post Cold War adjustments in international relations and the 
consolidation of regional economic bloc within the industrialized countries which 
climaxed in the united concern of Europe and the United States for the economic 
liberalization process leading to a shift of economic aid to former Communist 
Soviet Union. Thus while the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) was making its facilities available to the presently 
democratizing Eastern Europe, American capital also showed increasing support 
as evidenced by the April 1993 promise of $43 billion American assistance to the 
Russian Federation. And contrary to repeated assurances by the West, West 
Africa could not help but absorb the shocks of the diversion of Western attention
Abbas Bundu (1993), "ECOWAS Comes of Age; An Overview of Developments In 1992^93," 
West Africa. 19.25 July, 1993, pp. 1250-57.
59
and capital away from the pressing development needs of the subregion;®̂  (2) 
the second factor is the increasing debt burden which stood at $78.3 billion in 
1991 (refer to Table 7 of this Thesis) - representing 45 percent of Africa's debt 
burden: and (3) is a combination of several factors, including poor economic 
performance of member-countrles, the failure of member-countrles to live up to 
their commitments to the organization, and the Liberian civil war coupled with the 
non-intervention clause embodied in the original Treaty.®®
At the beginning of this section, reference was made to the establishment. 
In 1990, of a Committee to revise ECOWAS Treaty. Named the 'Committee of 
Eminent Persons on ECOWAS Treaty’ and headed by the former Nigerian 
President, General Yakubu Gowon - who Incidentally initiated the establishment 
of ECOWAS in 1975, took over a year to complete. The Committee commenced 
work in May 1991 and completed in July 1992.®® The Treaty which was 
adopted in Cotonou In July 1993, Is highlighted below.
4.5 The Aims of the Revised Treaty®®
In the 1975 Treaty, there were a total of 65 Articles, but the revised Treaty 
was expanded to accommodate 93 Articles. The general aims of the new
® W  p. 1250,
®®!M. p. 1250,
®®See "Highlights of the Treaty," In West Africa. 19-25 July 1993, p. 1248-12 See also text of 
General Yakubu Gowon's Introductory remark to a news briefing In Dakar, Senegal on the report of 
his Committee of Eminent Persons on the ECOWAS Treaty Review, In West Africa. 10-16 August, 
1992, p. 1340-41.
®°See "Highlights of the (ECOWAS) Treaty," in West Africa. 19 25 July, 1993, p. 1248.
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Treaty, simply stated, are:
To promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of 
an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of 
its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster 
relations among member-states and contribute to the progress and 
development of the African Continent.
4.6 The Obtectives o f the Treaty
In order to achieve the aims set out, and. In accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the revised Treaty, the Community committed itself to ensuring:
1) the harmonization and coordination of national policies and the 
promotion of integration programs, projects and activities, 
particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources, industry, 
transport and communication, energy, trade, money and finance, 
human resources, education, information, culture, science, 
technology, services, health, tourism and legal matters;
2) the harmonization and coordination of policies for the protection of 
the environment;
3) the establishment of a joint production enterprises;
4) the establishment of a common market through :(i) the liberalization 
of trade by the abolition, among member-states, of custom duties 
levied on imports and exports, and the abolition, among member- 
states, of non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade area 
at the Community level, (ii) the adoption of a common external 
tariff and a common trade policy vis-a-vis third countries; (iii) the 
removal, between member-states, of obstacles to the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and to the right 
of residence and establishment;
5) the establishment of an economic union through the adoption of 
common policies in the economic, financial, social and cultural 
sectors, and the creation of a monetary union;
6) the promotion of joint ventures by private sector enterprises and 
other economic operators, in particular through the adoption of a 
regional agreement on cross-border Investments;
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7) the adoption of measures for ttie integration of private sectors,
particularly the creation of an enabling environment to promote 
small and medium scale enterprises;
8) the harmonization of national investment codes leading to the
adoption of a single Community Investment code;
9) the harmonization of standards and measures;
10) the promotion of balanced development of the region, paying 
attention to the special problems of each member-state particularly 
those of landlocked and small island member-states;
11) the encouragement and strengthening of relations and the
promotion of the flow of information particularly among rural 
populations, women and youth organizations and socio­
professional organizations such as associations of the media, 
business men and women, workers, and trade unions;
12) the adoption of Community population policy which takes into
account the need for a balance between demographic factors and 
socio-economic development;
13) the establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and 
development; and
14) any other activity that member-states may decide to undertake 
jointly with a view to attaining Community objectives.®’
Viewed from a comparative perspective, the revised Treaty is all- 
encompassing, covering broader range of objectives than the previous one. The 
new Treaty certainly supersedes the old Treaty of 1975 which ad 65 Articles 
against the new one which embodied 93 Articles. To mention briefly for 
example, matters such as tourism, the environment, joint production enterprises, 
promotion of joint ventures by private sector enterprises, harmonization of
®’M .  P.1248,
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investment codes - leading to a single Community unified Investment code, 
promotion of small and medium scale private enterprises, establishment and 
promotion of relations among rural population, women, youth organizations, 
professional organizations, the media, workers and trade unions, and the 
adoption of Community population policy, are all Items that were absent In the 
old Treaty. What is easily observable Is the fact that while the first thirteen 
objectives are clearly stated, the fourteenth objective Is ambiguous and can be 
subjected to maneuverability. However, the ability to Implement these broad 
objectives will be determined by member-countrles' commitment to the Treaty's 
aim and objectives. For, If member-countrles were handicapped In implementing 
the previously limited objectives, what can one expect In the revised Treaty? 
Certainly, doing this will, no doubt, call for serious commitment on the part of 
member-countrles. The task Is enormous as It Is challenging, and one hopes 
member-countrles will be prepared to face the challenge in practical terms.
In pursuance to the implementation of these objectives, member-countrles 
solemnly affirmed and declared their adherence to the following principles;
a) equality and inter-dependence of member-states;
b) solidarity and collective self-reliance;
c) Inter-state cooperation, harmonization of policies and Integration of 
programs;
d) non-aggression between member-states;
e) maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the
promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness;
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f) peaceful settlement of disputes among member-states, active 
cooperation between neighbouring countries and the promotion of 
peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development;
g) recognition, promotion and protection of human and people’s rights 
in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights;
h) accountability, economic and social justice and popular 
participation in development;
i) recognition and observance of the ruies and principles of the 
Community;
]} promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance
in each member-state as envisaged by the Declaration of Political 
Principles adopted in Abuja on 6 July 1991;
k) equitable and just distribution of the cost and benefits of economic
cooperation and integration.̂ ^
According to the revised Treaty, member-countries must undertake to 
create favourable conditions for the attainment of the objectives of the 
Community, and particularly to take all necessary measures to harmonize their 
strategies and policies, and to refrain from any action that may hinder the 
attainment of the said objectives. Moreover, each member-state shall, in 
accordance with its constitutional procedures, take all necessary measures to 
ensure the enactment and dissemination of legislative and statutory texts as may 
be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Each 
member-state must undertake to honour its obligations under the Treaty and to
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abide by the decisions and regulations of the C o m m u n i t y .O f  particular 
interest is sanctions which will be applied against countries who default in their 
annual payments to the Community’s Fund. These sanctions include (a) the 
suspension of new Community loans or assistance, (b) the suspension of 
disbursement for an ongoing Community projects or assistance, and (3) the 
suspension from the Community.
4.7 The Structure of ECOWAS
it has already been pointed out that in the original Treaty, several organs 
and institutions were established, the most important organs being the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive 
Secretariat, and the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development. All 
these organs were retained while institutions established in the original Treaty 
were expanded to include:
a) the Authority of Heads of State and Government;
b) the Council of Ministers;
c) the Community Parliament;
d) the Economic and Social Council;
e) the Community Court of Justice;
f) the Executive Secretariat;
g) the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development;
h) Specialized Technical Commissions; and
i) any other institutions that may be established by
the Authority.
A cursory look above will reveal there is now a Community Parliament,
^^Sea "Highlights," West Africa, p. 1248. See also Gotvon's 'Talking Points" in West Africa. 10- 
16 August, 1992, p. 1341
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an Economic and Social Council and a Court of Justice. The latter thus replaces 
what was known as the "Tribunal." The Institution conferred with the highest 
authority still remains 'the Authority of Heads of State and/or Government.' Its 
functions includes the general direction and control of the Community affairs and 
takes all measures to ensure Its progressive development and the realization of 
its objectives. It ensures that institutions of the Community perform their tasks 
and act within the limits of the powers conferred on them by the Treaty and 
Protocols. As the supreme body, the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government which is simply referred to as "the Authority," has the following 
responsibilities:^^
a) determines the general policy and major guidelines of the 
Community, gives directives, harmonize and coordinate the 
economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social policies of 
member-states;
b) oversees the functioning of the Community institutions and follow- 
up implementation of Community objectives;
c) prepares and adopt its Rules and Procedures;
d) appoints the Executive Secretary in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 17 of the revised Treaty;
e) appoints, on the recommendation of the Council, External Auditors;
f) delegates to the Council of Ministers, where necessary, the 
authority to take such decisions as are stipulated in Article 9 of the 
Treaty;
g) refers where it deems necessary any matter to the Community 
Court of Justice when It confirms that a member-state or institution
66
of the Community has failed to honour any of its obligations or an 
institution of the Community has acted beyond the limits of its 
authority or has abused the powers conferred on it by the 
provisions of the Treaty, by a decision of the Authority or a 
regulation of the Council;
h) requests the Community Court of Justice, as and when necessary, 
to give advisory opinion on any legal questions; and
i) exercises any other powers conferred on it under the Treaty.
There are now several specialized commissions established for the 
realization of the Community's objectives, and some of them include those 
dealing with Customs and Taxation; Environment and Natural Resources; 
Monetary, Finance and Payments; Industry, Energy, Science and Technology; 
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Transport, Telecommunications, and 
Tourism; Human Resources, information. Social and Cultural Affairs.^^
Comment on the above will be reserved at this point. For the moment, 
it is imperative to look at the major characteristics of ECOWAS member- 
countries economies which, it is hoped, will shed light to the above issues. By 
so doing one will appreciate the current socio-economic problems and efforts to 
overcome them.
4.8 Characteristics of ECOWAS Member-Countrles Economisa
In understanding the economic positions of ECOWAS member-states, it 
is necessary to present another economic indicator - each member-countries’
°°lbld. p. 1248. See also General Yakubu Gowon, 'Talking Points," West Africa. 10-16 August 
1992, pp. 1340-3.
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GDP in Table 3 - which was intentionally omitted in Table 1 (Chapter One). The 
intention here Is to show the degree of change between 1970 and 1992. What
Market Prices (InJMillions of U.S. PollanI I
COUNTRY 1970 1975 1980 1990 1992
Benin 646 686 837 1110 1187
Burkina Faso 807 947 1156 1697 1832
Cape Verde 103 91 98 184 193
Gambia 85 125 141 222 241
Ghana 4349 4258 4544 5671 6187
Guinea 1628 1864 2200 2992 3180
GuineaBissau 109 133 119 202 217
Ivory Coast 3568 5211 6399 6712 6526
Liberia 1141 1041 1147 977 983
Mali 661 761 983 1469 1609
Mauritania 610 609 703 816 875
Niger 1 1410 1240 1714 1561 1645
Nigeria 54013 74052 84010 105046 114116
Senegal 1878 2110 2229 3027 3131
Sierra Leone 1020 1114 1166 1463 1426
Togo 508 614 781 862 827
TOTALS 71926 94095 108227 134001 144175
Economy: Economic Integration and Structural Adjustment In Africa. Abidjian, 1993. p. A4, 
is easily observable is that GDP for all countries has been on the upward trend 
for the period 1970 through to 1992. The period Intentionally omitted - 1985 " 
was not significantly different In terms of growth rate for, when these figures are
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compared with GDP per capita, we have a completely different picture. For 
example, Nigeria persistently recorded the highest GDP for each year shown 
above, followed by Ghana. The country with the least GDP on Table 3 being 
Cape Verde. When calculated by each country's population, the whole picture 
Is reversed. For example, In Table 1, on page 3, we noted Cape Verde 
recording the highest per capita Income of US$890, whereas Nigeria could only 
contend with US$290, while Ghana was mid-way with per capita income of 
US$390 all In 1990. Table 3 having been presented, it is necessary to look at 
economic characteristics of ECOWAS member-nations.
Characteristically. West Africa has not developed economically as do 
countries of the Industrialized West for the following factors; (a) low labour 
productivity, (b) the dominance of agriculture, (c) capital shortage and external 
debt, (d) limited technical progress, (e) high population growth rate, (f) foreign 
trade oriented economies, and (g) structural adjustment programs. An attempt 
will be made to elaborate on these factors, 
a) Low Labour Productivity
One of the factors Inhibiting development In West Africa has been the 
subregion’s extreme low productivity of the labour force for the simple reason 
that most are either unskilled or semi-ski l led.To use Nigeria as an example, 
the output per person Is low compared with economically advanced countries
^^O.Lawal (1992), Economic» of West Africa. Heinamann, Ibadan, Nigeria, p. 223 See also 
Brian W. Walker (1988), Authentic Development in Africa. Headlines Series, New York.
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such as Canada, the United States, Germany, and Britain. The situation is not 
different in other West African countries. This low productivity is not restricted 
to waged employment but permeates the whole economy, namely farming, 
weaving, petty-trading, and those in tertiary activities. The major explanation for 
this low labour productivity, especially among farmers and craftsmen is the 
inadequate factors of production notably capital and enterprise which must be 
combined with other factors for optimum utilization and production. For example, 
an average West African farmer can neither buy modern agricultural equipment 
necessary for total output nor employ well paid manager who can oversee the 
use of modern techniques of farm management. And even if he is enterprising 
he may not have access to cultivable land because the prevailing system of land 
ownership in the rural areas precludes people from outside the village 
communities to use the communally-owned cultivable land.^° Another explana­
tion is that unskilled and semi-skilled workers are not exposed to complex 
industrial atmosphere and the complicated tools of new factories in West Africa 
most of which need some level of training. The result is ineffectiveness at work.
There are also environmental factors such as unhygienic surroundings 
resulting to poor health and consequently low productivity. Linked with this are 
climatic conditions; excessive heat and humidity with resultant effects on people 
and crops. The former - excessive heat - is the most damaging when it is
Bede N, Okigbo (1987), “Towards a New Green Revolution; from Chemicals to New Biological 
Techniques in the Improvement of Tropical Agriculture In Towards a Second Green Revolution: From 
Chemical to New Biological Technologies In Agriculture In the Tropics, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, pp. 458*59.
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combined with dry winds blowing dust from the Sahara desert down the West 
coast of Africa, and in most cases, causing drought among the Sahelian 
countries - a situation which Harrison once described as "eco-catastrophe."®^ 
Throughout West Africa, the proportion of those engaged in food 
production is greater than those in other sectors as we can see in Table 4 which 
follows shortly. The figures presented in Table 4 give a glaring picture of labour 
force participation in agriculture from 1975 to 1992. One could assume that prior 
to 1975, the percentage might have been much higher for all countries consider­
ing the fact that agriculture was, and is still, the backbone of some of the 
subregion's economies in that they generated between 80-96 percentage of each 
country’s foreign exchange prior to 1970.^°° As table 4 shows, by 1992 most 
countries had recorded a reduction in the participation of labour force in 
agriculture, especially Mauritania - one of the Sahelian drought-stricken 
countries. Its labour force in agriculture declined significantly from 85 percent
®®See Paul Harrison (1981), Inside the Third Woiid. Richard Clay Ltd, Bungay, Suffolk, See 
Chapter 4, pp. 63-76.
’°“see Okigbo, Co CIt. p. 458,
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Benin 81 70 65 59 56
Burkina Faso 88 87 86 85 85
Cape Verde 64 52 67 61 60
Gambia 87 84 83 82 81
Ghana 58 56 54 53 52
Guinea 85 81 78 76 75
Guinea Bissau 84 82 81 80 80
Ivory Coast 76 65 60 54 52
Liberia 78 74 73 71 71
Mali 89 86 84 82 81
Mauritania 85 69 61 54 50
Niger 94 91 89 88 87
Nigeria 71 68 67 65 64
Senegal 83 81 79 78 78
Sierra Leone 76 70 67 64 63
Togo 77 73 71 69 69
Total Average 79 74 72 70 69
Source; African Development Bank (19931) Africa In the world Economv; Economic inteoration and
Structural Adjustment In Africa. African Development Bank, Abidjan, p. A-44. 
in 1975 to 50 percent in 1992, making it the lowest of all ECOWAS countries. 
Benin, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone, showed modest declines, while others 
witnessed a reduction in their labour force in this sector by figures ranging from 
4 percent to 13 percent, with the subregion's average labour force dropping to
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69 percent. Here, caution Is necessary. However, the Involvement of 69 percent. 
In average, of the labour force In agriculture must not be over-emphasized. 
Factors leading to labour force decline In agriculture are easily traceable.
In recent years, there has been exodus of the rural population, a rural- 
urban migration of the active labour force to seek employment In secondary 
activities which are sometimes viewed as less energy exhausting and more 
rewardlng.^°^ As a matter of fact, rural-urban migration Is accompanied by 
both intra-subreglonal migration and emigration Into Europe and North America, 
not only by seml-educated people, but a large number of highly educated West 
Africans causing serious brain d ra in .A l th ou gh  rural-urban migration had 
commenced even before the arrival of SAP, there Is no doubt In one's mind that 
SAP acted to amplify the situation especially when viewed from the fact that all 
ECOWAS member-countries have been, and continue to be, recipients of the 
World Bank and IMF loans. Within cities, the impact of SAPs have led to serious 
unemployment in both the public and private sectors. These, among other 
reasons, thus explain why labour productivity has declined in terms of Its 
contribution to ECOWAS member-countries’ economic development.
Augustine Oyowe (1992), "Africa's Population, Development and Immigration into 
Europe," in The Courier. No. 134, July-August 1992, pp. 72-73.
102,,' Ibid. p. 73
®Jullu8 0 . 1 
World Development. Vol. 21, No.1, p. 142
J li s . Ihonvbere, "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria,"
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b) The Dominance üf Agriculture in West Africa
"he economies of West African countries are predominantly agrarian"" 
Agriculture plays a dual role In th " subregion. The first is production for exports, 
and the second is subsistence production. While the two types are Important, 
emphasis in the past had been for the former because of the benefit of cash 
eturn. Hence the derivative name of cash crops’ for export and the latter, is 
simply referred to as ’subsistence agriculture’ which meets immediate food 
needs of families."®
The fact that agriculture dr.minate the economies of ECOWAS countries, 
production trends have been largely disappointing. This decline in agricultural 
production has resulted in an increase in the importation of food and other 
agricultural products. Nigeria in particular which used to be a major exporter of 
agricultural products such as cocoa groundnuts and palm produce has, over the 
years, become a net importer of these crops. The situation is much more serious 
in the landlocked, the arid, and semi-arid countries."® ^ables 5 and 6 are 
presented below to show (1) the nature of cash crops on which most ECOWAS 
member-countries depend, and (2) the declining rate of agricultural production.
What can we observe from the following two tables? Table 5 points to
'°"See Chapter 12 which deals exclusively on agriculture. In O.Lawal (1992), Economics of 
West Africa, Heinemann Educational Books, Ibadan, pp. 148-163.
"®!bld. pp. 148-9.
"®See A. Owosekun (1985), "Some Thorny issues in the Economic Community of West African 
States," Economic Cooperation and integration In Africa. Codesria Books, Dakar, op. 90-110.
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COUNTRY Major Agricultural Exports Principal
Export
Benin Cotton, Cocoa, and Palm Oil. Cotton
Burkina Faso Cotton, Groundnuts, Sesame seed. Cotton
Cape Verde Bananas. Bananas
Gambia Groundnuts(shelled), Groundnut oil. Oil 
seed cake and meal.
Groundnuts
(shelled)
Ghana Cocoa, Coffee, and Bananas. Cocoa
Guinea Coffee, Cocoa, and Oilseed cake Coffee
Guinea
Bissau




Ivory Coast Cocoa, Coffee, and Cotton Cocoa
Liberia Rubber, Coffee, and Cocoa Rubber
Mali Cotton, Groundnut Oil, Oilseed. Cotton
Mauritania Fish, Millet, Sorghum, Maize, Rice Rice
Niger Cotton, Oilseed cake and meal Cotton
Nigeria Cocoa, Palm kernel. Rubber, Yam 
tubers, vegetable oil.
Cocoa




Sierra Leone Cocoa, Coffee, and Tobacco Cocoa
Togo Cotton, Cocoa, and Coffee Cotton
S o u rc e ; C o m p ile d  fro m  th e  W o rld  B a n k  (1 9 8 9 ) ,  S u b -S a h a ra n  A frica: F ro m  C ris $
to Sustainable Growth. The World Bank, Washington D C. pp. 246-248, and New 
African Year Book 1991-92 M992V 10 Publication, London.
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Table 6; Agricultural Food Production among ECOWAS Member?
w . w « « f  t » f  « W I .





Benin 2167 2776 2547 3330 3520 4,1 8.4
Burkina Faso 2377 2933 3053 3070 3463 6.5 3.2
Cape Verde 62 62 96 76 69 16.6 -8,0
Gambia 227 239 258 220 183 3.2 -8,3
Ghana 5221 9033 8605 8970 9562 13.3 2.7
Guinea 3017 3097 3159 3186 3610 1.2 3.4
Guinea Bissau 343 389 456 408 474 7,3 1.0
Ivory Coast 8835 9446 9798 9318 9794 : 6 -0.0
Liberia 1049 1095 1236 1259 939 4.2 •6.6
Mali 2810 3108 3197 3339 3858 3.3 4.8
Mauritania 413 512 568 658 498 8.3 -3,4
Niger 3101 3022 2875 3175 3791 -1.9 7,2
Nigeria 50327 59734 58209 58718 63061 3.7 2,0
Senegal 2335 3132 3421 2871 2632 10.0 ■6.3
Sierra Leone 1364 1204 1268 1311 1081 -1.8 -3.9
Togo 1293 1532 1431 1716 1656 2,6 3.7
TOTALS 84931 101314 100177 101826 108186 2.6 -0.1
source; African Development Bank îWGWr^ S laS ea SSSSHcTwrReSiSnsr liilember i iounWes
African Development Bank, Abidjan, p. 19,
one important conclusion; the fact that almost all countries produce the same 
goods. The only exception being Cape Verde whose principal export produce 
is bananas, although it has the potential of becoming a major fish exporter. 
Unfortunately this area has not been given the necessary priority it
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d e s e r v e s / F r o m  the above two tables, will the theory of economic 
integration hold considering the production of similar products by all countries? 
Perhaps the answer to this question lies on the level of production. That is, if 
some of the countries are producing less and less of given products and some 
others producing more than they need, then the answer to this question would 
have been in the affirmative. Besides, other sectors of the economies will have 
significant roles to play, particularly in the areas of industries, manufacturing, and 
service sectors.
Table 6 is self explanatory. The period between 1983 and 1987 was 
favourable for almost ail ECOWAS countries in food production. The only 
exception being Guinea which recorded the lowest percentage, while Niger and 
Sierra Leone both had negative growth for that period. Even then, while Sierra 
Leone's food production in 1987-91 further worsened, Niger recorded the second 
highest level of food production with 7.2 percent after Benin with a record high 
of 8.4 percent for the 1987-91 period. Several other countries, some of which 
recorded high growth for 1983-87, witnessed a steep fall. Both Cape Verde and 
Gambia had negative growth of -8.0 percent and -8.3 percent respectively, the 
over all average growth rate of ECOWAS member countries being -0.1 percent.
Some of the major constraints to agricultural production in the subregion, 
among others, include capital shortage, declining level of foreign investment in
African Yaarbook 1991-92. p. 69.
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this sector in some of the countries, Inadequate water supply especially in 
the case of countries of the Sahelian belt, and as already mentioned - migration 
to the cities, continued use of traditional methods of farming,’®® and endemic 
diseases such as river blindness in the fertile river valleys of the Niger and 
Burkina Faso. There is also the absence of technology which can be easily 
adapted to suit the particular needs of the tropical nature of the subregion.
Closely linked with agriculture is the transfer of technology from developed 
nations to the subregion. An important part of this is research and development 
(R & 0). It has been established by Jenkins that multinational corporations 
(MNCs) tend to concentrate the bulk of their R & D in their country of origin. 
Using the United States as an example, Jenkins concludes that only 10 percent 
of all their R & D that are carried out overseas, particularly in advanced capitalist 
countries "with very little being undertaken by subsidiaries in the Third 
World."” ° Vernon attributes the reasons for this tendency to (1) comparative 
advantage in the MNC’s home country, (2) lack of trained manpower in the Third 
World countries, (3) to allow economies of scale in R & D, and (4) to eliminate 
the problems of co-ordinating decentralized units considered to be uneconomical 
with regards to R & D as opposed to dispersed units. Other arguments advanced
See for example Luis Serven and Andres Soiimano (1993), "Debt Crisis, Adjustment Policies 
and Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Where Do we Stand?" in World Development. Vol. 
21, No. 1, pp. 127-140,
’°®Okigbo, Go cit. p. 460.
” °Rhys Jenkins (1987), Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development. Metheun &Co. 
Ltd., London, p. 87.
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against decentralization of R & D is that it requires constant contact with 
production and markets so that processes and products can be modified and 
developed, This implies that the centralized activities should be located in the 
country where major production markets are found which, according to 
Vernon, is usually the home country.’ "
While these arguments are convincing and plausible, they cannot be seen 
as adequate explanations for not decentralizing R & D not only in Africa but also 
In other regions of Third World countries. The solution to these problems 
requires major efforts* by the Community as well as international assistance on 
a vast scale. In fact, extending R & D to the Third World will, in general, help 
in adapting 'transferred* agricultural technology to suit the particular needs of 
these tropical countries. It must be clearly stated that unless the problem of low 
level of production is removed the aspiration of ECOWAS will be difficult to fulfil. 
Removing these problems will involve effective government policies backed by 
strong will and determination to transiate such policies into concrete terms,
c) Capital Shortage and External Debt
In no subregion of Sub-Saharan Africa is so starved by capital shortage 
than in West Africa, Throughout West Africa, there is enormous shortage of 
capital which is essential for overall development. This shortage of capital is not 
limited to infrastructures machines, and overheard capital such as roads,
” ’R. Vemon (1977), Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues, MacMillan. London, 1077. 
pp, 43-5. See also F, Stewart (1977), Technology and Underdevelopment. Oxford University Press, 
London,
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railways, ports and electricity, but extends to high yielding crop species, 
fertilizers. The resultant shortage of domestic capital which can be invested in 
productive enterprises prevents the accumulation of more capital and also 
hinders the production of more goods for domestic consumption.̂ ^® For 
example, according to World Bank’s 1990 statistics on gross domestic product, 
apart from Guinea and Nigeria whose savings were in excess of 20 percent of 
national income respectively, all other countries' savings ranged between 2 and 
11 percent while Ivory Coast’s savings was 14 percent,’ ®̂ whereas savings 
could sometime exceed 30 percent of national income in many developed 
n a t i o n s . O n  the one hand, it was this lack of capital that forced all 
ECOWAS member-states to take advantage of the World Bank/IMF loans 
especially from the early 1970s and in most of African countries. On the other 
hand, the oil shock of the early 1970s prompted a wave of demands for the 
World Bank/IMF facilities by needy countries affected by that oil shock. What 
this meant for ECOWAS was to begin to accumulate debt as they continued to
careful scrutiny of economic Indicators, percentage of economic growth, level of illiteracy 
rates, greater dependence on some international Institutions such as Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA), international reserves, levels of production, and so forth of African countries In 
the African Development Report 1993. World Development Report 1992. and New African Yearbook 
1991-92 • all point to the same direction: that West Africa subregion Is a little behind other 
subregions. Official development assistance to Mozambique, Tanzania, and Somalia, from ODA • 
as a percentage of GNP for 1990 was 65.7%, 45.2%, and 45.9% respectively. Whereas ECOWAS 
countries’ receipts of assistance from the same source was marginal, ranging from 0.7 to 14% of 
their GNP, and only one country, Mauritania had the luxury of receiving 20% of ODA assistance. 
This is understandable since about 95 of these countries fall In the low Income category. See World 
Development Report 1992. p. 258.
” ®The World Bank (1992), World Development Report, p. 234.
' ' W  pp. 234-5.
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borrow more and more funds from these two United Nations financial Institutions, 
and reschedule repayments of previous loans. From this phenomenon emerged 
mandatory structural adjustment programs (SAPs) for countries seeking loans 
from the IMF or the World Bank ’̂® which, as of 1991 had accumulated to much 
higher levels than was the case a decade ago. Table 7 presented in the 
following page summarizes each country’s debt standing for the period 1970 
through to 1991 in the following page. It presents an unfavourable situation for 
all countries of the subregion. While some countries contracted larger foreign 
loans, others were cautious in borrowing foreign loans probably to avoid 
unfavourable future repayment problems. But the situation progressively 
changed with each country increasing its debt burden by millions of dollars. To 
the extent that by 1991 while the least indebted country was Cape Verde with 
a debt burden of only US$158 million, Nigeria's debt had accumulated to an 
alarming high of US$34.5 billion. This Increasing debt scenario is also evident 
in all countries of the subregion. The negative effects of these loans have been 
mentioned. A further elaboration on these debts will be made In the section 
dealing with SAP.
^^®See L.D. Smith (1989), "Structural Adjustment, Price Report and Agricultural Performance 
In Sub-Saharan Africa," In Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 40, No, 1, January 1089. pp. 21* 
31. See also K. McAfee (1990), "Why the Third World Goes Hungry; Selling Cheap and Buying 
Dear," in Third World. The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc. Guilford, Connecticut, pp, 12-17,
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Tabla 7: Total External Debt of ECOWAS Member-Countries. 1970-1991
COUNTRY 1970 1975 1985 1989 1991
Benin 40 89 817 1185 1300
Burkina Faso 21 63 511 717 956
Cape Verde 1 100 137 158
Gambia 6 13 245 341 351
Ghana 543 723 2226 3296 4209
Guinea 315 767 1455 2256 2626
Guinea Bissau 7 308 500 653
Ivory Coast 278 1021 9745 15683 18847
Liberia 162 178 1244 1694 1989
Mali 246 355 1468 2145 2531
Mauritania 27 189 1502 2044 2298
Niger 32 111 1208 1587 1653
Nigeria 567 1143 19550 31977 34597
Senegal 131 342 2563 3286 3522
Sierra Leone 59 155 723 1093 1291
Togo 40 119 940 1186 1356
TOTALS 2466 5276 1 44605 69039 78338
Integration and Structural Adjustment in Africa. Abidjan, p. A-22.
d) Limited Technical Proareaa
It is important to emphasize that due to limited technical progress in West 
Africa, technological and scientific progress are not as widely applied as they are 
in countries such as the United States, Japan, Britain, Canada, Germany, and
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other developed countries. Nor are modern equipment widely available; in fact, 
minimal availability of modern technology leads a great number of people and 
businesses to use obsolete implements for weaving, spinning, farming, tailoring 
in many ECOWAS member-countries.’’® Available machines are also obsolete 
and cannot be used effectively as would be modern equipment. Even many 
industries tend to rely to a large extent on machines which are considered 
obsolete in economically advanced countries. The use of the few sophisticated 
machines available Is hampered, in some cases, by lack of adequately trained 
personnel most of whom have not been exposed to such technology.’ ” ’
In agriculture, while traditional hoes and cutlasses are used,” ® in 
developed countries such as Canada, Britain, Sweden, and the United States, 
sophisticated machines and techniques such as combined harvesters, ploughs, 
low flying helicopters, insecticides, fertilizers are used for farming. This 
development occurred as result of industrialization which paved the way for 
mechanization processes.” ® In the West Africa subregion, this has not been 
the case especially in the rural sector where the bulk of food are produced 
through manual labour which is both energy-sapping and back-breaking
” ®See Brian W. Walker, Authentic Development, p. 38. Rhys Jenkins (1987), Transnational 
Coroorattons and Uneven Development. Metheun & Co. Ltd., London, p. 90,
p. 41.
” ®Okigbo, Op cit, p. 469.
” ®The World Br k (1987), Mechanization of Agriculture in the Third World: World Bank Study. 
World Bank, Washlr,y,an D C,, p, 11,
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exercise/^® Besides, many machines in use in West Africa were those 
designed for the temperate countries, and the use of these machines in the 
tropical countries lead to frequent breakdown and easy wearing under tropical 
climate. Moreover, these machines are labour-saving devices which do not 
match with the labour-intensive methods in which West Africans were 
accustomed.
e) High Population Growth Rate
Throughout West Africa, the population has long been on the upward 
trend In the last several decades. The population increased from about 33.7 
million in 1913 to 199.9 million in 1991.’ ’̂ This Is an increase of about 600 
percent. The reasons for these Increase can be attributed to Increased medical 
facilities and Improved sanitary conditions which have reduced death rate, and 
raised the average span of life.̂ ^  ̂ Added to these Is the conservative attitude 
of many West Africans to have large families and the traditional African belief 
that procreation of males work towards carrying the family head’s name into the
’ ’̂Samuel Ibelman (1993), "Agriculture and Increasing Population in West Africa," in The African 
Concord. London, May, 1993. p. 39.
^̂ Ît should be noted here that although life expectancy as of 1990 still remains much lower than 
those of Industrialized world, this Is an improvement in the case of West Africa subregion, especially 
when compared to fbur decades ago. See Table 1 on Basic Economic Indicators on Chapter One 
of this Thesis.
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next generation.’ ®̂ The effect of this cultural phenomenon can be devastating 
in the face of decreasing food production. At any rate, to put the current 
population growth rates in perspective, Table 8 is presented below to show the 
rate of growth for each country for the period 1983-1991:
’ ’’^Ibelman, Op  cit. p, 39.
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Benin 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.8 2.9 3.1
Burkina Faso 7.5 7.9 8.3 8.8 9.2 2.6 2.7
Cape Verde 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 2.4 2.5
Gambia 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.9 3.0 2.9
Ghana 11.9 12.8 13.7 14.6 15.5 3.6 3.1
Guinea 4.7 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.9 2.6 3.0
Guinea Bissau 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.7 2.1
Ivory Coast 9.2 9.9 10.7 11.5 12.4 3.9 3.8
Liberia 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.3
Mali 7.5 7.9 8.4 8.9 9.5 3.0 3.1
Mauritania 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.8
Niger 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.0 3.3 3.2
Nigeria 86.3 92.0 98.3 105.1 112.1 3.3 3.3
Senegal 6.0 6.4 6.7 7.1 7.5 2.8 2.8
Sierra Leone 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.3 2.4 2.6
Togo 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.0 3.2
TOTALS 165.1 165.1 176.8 187.6 199.9 2.7 2.8
source: Complied from African Development Bank’s "§elS!ea wnSeoISmil UemSer
Countries. Development Research and Policy Development, Abidjan, p. 21.
What can be noted from Table 8 is that the rate of population growth is
124.
Mid-Year population are figures from United Nations Population Division, the World Bank, 
or national sources (obtained by the African Development Bank). Long-term refugees In a given 
country are considered to be part of that country.
86
faster than the rate at which the economies grow to the extent that efforts by 
ECOWAS countries to increase economic growth are completely eclipsed by the 
consumption pressure from rising population. Even surpluses in some sectors 
that could have been channelled into investment are consumed. The needs of 
the increasing population are constantly in excess of the production. Besides, 
there is high percentage of dependency in West Africa on the external 
environment. For Instance, it has been shown that the average population of 
youths aged between 0 and 14 years is 46.3 percent for the whole of West 
Africa. While Sierra Leone has the lowest youth population rate with a 
percentage of 43.4, Togo has the highest number of youths with 48.1 percent of 
the total population of the country. There is a sharp contrast in this scenario 
when compared to Germany where the youths only form 16.2 percent of the 
country's total population.’ ®̂ Under the West African condition, what this 
implies is that investment will be diverted to the provision of schools and 
colleges, children medical facilities and other social amenities needed by the 
youths rather than on investments that will promote economic growth. In fact, 
this is an area that deserves effective policy, not only by individual countries, but 
also ECOWAS.
f) Foreign Trade Oriented Economie#
Like all other developing nations of the world, foreign trade plays a
125,World Development Report 1992. pp. 268-9, See also O.Lawal, Op, Cit., p. 123.
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s ig n to n t role In the economies of West Africa. More than 90 percent of export 
earnings come from agricultural sector in the colonial era.’ ®̂ Cash crop 
production in which former colonial masters played key roles, as evidenced In 
the following table, were oriented towards the supply of raw materials to the 
industries in the developed countries, each country channelling its produce to its 
former colonial masters and other developed countries with which trade relations 
had been established.Realizing that leaving production of cash crops to 
local farmers alone will not yield the desired results, foreign companies from 
metropolitan countries had to establish and solidify their presence in the 
subregion. Thus while Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia sent 
majority of their produce to Britain, the Francophone countries such sent their 
produce to France. In return for these, they imported manufactured goods, 
fertilizers, and agricultural machines. Table 9 shown in the following page 
provides evidence in support of this assertion.
A.Y. Yansana (1977), "The Economic Community of Weat African States (ECOWAS)," 
in The Review of Black Poiiticai Economv. Black Economic Research Centre, New York, p. 219.
p. 220.
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Table 9; Foreign Investor and thoir Area(s) of Operation 
In West Africa from Colonial Period to lndepen<jansa
Company Place/Year of Sector
Commencement
United Africa Company Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, The Gambla/1861
Various
Royal Niger Company Nigeria, Ghana/1861 Banking
Fanti Consolidated Ltd Ghana/1910 Mining
Anglo-American Corp. Llberla/1917 Various
Société Generale Ghana, Nigeria, ail 
French West Africa/1932
Various
Société Internationale All French W.Africa, 
Nigeria/1932
Various
Anglo Mining Corp. Nigeria/1920 Mining Exploration
Niger Delta Company Nigeria/1861 Various
Union Carbide Ghana, Nigeria/1920 Mining
Lever Brothers Nigeria, Ghana, 
Liberia/1929
Plantations
Firestone Copper Co. Liberia/1920 Mining
Mobil Oil (formerly 
Vacuum Oil)
Ghana, Nigeria/1960 Oil Exploration




Africa; A Historical Perspective’ in D.B. Thomas (1976), importina Technology Into Africa. Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1976, p.26,
Table 9 gives a glaring picture of activities of foreign companies which 
were used by the imperial powers to extract the resources of countries of the 
subregion to metropolitan countries. In fact, no research is needed to be carried 
c'ut to discover the proliferation of foreign investment in the subregion and the 
rest of sub-saharan Africa. While their continued presence and subsequent
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proliferation Is in response for foreign joint ventures, their importance to countries 
of the subregion is unquestionable especially when technology and technical 
know-how which they possess are assets. Yet those sectors of economies in 
which they are engaged have only made modest contribution to the overall 
economies of the subregion, but when compared to agriculture, the sectors 
shown in Table 10 points to the fact that their contributions to economies of 
these states are, by far, greater than agriculture.
As a matter of fact, the plight of West Africa was, and is still, that owing 
to the low elasticity of demand of many of their products, commodity prices 
suffer from fluctuations in the world market. Hence, the expected return often 
do not meet with their estimated revenue for planning development projects 
thereby retarding development efforts. Because export-oriented products are 
accorded high priority, stable food production tend to receive less priority. 
Consequently severe regional famines set in, creating opportunities for Western 
media to portray hundreds of thousands of people as "sinking toward death, 
This is why McAfee was forced to conclude that Western media report 
emergency goods shipments, foreign aid grants, private and governmental loans 
from the developed countries, leading Westerners to assume that by these 
measures, the rich countries are sustaining the battered economies of the Third 
World. According to McAfee, the opposite is closer to the truth. In the 
movement of wealth around the world, NcAfee contended, far more flows out of
McAfee, "Why the Third World Goes Hungry." p. 12.
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impoverished countries of Africa...into the richer economies of Europe, North 
America, and Japan.̂ *® One instance of this dilemma is an estimate by the 
Overseas Development Council, which revealed that every year from 1986, 
U.S.$43 billion in net financial resources are transferred from the South to the 
North, although this estimate is conservative as others have put the South's net 
loss much higher.’®® McAfee, for example, revealed a 1988 UNICEF’s study 
which showed that developing countries had to channel $178 billion to developed 
countries to meet their debt bills repayments which as at that year had climaxed 
to $1.2 trillion.’®’ Of course, this was not the first time such revelation was 
made. Indeed, expressing his personal view in an article, Lai did not hide his 
feelings when he revealed that "billions of dollars were being drained from "crisis 
debtors" to developed nations.’®®
Speaking of trade, however. Table 10 presents the picture of intra-trade 
of ECOWAS member-countries against trade with the industrialized countries. 
A careful look reveals that member-states’ Intra-trade continues to remains low 
despite their avowed commitment to increase it. Instead, trade with industrialized 
countries continues to increase than ever as evidenced in Table 10 which
’®®K, McAfee, Op cit. p. 12.
’®®M. p. 12.
’ ®®Oeepak Lai, "Poor Countries and the Global Economy; Crisis and Adjustment" in C. Fred 
Bergsten, ed. (1986), Global Economic Imbalances. Institute for International Economies, Special 
Reports No. 4. December, pp. 65-76.
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follows:
Table 10: ECOWAS Intra-trado Against Trade with 
Industrialized Countries. 1979-1987 (In percentage terms!
ECOWAS Intra-Trade ECOWAS-Industrialized Countries
Year Exports Imports Exports Imports
1979 3.3 4.0 76.5 70.2
1980 2.7 3.8 70.0 65.8
1981 5.0 4.1 63.2 63.7
1982 5.6 5.1 67.6 61.6
1983 5.7 6.1 65.4 64.2
1984 4.8 7.3 64.0 62.7
1985 4.1 5.8 64.0 63.1
1986 5.1 6.1 66.5 67.9
1987 5.4 5.3 66.5 65.0
Averages 4.6 5.3 67.1 64.9
source; Compiled rom countrv Reports Tn New African yearisooK 1991-92. wSnS'BevSloDmSm
Report 1992. World Bank, Washington D C., pp. 218-223. African Development Bank's Selected 
Statistics on Regional Member Countries. Development Research and Policy Development, Abidjan,
p. 21.
A close look on Table 10 for the years 1979-87 is indicative of this ebbing 
intra-trade in the subregion, while external trade with the industrialized world 
remains high. On average, it can clearly be seen that intra-trade accounted for 
only 4.6 percent of exports against 5.3 percent of imports within the subregion 
for the nine-year period, 1979-87. A comparison of external trade, on the other 
hand, weighs more heavily in favour of the developed countries, and this is 
indicative that a far high proportion of ECOWAS member-countries trade in both 
exports and imports is with the industrialized world and less intra-subregional
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trade. In the process, imported inflation is stimulated with high cost of imports.
The average ECOWAS exports for the period indicated above is 67.1 
percent, against average imports of 64.9 percent. There is no doubt the former 
could be attributable to cash crops and mineral exports, while the latter could be 
attributed to merchandise imports, including machinery and equipment. From a 
theoretical stand point, it is evidently clear that there is no basis for economic 
integration. It is therefore an Illusion to perceive ECOWAS as such,
g) Structural Adjustment Programs
in the introductory Chapter, it was clearly stated that both subregional 
integration and SAPs were the two major policies adopted at the Lagos Plan of 
Action by African countries - West African countries inclusive - to rectify their 
deteriorating economies. SAP, as a second strategy for West African survival, 
is a response to the sharp deterioration of economic performance in the 1980s. 
According \o African Development Bank (ADB), the depth and severity of African 
crisis, caused by a combination of external and internal factors, forced African 
leaders to seek new development initiatives, the most significant being the 
reform and adjustment of their economies.Anchored on a liberal economic 
philosophy, most of the SAPs adopted by ECOWAS member-countries were 
aimed at eliminating economic distortions; adapting the economies to market 
forces; improving the efficiency of resource allocation and utilization; and
^^^African Development Bank (1993), African Development Report 1993: Africa in the World 
Economv. Economic integration and Structural Adiustment in Africa. Abidjan, p. 152.
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restoring the economies to the path of rapid and self-sustaining growth and 
development/^^ Thus while economic integration could be seen as a means 
of fostering economic growth and development by making ECOWAS states 
inward-looking, at least on a collective basis, SAPs adopted by the subregion, 
like other countries of the Third World, have mainly been outward-oriented.
SAP policies have two components. While the first is usually directed to 
stabilization of the economy through measures to reduce or remove external and 
internal imbalances - referred to as "managed reduction in expenditure" to bring 
about an orderly adjustment of domestic demand to the reduced level of external 
resources available to a country, the second component is directed to measures 
to achieve structural changes that will contribute to economic recovery and long­
term growth.^^^ This requires changes in relative prices; and institutional 
reforms designed to make the economy more efficient, more flexible and better 
able to use resources in a way that generate long term growth. These changes 
are expected to improve resource allocation and increase the resilience of the 
economies to future shocks.
While there have been few cases of fairly successful adjustment 
programs, the general picture has been very uneven. A review of the 
experience so far points to a few important conclusions from the analysis of the
^^^See World Bank (1983), See especially Chapter 4, World Bank, Washington D C,; Ismail 
Serageldln (1988), Bevond Crisis Management: The World Bank's Comprehensive Program for 
Promoting Sustained Growth with Equity In Africa. World Bank, Washington D C.
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African Development Report.
The first is that in spite of the aim of structural adjustment policies to 
achieve adjustment with growth, experience to date suggests that only a handful 
of countries have been able to record appreciable growth rates, even after a 
decade of adjustment process.’®® Indeed, adjustment policies in many 
countries have depressed incomes of a wide rate of income groups. Secondly, 
adjustment programs seem to have accorded greater priority to short term 
objectives of maintaining sound balance of payments improvement, and less 
priority to long-term growth. Thirdly, adjustment policies have fallen short of 
expectations in stimulating growth, because several countries implementing 
SAPs have been subjected to heavy burden of external debt, forcing them to 
implement austerity measures that leave little room for growth. Fourthly, many 
countries have faced the problem of limited institutional capacity to manage 
reforms. Apart from the problem of managing macroeconomic objectives, many 
ECOWAS countries have been confronted with major issues of sectoral reforms 
in areas such as education and other social sectors, in transport, infrastructure, 
environment, and urban development, not to talk of the development of rural 
areas which would have halted emigration into urban towns. Fifthly, SAPs have 
continued to rely predominantly on concessional lending by international financial 
institutions, while the expected increase in foreign investment to support
’ See Paul Mosley and John Weeks (1993), "Has Recovery Begun? 'Africa's Adjustment In the 
ibdOs' Revisited," in Worid Development. Vol. 21. No. 10, pp. 1583. See also African Development 
Report, p. 162,
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adjustment growth has remained unrealized.
Nevertheless, the inter-relationship between structural adjustment 
programs and economic integration cannot be subjected to any serious debate. 
Both have an inseparable goal of promoting economic growth and development. 
Moreover, the two involve actions on the same macroeconomic and sectoral 
variables. Even without any conscious attempt to link SAP and economic 
integration programs, policy in one particular area necessarily has implications 
for actions in the other area. Therefore, in examining the inter-relationship 
between the two, the crucial issue is how to ensure that SAP policies and 
integration objectives are mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting.^^®
4.9 Monetary Integration
Monetary integration is another vital facet of an economic union. In most 
cases the existing colonial currencies were used in post-independence West 
African subregion and they have continue to use them as the official currencies 
issued by each country’s central bank. Even though ECOWAS committed itself 
to introducing monetary integration, this has not worked well. Rather, what 
ECOWAS did was the establishment of a West African Clearing House (WACH), 
and this has not been effective as it should. According to Cobham and Robson,
®̂\frican  Development Report, p. 153
^®®African Development Bank, African Development Repoi. p. 156. For a comprehensive 
analysis, see Thomas Callaghy (1990), Tost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment In Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria," In Joan M. Nelson, ed. Economic Crisis and Policy 
Choice: The Politics of Economic Adiustment In the Third World. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton.
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WACH is bedeviled with serious constraints.
One of the prerequisites for external loans, particularly from the IMF and 
other international lending agencies, is the devaluation of national currency. 
Devaluation of currencies lead to unfavourable situations in most cases in the 
short-term. The adverse effects of such situations occasioned by a devaluation 
have been deeply felt by several debt-ridden countries. Consequently both 
Ghana and Nigeria were forced to adopt the IMF favoured two-tier system of 
foreign exchange market, in which anyone may buy foreign currency legally and 
anonymously from exchange bureaus. The bureaus set the rate as they please, 
according to market forces. So far this has led to improved economic 
performance in the case of Ghana where the bureaus are not controlled by the 
government, whereas the Nigerian case is bedeviled by serious constraints as 
the Nigerian central bank directs the commercial banks in the operation of the 
bureaus."°
4.10 Summary
In concluding this Chapter, it is important for one to note that trade in 
West Africa has evolved over the past centuries. While at the beginning of 
nation-states, trade in the subregion flourished with the absence of frontiers, the 
penetration of Europeans into the West coast of Africa tended to halt this 
process by creating artificial boundaries, indirectly forcing indigenous West
David Cobham and Peter Robson (1994), "Monetary Integration In Africa; A Deliberately 
European Perspective," in World Development. Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 285-299.
^̂ ®See New African, p 136 and 258.
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Africans to produce cash crops for their homeland in Europe. At independence, 
most West Africans thought they would be free from subordination to their 
imperial masters. The fact that trading process led to the entrenchment of West 
Africa into the global market is an example of this absorption which has 
remained up to the present time. To the extent that fluctuations in the World 
market prices for commodities must, of necessity, affect West African 
governments in relation to their exports and imports, thus weakening their 
capacity to generate income from exports revenues when prices are low. The 
effects of this is low economic growth and low level of development process. 
The formation of ECOWAS and subsequent introduction of structural adjustment 
were both a response to remedying the already battered economies. Both 
strategies have yet to yield any positive result, and no one expects them to do 
so at least, in the immediate future. While there are potential for economic 
improvement using these two strategies, this improvement will likely come about 
in the long-term. They both call for serious commitments on the part of 
governments of the subregion - not just rhetoric - to translate these two 
strategies into concrete terms for the benefit of their peoples.
With reference to economic integration, one will question the validity of 
this economic enterprise since, conventionally, economic integration posits 
greater trade among member-countries. The minimal intra-trade among 
ECOWAS member-countries against greater trade with the industrial world 
renders the subregion's endeavour invalid from a theoretical viewpoint.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Military and Authoritarian Regimes. Ethnicity. Political 
inatabilitv. and the Need for Political Integration
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter will concentrate on the pervasive Instability arising from coup 
d'etats by the military, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes, and hegemonic 
relations resulting from ethnicity in most ECOWAS member-states. An attempt 
will also be made to demonstrate that since the advent of military regimes in 
most ECOWAS states, factionalism within both the military and political elite, 
have played a destabilizing role in these countries - particularly where there is 
a functioning democracy. Besides, hegemonic relations among the ruling elites 
have tended to punctuate the realization of development goals in most ECOWAS 
states. To the extent that democracy which provides guiding principles on both 
the actions of governments and the governed have, in recent years, been 
relegated to the background of state policies if not totally neglected. Even where 
democracy is being practised, the governments tend to be headed by autocrats. 
In others they are simply self-installed authoritarian military men. This is not to 
say that in functioning democracies, authoritarianism is non-existent. In fact, no 
where in the world has the military intervened frequently in democratic processes 
as in West African countries, as will be seen shortly. Even the rudimentary' 
democracies presently being practised by a handful of ECOWAS member-states
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have one thing in common; they are either autocratic or authoritarian or 
both/^^ Consequently, the rules of governing - even where they are legally 
documented in the form of Constitutions - the military usually set aside or 
suspend such constitutions indefinitely once they succeed in gaining power for 
the mere reason of having possession of military arsenal with which they 
forcefully control and repress their subjects. This is, perhaps, what motivated 
Weiner to conclude that those that have achieved effective control over their 
subjects did so largely by committing resources to the acquisition of military 
arsenal and the development of the police as an institution of silencing 
opposition thereby ensuring their continuous control of state apparatus. A 
broad range of decrees are frequently instituted as mechanisms for safeguarding 
the interest of the military regimes. They also establish other institutions similar 
to America's Central Intelligent Agency to perpetuate repression over those who 
oppose their policles.^"^ The major target of such institutions are usually the 
media which are sometimes critical over government actions and individuals who
’“’ ’See for example, Robeit H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg (1982) Personal Rule in Black 
Africa: Prince. Autocrat. Prophet. Tyrant. University of California Press, Berkeley; See also Ladipo 
Adamolekun and J. Osuntokun (1992), Government and Politics in West Africa. Heinemann, Ibadan, 
p. 130.
‘̂’^Myron Weiner, "Political Change: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East," in Myron Weiner and 
Samuel P. Huntington, eds. (1987), Understanding Political Development. Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston and Toronto, p. 35.
^^^Most notorious was the Nigerian Security Organization (NSC) whose activities was similar 
to America's CIA or the former Soviet Union's K G B., although NSC operated internally. This 
organization has since been replaced by yet another potent and highly feared State Security 
Services (simply widely referred to by its acronym "SSS.") See African Guardian. Lagos, Nigeria, 
May, 1993, p. 9.
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openly criticize governments,’'*̂  Thus, where such control Is exerted on the 
majority of the people, can development succeed If the larger population is not 
allowed to freely express their opinion or are excluded in policy formulations? 
The question can only attract a NO' answer. For, no modern state has the 
mandate to do whatever It wishes without Its subjects' approval through 
democratic process, especially at the present time when dictatorship and 
authoritarianism are being replaced by democracy. This, of course, does not 
mean that some democratic states in the subregion are or can be exonerated 
from dictatorship or authoritarianism.
Ethnicity is another area of concern. In fact, ethnic diversity becomes 
more vivid when the number of distinct ethnic groups within the West African 
subregion Is considered, in some Instances, the number of groups within a state 
runs into hundreds. An example is Nigeria whose ethnic groups is over 250 
distinct groups. When subgroups are taken Into consideration, the number of 
Nigeria's ethnic groups reaches alarming high of 400, each speaking a distinctly 
different language or dlalect.’^̂  The same Is true of other West African states.
"Having lived In both Nigeria and Ghana respectively and have indeed experienced actions 
of these governments against the media, I can rightly claim this to be a fact of life. In fact, many 
invaluable lives have been lost and many thrown into prisons simply because editors, newspapers 
and periodical reporters or contributors were critical of governments' actions, especially when these 
media are privately owned. Several instances have occuired when particular magazines, 
newspapers and journals were banned for publishing the truth or that they were not pro­
governments. See for example, Newswatch. Lagos, September, 1986, p. 37.
*"®See the Nigerian case In Africa Watch. Vol. 6, No. 11, June 1993; Ghana; Africa Watch. Vol. 
IV, No. 1, January 31, 1992. Liberia; Africa Watch. Vol. 5, No. 6, June 1993, See also Ladipo 
Adamolekun and Jide Osuntokun (1992), Government and Politics in West Africa. Heinemann, 
Ibadan. See Chapter 6, "Nigeria; Ethnic Diversity and Politics, pp. 120-123. See also Walker 
Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" In World Politics. No. 3, April, 1972, pp.319-356.
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although the number of ethnic groups Is by far lower than that of Nigeria. 
From this focal point, it is clear that the problem of ethnic diversity is far too 
ubiquitous to be ignored by any analysis of nations of West Africa. It was this 
ethnic diversity that perhaps led Weiner to point out that the post-colonial states 
were arbitrarily created by the imperial powers without regard to differences in 
ethnic groups and boundaries and other factors that acted to differentiate them 
from one another,’'’  ̂ Consequently, hegemonic rather than accommodative 
ethnic politics characterize the newly independent states of West Africa. To the 
extent that "in country after country, a single ethnic group has taken control over 
the state and used its powers to exercise control over others."^"^ In fact, this 
hegemonic relations has become problematic in most countries of West Africa 
due to the fact that among multi-ethnic states, the process continues to be one 
of "nation-destroying" rather than "nation-building," as Walker Connor put it.̂ ®̂ 
In fact, ethnic hegemony has been exercised in a variety of ways, from the 
repression of ethnic and religious minorities to the more benign use of state 
power to give preferences in education and employment to the dominant group
^^®Ademolekun and Osuntokun, Co Cit. p. 322.
Myron Weiner, "Political Change; Asia, Afdca, and the Middle East," in Myron Weiner 
and Samuel P. Huntington (1987), Understanding Political Davelooment. Little, Brown and Company, 
Toronto, pp. 33-64.
p. 35.
^^®Walker Connor, Oo Cit. pp. 321-321.
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or groups.’®® As will be seen later in this Chapter, hegemony, ethnicity as well 
as the failure of the military and/or authoritarian regimes to relinquish power in 
order to give way to democratic process almost throughout West Africa, have led 
to several counter military coup d’etats. The questions which readily come to 
mind are (1) Why are military rule so pervasive in the West African subregion? 
(2) Why are the military leaders so tenacious to power once they Illegally 
succeed in overthrowing their respective governments? And (3) why do they not 
keep to their promise of relinquishing power to elected civilian administrations? 
To answer these questions, it is important to look at military coup d’etats in 
Africa and the role of the military regimes which tend to perpetuate hegemony 
as well as ethnic tensions and the consequent political instabilities throughout 
the subregion from post-independence. By so doing, we shall gain some insight 
into the behavioural attitude of the various governments in West Africa.
This hegemonic reiations has been practised since countries of the West African subregion 
gained independence in the early 1960s. To the extent that minority groups were forced to put 
pressure on ruling elites to create their own separate provinces or states. To avoid generalization, 
Nigeria is the most significant example where domination of the minorities by the dominant groups 
has resulted to demands for, and the creation of, states. Thus Nigeria which, at independence, had 
only three regions composed of three dominant groups: the Hausas, ibos, and the Yorubas, now has 
30 states structure, each with Its own Governor, (legislative assemblies during civilian administration 
such as those that were put in place in the Second Republic), and local governments. While this 
process has the advantage of lessening hegemony, it Is unlikely to remove the problem in a country 
where there are over 250 distinct ethnic groups. Including the three major ones mentioned above, 
For the number of ethnic groups See New Africa Yearbook 1691-92. p. 243. For an analysis of this 
hegemonic and autocratic relations, see Clifford Geertz, "The Judging of Nations: Some Comments 
on the Assessment of Regimes in the New States," European Journal of Socioloov. Vol. 16, No. 2, 
1977, pp. 245*61. See also Walker, Oo cit.. p. 333.
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5.2 MHitarv Couds and Internal Political Inrtability In ECOWAS State»
The intention here is not to make a detailed analysis of military coup 
d’etats, but to show how military coups have emerged as a mechanism for 
changing governments from post-independence Africa to the present time 
thereby precluding democratic process in much of the subregion. It is imperative 
for the reader to understand what is meant by a military coup or coup d'etat. 
These two phrases refer to the same thing with regards to a coup. By a military 
coup, it is meant an irregular seizure of the state's central executive by the 
regular armed forces or by the Internal security forces through the use (or threat 
of the use) of f o r c e . T h i s  definition includes plots, attempted coups, and 
successful seizures of political and administrative powers, thus exclude civilian 
irregular transfers as cabinet reshuffling and palace coups.
But what are the factors leading to coup d’etats? Two of the most 
important factors have already been mentioned; hegemonic relations arising from 
deep-rooted ethnicity, military and political factionalism among the elites. Others 
include political crisis rooted in the tension between an increasingly disenchanted 
citizens over the role of the state and weak political institutions. There is also 
lack of opportunities for citizens’ participation in the political p ro c e s s .O th e r  
important elements that cannot be ignored include political centrality of the
Augustine. J. Kposowa and J. Craig Jenkins (1993), "The Structural Sources of Military 
Coups in Postcoloniai Africa, 1967-1984," American Journal of Socioloov. Vol. 99, No. 1, July 1993, 
p. 127.
’®^Myron Weiner, Qo cit. p. 44.
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military as rooted in its resources and organizational cohesion, plurality, 
competition and the prevalence of ethnic antagonism. In addition to these 
factors is a world system of dependency with regard to political turmoil created 
by export specialization and foreign capital penetration,
To sketch a brief history of military regimes in post-colonial Africa with 
some emphasis on West Africa will be in order, especially since miiitary coup 
has, in fact, become the institutionalized method for changing governments until 
very recently when most military states have, indeed, pledged to relinquish 
power to democraticaily elected civilian administrations.^^'* Some of these 
states include Mali, Mauritania, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Ghana, and so forth. I will 
return to this later.
Since the Third Worid countries gained independence, military 
interventions have become pervasive. According to Kposowa and Jenkins, for 
example, between independence period and 1985, 45 African countries exper­
ienced 60 successful military seizures of power, 71 coup attempts, and 126 
reported plots. By the mid-1980s, 25 of African states were directly controlled by
Kposowa and Jenkins, Go Cit. pp. 129-132. What I mean by capitai penetration is not only 
direct foreign investments encouraged by individual countries and the Worid Bank/IMF which 
stressed the importance of market-oriented economies - an essential conditions for structural 
adjustment, but also separate loans made available to these countries by individual developed 
countries and international financial institutions. See for example, Uma Lele and Kofi Adu-Nyako 
"Integrated Strategy Approach for Poverty Alleviation; A Paramount Priority for Africa," in African 
Development Review. Vol.3, No t, June 1991, p. 15.
***^There is no doubt these pledges were partly an outcome of the collapse of communism In 
Eastern Europe and partly due to pressure from developed countries which insist that 
democratization must be a condition for foreign assistance. Subsequently since 1986 most military 
regimes in the subregion have pledged to hand over power to democratically elected governments.
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the military and over 90 percent had experienced at least one coup d'etat.’®® 
It is important to note the period covered, that is, 1960-1985. Since then several 
more plots, attempted, and successful coups have occurred. Nigeria, a country 
where hegemony by the Hausa-Fulani and their frequent tendency to plot and 
most often succeed in seizing power from a ruling regime, is the best example. 
There is therefore the belief that the statistics presented in Table 11 with regard 
to Incidence of coups would have been much higher If plots were included. On 
the other hand, when the incidence of coups is compared in giobai terms, Africa 
ranks the highest. Bertsch, Clark, and Wood, for example, found In their study 
that a coup or attempted coup occurred once every 4 months In Latin America 
(between 1945 and 1972), once every 7 months in Asia (1947-1972), once every 
3 months in the Middle East (1949-72), and once every 55 days In Africa (1960- 
1972).’®® In fact, in West Africa, the incidence of coups is more pronounced 
than In other subregions of Africa. Table 11 merely summarizes successful and 
attempted coup d'etats In ECOWAS states for the period 1963 through to 1993, 
excluding plots which occur more frequently.
The information presented in Table 11 is self-evident. In country after 
country coup d’etats have become the order of the day as reflected In the above 
table. It reveals each ECOWAS mernber-state's colonial master, year of indepen
’®®Kposowa and Jenkins, Op Cit, p. 126. See also All Mazrul and Michael Tidy (1684),
Nationalism and New States In Africa. London, Heinemann.
’®®G.K. Bertsch, P. Robert Clark, and U.M. Wood (1978), Comparing Political Systems: P ^ e r  
and Policy in Three Worlds. Wiley, New York. p. 431,
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dence, years of successful and attempted coup d'etats, and the total number of 
these events. Out of 63, there were 41 successful, and 22 attempted coups.






Years of Successful/ 
Attempted Coup d'etat
Total
Benin France 1960 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, 
1972, 1977* 1980
7
Burkina Faso France 1960 1980, 1974*, 1980, 1982, 
1983, 1987
6
Cape Verde Portugal 1975 1980 1
Gambia Britain 1965 1981*, July 1994+ 2
Ghana Britain 1957 1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 
1982
5
Guinea France 1958 1980, 1984, 1984 3
Guinea Bissau Portugal 1974 1980, 1984 2
Ivory Coast France 1960 1963*, 1973*, 1980* 3
Liberia Referen­
dum (U.S)
1847 1980, 1983*, 1984* 
1985*
4
Mali France 1960 1980, 1980*, 1991 3
Mauritania France 1960 1978, 1979, 1984 3
Niger France 1960 1965*, 1974, 1976, 1983*,1992 5
Nigeria Britain 1960 1966,1966,1975, 1976, 1983 
1983*,1985, 1986*, 1990*, 
1991*, 1993*, April 1994
12
Senegal France 1960 Various political crises 0
Sierra Leone Britain 1961 1967*, 1967*, 1983 3
Togo France 1960 1963, 1965,1967, 1986* 4
— - Total Number of coups 64
Mall, see Colleen Lowe Morna (1992), "Africans Chart a Course for Political Change," in Third Worid 
1992/93. The Oushkin Publishing Group Inc., Guilford, Conn. p. 60-1. West Africa. London various 
issues from 1992-July 1994.*Asterisked years connotes attempted and unsuccessful coup d'etats. 
+ln the Case of the Gambia, see The Mail-Star. Halifax, 26 July, 1994, p. A.8.
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Benin (then Dahomey) and Togo both witnessed their first coup d'etats in 1963 - 
barely three years after gaining political freedom from France respectively. 
Subsequent successful military coups occurred in both Ghana and Nigeria in 
January 1966, and the latest one to occur as this Thesis progresses is that of 
The Gambia which took place during the third week of July 1994.̂ ®̂
From Table 11, it is noticeable that of all ECOWAS countries, Nigeria 
experienced 12 successful and attempted coup d'etats, followed by Benin and 
Burkina Faso both of which had 7 and 6 respectively. Ghana and Niger each 
recorded 5 successful and attempted coups, while Liberia and Togo had four 
each. Others recorded either one or more of these events. The only country 
which received the obedience of the military was Senegal which had no history 
of coup d’etat. This does not, however, exonerate the country of internal political 
problems. Indeed, political crises have occurred at various times. But the 
country was able to hold on to power in spite of these crises.̂ ®®
Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, and popularly regarded as the 
most powerful in Black Africa, has experienced several political, ethnic and even 
religious conflicts than any ECOWAS states. The country recorded, perhaps, the 
bloodiest of all military coups at the time, and the outcome of this was a 30- 
month long war between Nigeria and the then Biafra (Eastern Nigeria) which
®̂̂ The Mall-Star. Halifax, 26 July. 1994. p. A.8,
®̂®See Catherine Boone (1992), Merchant Caoital and the Roota of State Power in Senegal. 
1930-1985. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. See also New African, pp. 280-9.
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attempted to secede from Nigeria in 1967.’®® In fact, in Nigeria coup d’etats 
has iiterally become a culture within the military. The above table points to this 
conclusion, considering the fact that the country is still governed by the military 
despite the regime’s expressed commitment to relinquish power to an elected 
government in 1992.’®° According to Adamelokun and Osuntokun, the crises 
that eventually led to bloody civil war from 1967 through to 1970 arose from 
political disagreement by parties that were ethnically dissimilar but all similar in 
their commitment to a Western-oriented capitalist economic system.’®’ In fact, 
Nigerian politics between 1960 and 1966 were intricate and complex. Firstly, 
competition for political office was fierce and ruthless since the control of the 
state apparatus was the only means of acquiring economic power, particularly 
with regards to jobs and personal wealth for one’s suppôtwors. Secondly, 
politicians were unwilling to construct any ideology based on a critique of social 
conditions or to formulate the corresponding set of policy prescriptions; instead 
they furthered their claims by identifying them with those of their tribes.
’®°See African Yearbook 1991-92. pp. 131 and 246.
’®°The first announcement by Nigeria's military regime to hand over power to a democraticaily 
elected government by 1 0ctober 1990, was made by the country's President, Major General Ibrahim 
Babanglda on 13 January, 1986. The date was further pushed to June 1992, and later to June 1993, 
culminating In a nation-wide threats by traditional rulers and statesmen about the consequence of 
the military staying in power beyond June 1993. It was these threats that forced the then head of 
state, Babangida to bow to the wishes of the people by causing the October 1993 elections to hold. 
Even then, the election became a non-event as it was cancelled by the ruling government simply 
because a southerner won by a nation-wide majority which cut across ethnic and religious 
boundaries. See "Nigeria; Democracy Derailed," in a special issue of Africa Watch. Vol. 5, No. 11. 
August 27, 1993. See also New African Yearbook 1991-92. pp. 263-64.
’° ’Adamolekun and Osuntokun, Oo Cit. p. 16-19.
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Consequently, the rules of the parliamentary democracy were rapidly jettisoned, 
and the political system proved unable to contain the conflicts.
A crucial elections in Nigeria’s Western region in 1964 led to total 
breakdown of law and order leading to violence as the elections were blatantly 
rigged. Protesting groups went on the rampage which culminated in the first 
coup of January 15, 1966, which brought General Ironsi to power . I rons I ,  
an Ibo tribe himself was toppled and assassinated along with the Western State 
military Governor by northern officers In another coup d’etat in May 1967. Up 
to the time of this work, the country had been ruled by the army except for a 
brief period of four years - from October 1979 through to December 31, 1985, 
when Alhaji Shehu Shagari legitimately ruled the country as the President. 
Since the first coup of January 1966, subsequent successful coups were to see 
military regimes headed by General Yakubu Gowon^ ’̂* who ruled from 1970- 
75; General M. Muhammad, General 0. Obasanjo, 1975-79; General M. Buharl, 
December 1983-August 1985, General Ibrahim Babanglda, August 1985-March 
1994; and Major-General Abacha who seized power from an Interim government 
Installed by Babanglda in April 1994 and continues to rule Nigeria up to the
’ “ M .  p. 18.
Is Important for the reader to note that Ironsi himself did not participate in the January coup. 
Being the head of the army and the most senior officer, he was considered the only leader capable 
of leading the country. See New African, p. 247.
Yakubu Gowon then, the Army Chlef-of-Staff, a Christian officer from a minority group In the 
North and a non-partlclpant In the coup of May 1967, was asked to head the government, which he 
did until the end of the Nigeiia-Blaffa war. See New African, p. 247. See also Adamelokun and 
Osuntokun, Government and Politics, p. 278.
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present In fact, ethnic sentiments have been noted to be the chief
motivation for the various coups In Nigeria. These were also the central reasons 
for the extermination of over 30,000 easterners (majority of these being the Ibos, 
the Ibibio and Efik tribes) In northern Nigeria - one of the major factors which 
forced the then Eastern Nigeria to secede and proclaim the region the Republic 
of Biafra by Lt.-Colonel O. Ojukwu - a situation which immediately attracted the 
Nigerian federal government to institute a "police action," and which eventually 
culminated in a full-scale civil war.̂ ®® Coupled with ethnicity had been religious 
riots mainly concentrated in northern towns. A Muslim religious group known as 
the Maltatsine sect had, in 1980, been involved in riots which claimed not only 
the death of over 1,000 people, but also the burning of several Christian 
Churches. In February 1984, another Maltatsine riots also occurred in Yola 
spreading to other towns. This too claimed over 1,000 lives of people believed 
to be Christians. ®̂̂ These occurrences, motivated by ethnic underpinning, 
have, in the last eight years, claimed over 5,000 lives, displaced over 80,000 Tiv
®̂®ibid. pp. 247-263. See also West Africa. 25 April-1 May, 1994. For a comprehensive analysis 
of the Nigerian situation see B.O. Nwabueze (1993), Miiltarv Ruie and Social Justice In Nigeria. 
Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan.
^®®Chimere ibedum (1976), War and Unity In Nigeria. Paxton Press, Lagos, Nigeria, pp. 9-27.
'®^Whiie northern Nigeria are widely regarded to be predominantly Islamic region in Nigeria, it 
should be noted that the reverse is the case. There are millions of northerners who are Christians. 
Coupled with these are southerners who have worked with their northern Christian counterparts to 
establish Churches in northern cities and towns. The fact that the number of Muslims and Mosques 
far outweigh those of Christians, these churches are seen to be a threat to Islam. This Is one reason 
why conflicts continue to exist between the two religious faiths. See Africa Watch N/oi.5. No. 9, June 
1993, p. 10
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and Jukun tribes people in Taraba, Kaduna, Kano, Niger and Benue States.
Most significant, on the part of the Nigerian government, is its dictatorial 
nature. The promulgation of a decree that barred any court from inquiring into 
abuses of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights is an example of the military 
government’s hard stance against citizens of the country who voice their opposi­
tion on government actions. Another manifestation of the Nigerian government’s 
dictatorial tendency is the arrest and threats of human rights activists, the 
closure of two publications, arrest and detention of journalists, the seisure of the 
national bar association and threats to striking academics. Having instituted 
such a decree, the Nigerian government immediately intensified its action on the 
detention of opposition groups, culminating in the charging of several leading 
human rights activists with conspiracy and treason on June 15, 1992.’ °̂ 
According to Africa Watch,
So fearful was the government of the popular reaction to the charges In 
Nigeria's cities that the accused were produced in a magistrates court in 
the village of Gwagwalada, 500 miles from Lagos and 50 miles from the 
new federal capital, Abuja. These well known detainees are but a small 
part of a wider campaign of arrest and detention targeting suspects
p. 11-12.
^̂ Âfrlca Watch (19S3) "Nigeria: Threats to a New Democracy, Human Rights Concerns at 
Election Time," Vol. 5, No. 9. p. 1.
^^°Among those charged were internationally known people such as Dr. B. Ransome-Kuti of the 
World Health Organization, Chief Gani Fawehlnmi, a famous human rights lawyer. See Africa Watch. 
"Nigeria: Silencing the Vocal Opposition, Crackdown on Democracy Advocates," Vol. 4, No 7, June 
25,1992. p. 1; See Bjorn Beckman (1992), "Empowerment or Repression? The World Bank and the 
Politics of African Adjustment," in Peter Gibbon, Y. Bangura and Arve Otstad, eds. Authoritarianism. 
Democracy and Adjustment. Nordiska Africa-lnstitutet, Uddevalla, Sweden, pp. 83-105.
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opponents/^^
Africa Watch pointed out further that,
These latest measures taken by the military government of General 
Ibrahim Babangida are the most graphic Illustration to date of the 
government’s manipulation of the transition to civilian rule initiated in 
1987...[which] has the avowed aim of handing over power to a 
democratically elected civilian government in January 1993.̂ ^^
Indeed, periodicals are often replete with news of the Nigerian military 
regime’s repressive stance. According to Africa Watch, since the transition 
program was officially announced in 1987, Nigerians have been sceptical about 
how democratic a militarily dictated democracy could be. The history of Nigeria’s 
tightly controlled transition program have proven the validity of such concerns, 
particularly since popular participation, freedom of association and respect for 
the rule of law were all undermined by Babangida, the former head of state. In 
1989, for example, after exhorting Nigerians to form new political parties, the 
government banned them all and in their place created two of its own parties - 
the National Republic Convention (NRG) and the Social Democratic Party (SOP) 
to contest elections. Babangida's regime followed the same practice with regard 
to individual candidates. In 1987, it banned all former politicians from participat­
ing in elections. The ban was revoked in 1991, but government control of candi­
dates was strengthened by a 1991 decree giving the National Electoral Commis­
sion (NEC) the authority to disqualify any candidate deemed by the NEC to be
Africa Watch. "Nigeria: Silencing the Vocal Opposition”, pp. 1«3. 
p. 4,
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u n f i t / I n  spite of this however, the election did take place as scheduled but 
was frought with problems. Indeed, Nigerians should have been celebrating the 
end of military dictatorship. Instead, they were faced with a new and more 
dangerous phase of military rule as Nigerian ruler, General Babangida and his 
cronies, in an attempt to disguise the perpetuation of their regime, seek to 
implement a so-called interim national government. Two months later. General 
Babangida annulled the presidential election and for the fourth time, postponed 
the military’s exit from politics. His last minute maneuverings did not only 
betrayed citizens, who in the June 12 elections had overcome ethnic and 
regional rivalries in an effort to rid themselves of military rule, but, tragically, 
have brought such rivalries back to the political foreground. The recently 
reported participation of government forces in ethnically based attacks in the 
southern delta region demonstrates the military's willingness to foment ethnic 
conflict for its own gain. The danger of such practices is all too evident from 
events elsewhere in Africa and the wodd/^
That General Babangida and his cronies had no intention of allowing a 
significant voice in government was proven by the brutal reaction of military and 
security forces to the outcry which followed the election's annulment. Over a 
hundred demonstrators were killed in a pro-democracy demonstration in July
^^^"Unfir here refers strictly to those who had held political offices both in the First and Second 
Republics: See Nwabueze (1993), Military Rule and Social Justice, p. 161. See Africa Watch, 
"Silencing the Vocal Opposition." pp. 2-3.
^^^See for example a detailed analysis of the Nigerian situation in Africa Watch, "Nigeria: 
Democracy Derailed," Vol. 5, No. 11, August 27,1993.
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1993, while hundreds of human rights and pro-democracy activists, labour 
leaders, journalists, students and workers were arrested In July and August of 
the same year. Many, according to Africa Watch, are still detained in abysmal 
conditions, including pro-democracy leaders who have been under detention for 
about nine months without access to their families, defense counsel or doctors, 
despite court order granting their release on bail. Six media houses were 
proscribed, while a number of journalists were detained and others were 
declared wanted by security agents. New restrictive press regulations were 
decreed. This, in fact, led to the formation of an organization called Universal 
Defenders of Democracy - whose basic role Is to challenge the military decrees 
which they see as one strategy to silence opposition. Reacting to the June 
12, 1993 election, Nigerian traditional rulers insisted that the annulled 
presidential election must not be cast away In the interest of national unity and 
especially since it represented a new dawn in Nigeria’s political h i s t o r y . A s  
of July 1994, the country appears to be heading toward total collapse following 
strike action initiated early in the month by the Nigerian petroleum oil workers 
who were later joined by their top officials. This has halted petroleum oil 
production on which the country depends for about 90 percent of Its exports 
earnings. This action has, as can be expected, caused nation-wide paucity of 
oil and gas. Industrial production has been stalled for lack of fuel necessary to
p, 10.
^̂ Ŵest Africa. 7-13 March, 1694. p. 402.
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generate their plants. As support to the oil workers, the Nigerian Labour 
Congress recently ordered workers across the country to join the striking oil 
personnel, which they did. The strike has already spread to civil servants both 
at federal and states levels. The reasons behind these are two-fold; the first is 
the demand for the release from jail of M.K.O. Abiola, who won the 1993 presid­
ential election, but who was recently charged and then jailed for treason. The 
second is the paucity of basic necessities such as gas and petroleum oil needed 
for local consumption, virtual collapse of transportation services, continued 
domestic shortages of power and water across the country. As IVesf Africa 
reported, the country is on the verge of total break down.̂ ^^
For several years, ivory Coast's autocratic regime headed by President 
Felix Houphouet Boigny, faced opposition from political parties and several 
attempted coup d'etats took place, beginning from 1963. As Adamolekun and 
Osuntokun revealed, in response to the first coup, the government created a 
strong popular militia group as a countervailing force to the miiitary. This did not, 
however, prevent the military from trying again in 1973 and 1980. In spite of 
opposition from political parties and the army, Boigny was able to devise various 
means to repress the three opposition parties: the Parti Démocratique da Cote 
D’Ivoire (PDCi), Front Populaire Ivorienne (FPi), and the Ivorian Workers Party 
(IWP) and place the army where they belonged, and indeed, held to power from
^̂ Ŵest Africa. July, 1994.
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independence until his death in December 1993/^® Before his death, Boigny's 
government had frequent confrontation with students who were critical over 
government policies. Using intimidation, detention of students, imprisonment of 
members of opposition parties for causing "acts of violence," Boigny was able 
to silence his opponents.’ ®̂ The major question, however, is that could 
Boigny's exit pave a way for an ideal democracy? What will provide an answer 
to this question is the experience which will be brought into fore by his successor 
and political opponents as well as the people themselves.
With regards to Togo, an unsuccessful attempt to topple the government 
led to repression and imprisonment of several people in September 1986 that 
Amnesty International had to intervene by sending an official mission to 
investigate alleged human rights violation by the Togolese government. What 
Amnesty discovered during its mission were scores of people who had been 
imprisoned without charges.̂ ®® Before Amnesty International came in, France 
had despatched 250 troops on 25 September, 1986 to support the former 
Togolese President Eyadema, against "subversive elements" in the country, and 
to prevent any attempted coup.̂ ®' Indeed, it was because of the political
^̂ ®West Africa. 31 January-6 February, 1994. 
^̂ ®See West Africa. 16-22 March. 1992, pp. 477.
*®®See especially Adamoiekun and Osuntokun, Op Cit. p. 359. See also New African Yearbook.
p. 355.
^ ® W  P 355,
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climate In Togo and In particular, Eyadema's repressive stance, that forced the 
formation of Mouvement Togolaise pour la Democracle (MTD) in Paris/"^
In January 1987, Eyadema celebrated his 20 years In povtrer with great 
pomp and pageantry - an event which was attended by a large number of 
Francophone Presidents within the subregion and a delegation from France. 
Here, what is evidently clear is grand corruption’ which manifested in the use of 
public money by Eyadema for his own personal use, while a large majority of 
Togolese people are frequently neglected and denied access to education, 
health, and other social support usually expected from government. The fact 
that no citizen could raise an eye-brow against such activities by the country’s 
leader goes to express Eyadema's dictatorial rule. In December 1986, he called 
for an election and his ruling party, being the only one In the country, Eyadema 
was re-elected for another seven-year term. In 1990, legislative elections were 
held on March 4 for the 77 seats in the national assembly. On 25 August 1993, 
Eyadema was once again re-elected for yet another 7-year term of office.
The case of Benin is not, in fact, different from those of other ECOWAS 
states. This is indeed revealed by the fact that the country is placed next to 
Nigeria In terms of the number of coup d’etats that had taken place In the 
country. Being one of the first two countries to have recorded a coup in 1963,
African Yearbook 1992. p. 366. 
^*®Adamolekun and Osuntokun, Go Cit. p. 372
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Benin has a chequered history of coups.’®® In October 1963, the civilian 
administration was overthrown by Colonel Christophe Soglo, commander of the 
army, who formed a provisional government uniting the country’s three political 
leaders before and then made temporary exit. In December 1965, he formed the 
Comité de Renovation Nationaie (CRN), but his government was short-lived as 
in 1967, he was himself overthrown by Lleutenant-Colonel Alphonse Alley who 
named his executive Comite Revoiutionnaire Militaire (CRM). Alley became 
President and he, in turn, was swept away in a coup led by Major Kouandete. 
This government was only to last till 1972 when the longest ruling president. 
Brigadier General Mathieu Kerekou seized power on 26 October 1972, accusing 
his predecessors of ineffectiveness, ethnicity and anarchy. As New African 
pointed out, on 30 November 1974, Kerekou announced his government’s 
political orientation being socialist based on the phiiosophical ideal of Marxist- 
Leninism.’®® Now that this ideology is being replaced by democracy in Eastern 
Europe and other Third World countries, which hitherto leaned toward communist 
orientation, will the country continue with Marxist-Leninism? The author of this 
thesis does not think so.
In Mauritania the dominant political power historically remains with the 
tight-skinned Arabs (the Maures Blanc) who are, by far, outnumbered by the
’®®See New African, pp. 28-31; Adamoiekun and Osuntokun, Do Cit, p. 374. See also Third 
World Guide 1991-92. pp. 226-27.
’®®New African Yeaitook. p. 29.
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Black Mauritanians, and this has been so for several generations. in spite 
of this high population of Blacks which are composed of the PeuI, the Sarakoule, 
the Woiiof and the Bambara tribes, hegemonic relationship between the Arabs 
Mauritanians and the Black African tribesmen has been a vexing one since the 
country became independence. As Davies recalled, because political power is 
dominated by the Arabs to the exclusion of Black Africans, there is a constant 
ideological dichotomy between the two groups. As a consequence, there is little 
or no representation of Blacks in the bureaucracy and institutional apparatuses 
of the state. It was this lack of representation that compelled Black Africans to 
form the Rally for the Rebirth of Negro Africans of Mauritania (RENAM),’®® - 
an armed struggle group whose members are drawn from Black Mauritanians 
and organizations who feel they are "being badly treated by political authorities." 
Created in 1989, and following subsequent government negative attitude towards 
the Blacks, thousands had to emigrate to Mali and Senegal while the rest 
emigrated to other West African countries and Europe to form a leftwing group 
with headquarters in Europe. The military regime headed by President Maaouya 
Quid Taya employs several exclusionary measures to ensure the Arabs are in 
control of state's resources - a situation the Blacks do not want. According to 
Davies, the numerical strength of the Blacks notwithstanding, there has never 
been power sharing at the apex of state authority, and it was only after a




prolonged outcries by Blacks that few Blacks were allowed to hold administrative
positions within the civil service. It was this domination by the few Arabs over
the years, for example, that compelled Davies to conclude that:
In the corner, there is a cauldron smouldering and if it is allowed to spill 
over, Mauritania will join those countries that have been experiencing 
serious fratricidal war in the West African subregion.̂ ®®
In Mali, the military has dominated the political life of the country since the
army took control of state apparatus to the chagrin of disillusioned, if not
indifferent, population. Dissatisfaction expressed in sporadic violence since the
death in detention of Malian first President, Modibo Keita, who remained very
popular, and spontaneous demonstrations at Bamako, a majority of the country's
population were persistently repressed through detention and imprisonment of
citizens, including students. Following popular outcry over the repressive stance
of the government. Amnesty International was forced to investigate the problems
brought to its attention by Western media and found hundreds of political
prisoners in jail. Appeal to the government by Amnesty International yielded
result as the head of the military regime had to bow down to this organization
and international pressure by releasing political prisoners.̂ ®® Internal crisis in
Mali seems to have no end. In fact, one of the casualties of this crisis is Colonel
Saloum Bilal, military leader of the Popular Movement of the Azaouad (MPA)
who was gunned down by an unidentified armed soldiers. Yet, Bilal was noted
®̂®lb!d. P 1345.
®̂®New African Yearbook 1991.92. p. 203-4.
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to be one of the architects of the peace process which was embarked upon 
following the signing of the National Pact on April 11, 1992.’®’
Ghana, the most progressive country at post-independence under the 
leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, also witnessed a spate of political crises. 
Nkrumah’s government having been toppled in February 1966 while he was on 
a peace mission in Hanoi, Lt. General J.A. Ankrah who played no part in the 
coup d’etat, became the new President.’®̂ Civilian administration was put in 
place in 1969 under the Presidency of late Kofi Busia - a former university 
professor in Britain, following a democratic process. Lacking effective political 
skill or sound policies, Busia's government dismissed nearly 1000 civil servants. 
But Busia’s government did not last as a group of army officers toppled his 
government in 1972, and Lt. Col. Ignatius Acheampong became the new head 
of state. He too was dethroned in a coup in 1978 and General Akuffo who 
seized power from Busia was, in turn, toppled by the present leader. Flight Lt. 
Jerry Rawlings In 1979. The first important, but most deplorable, task undertaken 
by Rawlings' Government whose central executive body was named the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRO) was to do a "vigorous house-cleaning 
exercise" - the execution of three former heads of state, namely Acheampong, 
Akuffo, and Lt. General Ankrah as well as several other high ranking military 
officers, including General Afrifa for reasons of embezzlement of state’s funds.
’®’West Africa. 14-20 March, 1994, p. 464. 
’®®New African Yearbook. 1991-92, p.131.
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Altogether eight top army officers were executed - a situation which occasioned 
immediate international repercussions/®® Apart from international 
condemnation of Rawlings’ action, Nigeria which supplied Ghana 80 percent of 
crude oil placed immediate halt of oil supply, thus depriving Ghana of its oil 
requirements and causing a severe shortage. The house-cleaning nevertheless 
continued, and up to 100 senior officers and civilians, and businessmen were 
tried in camera by impromptu "People’s Courts."’®̂ While Rawlings gave way 
for a brief civilian administration under the presidency of Dr. Hilla Limann, the 
former returned to power in a coup in the early hours of December 31,1982 and 
instituted a central executive called Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) under the aegis of corruption. ̂ ®®
Soon after Rawlings seized power for the second time, Ghana's PNDC 
established a "revolutionary" court system. Consisting of Public Tribunais which 
operate within the country’s judicial system, this parallel system for the 
administration of justice showed cavalier disregard for normal jud lal 
procedures. Created by decree No. 24, to strengthen the legitimacy of Rawlings 
and to further the government’s political interests, only a handful of verdicts 
handed down by these courts have run contrary to the government’s wishes. As 
Africa Watch pointed out, these public tribunals are the cornerstone of the
®̂®Afi1ca Watch. Vol. IV, No. 1. January 31, 1992, p. 2.
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government's institutionalized violation of human rights as they operate under a 
veneer of legality that does not prevent widespread manipulation by the 
government, but which is often sufficient to make it difficult for Ghanaians to 
protest against their abuses/^^ In fact, since these tribunals were created, 
leaders of former political parties and individuals have been tried and sentenced 
to terms of imprisonment for alleged breaches of the political parties Decree. In 
fact, three prominent judges and others were abducted and murdered by an 
unidentified armed group. Rawlings denied any complicity. And to maintain his 
legitimacy, prominent politicians and businessmen, including a former High 
Commissioner of Ghana in London, Britain, were given prolonged prison 
sentences under the aegis of corruption, and embezzlement of public funds.
In fact, the autocratic rule of Rawlings resulted in the formation of rebellious 
factions within Ghana and in neighbouring countries such as Ivory Coast and 
Togo.^^  ̂ There is no doubt that these events are attributable to ethnicity 
leading to disillusionment by various groups which, in turn, led to frequent 
unsuccessful coup. For example, northern Ghana made up predominantly of
"Ghana; Revolutionary Injustice, Abuse of the Legal System under the PNDC 
Government," In Africa Watch. Vol. IV, No. 1, January 31, 1992. p. 2. It should be noted that this 
publication by a Committea o f Human Rights Watch, based in Washington, New York, and London, 
reports country by country news on human rights issues in African countries.
°̂ l̂bid. p. 136.
^̂ Îbld. p. 137; One manifestation of disenchantment with Rawlings regime, is the incidence of 
coup attempts since he came to power. Table eleven revealed five successful coup d'etats, and in- 
between this are several coup attempts all of which were foiled. Another manifestation of this 
disenchantment rests on exodus of Ghanaians to other countries within the subregion, Europe or 
North America.
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Hausa tribe are often neglected or are under-represented In the central 
government. As recently as March 1994, conflict erupted in the northern region 
leading the death of over 1,000 people - a situation which was blamed on the 
refusal of the Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba tribes to allow the Konkombas to 
have a chieftaincy.’®® In spite of the high number of deaths, Rawlings 
government seemed unconcerned. Consequently, the opposition party, the New 
Patriotic Party (NPP)^°° challenged Rawlings and his National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) and urged him to "take firm and tangible steps towards 
reconciling differences with opponents and among warring ethnic factions 
involved in land disputes In the Northern Region." The NPP spokeman, Kwame 
Pianim, was responding to Rawlings who stated earlier that "vested Interests 
were bent on causing trouble in the country."^®’ Pianim, an executive of the 
NPP, lamented that his party stood for compromise, while the Ghanaian leader 
kept talking about the need for others to reconcile "while doing little or nothing 
himself." According to Pianim, the government had been accusing the opposition 
parties of "stroking flames of the conflict" rather than coming up with concrete 
proposals to lessen the tension which had emerged from land disputes." 
Charging at the government, Pianim asked, "Wasn’t he (Rawlings) who said no
’®®Weat Africa. 28 March-3 April 1994, p, 552,
^®®Ghana recently returned to civilian administration with Rawiings retaining his position of 
Presidency being the leader of his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC).
^°’west Africa. 21 March 1994,.
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one was born with land?"“ ^
Liberia, the most politically troubled country during the last year of 
President William Tolbert's government, the political establishment had 
witnessed unprecedented events in the history of the country when an increase 
in the price of rice triggered a chain reaction in January 1979, including 
demonstrations, country-wide unrest which, by official sources, led to the death 
of 41 people and 548 others seriously injured, although J. F. Kennedy Medical 
Centre estimated over 100 killed by police.^”  Upon Tolbert’s request, 
President Sekou Toure of Guinea despatched troops immediately to Liberia in 
support of Tolbert’s True Whig Party which was troubled by the civil strife led by 
opposition parties - the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), (which later 
changed its name to Progressive People's Party (PPP)), and Movement for 
Justice in Africa (MOJA) supported by Amos Sawyer, a university professor/''^ 
The gravity of the situation reached alarming proportion as the country was 
gripped with fear. Yet, as New African recalled, the leader of the government 
party, Tolbert’s True Whig, was always making propaganda at home and abroad 
to the effect that Liberia was Africa’s most stable country, particularly with
^°^West Africa. 28 March-3 April 1994.
^°®See T. Lardner, "Liberia: An African Tragedy," in Africa Report. November-December 1990, 
p. 15-16; Gordon Thomasson, "Liberian Dieaster: Made in the USA," New York TImea. Juiy 14,1990, 
p. 21; and Christopher Clapham, "Liberia," in Donald B. Cruise, ed. (1989), Contemporary West 
African States. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 108. See aiso for a detailed political and 
socio-economic history of Liberia, in New African p. 182.
°̂'*New African Yearbook. Co Cit. pp. 185-86
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asserted commitment to ’humanistic capitalism,’ which claimed to protect the 
interest of each individual, including the poor. The True Whig’s leadership 
seemed confident of maintaining a level of consensus politics in the country with 
the larger population, including political organizations.̂ ®® Here one finds the 
True Whig’s position contradictory for, on the contrary, organized opposition to 
the ruling party had long been brewing about its dominance of the country’s 
political life. Numerous political organizations began to emerge in addition to 
community groups in rural areas, workers’ self-help groups, and anti-imperialist 
groups which took up the problems of Liberia’s workers and peasants. Students 
also began to adopt a more assertive and critical posture, and radical groupings 
began to form in universities to challenge the long-established authority, using 
increase in the price of rice as a critical basis for argument.̂ ®® It is important 
for the reader to note that Liberia was founded in 1847 by freed American 
slaves. According to Africa Watch, the new country was controlled by the 
settlers, known as Americo-Liberians, who effectively held power for 133 years. 
Believing it was their mission to christianize and civilize Liberia, they ruled the 
country like a colony, establishing a feudal structure with all social, economic 
and political power in their hands, and subjecting the indigenous population to 
a range of abuses. It was against this background that the 1980 military
°̂®New African, p. 183
°̂®lbld. pp. 180-86.
°̂̂ Africa Watch Vol. 5, No. 6, (1993), "Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace: Ttie ECOMOG 
Intervention and Human Rights." p. 6.
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coup that brought Master Sergeant Samuel Doe to power was welcomed by 
majority of Liberians who saw it as the overthrow of the ruling elite. Tolbert was 
shot in his office in cold blood. This incident marked the beginning of ethnic 
antagonism and subsequent power struggles. Doe installed himself as the new 
head of state, banned political parties, and then threw members of political 
parties into jail without trial. To solidify his position as the new head of state and 
government, and apparently in an attempt to silence the opposing ethnic groups, 
he proceeded to do house-cleaning by executing 14 members of Tolbert's 
administration publicly against international community’s appeal for clemency, 
while some countries were quick in condemning the new military government's 
a c t i o n . I n  fact, to demonstrate its chagrin against Doe s deplorable action, 
Nigeria had to close down its embassy in Monrovia and ordered it staff home. 
Libya’s relations with Liberia deteriorated and had to withdraw its "people's 
bureau" which it had hoped to make a full-fledged embassy. ECOWAS 
member-states were unanimous in condemning Sgt. Doe, and took immediate 
action by preventing him, upon his arrival in Lagos, Nigeria, from entering the 
venue of ECOWAS' 1980 summit as he was "not recognized as the legitimate 
head of state" of Liberia.^^°
Sgt. Doe ruled the country with iron-fisted hand similar to Zaire's Mobutu
°̂®Country Profile, "Liberia" in Third World Guide 91/92, Garamond Press, 1991, pp. 390-92. 
See also New African Yearbook 1991-92. pp. 180-185.
^°°New African, p 184.
’̂ °!Mb.
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and Ugandan’s Idl Amin. In fact, his dictatorial tendency culminated In the 
elimination of politicians from the deposed ruling elite and proceeded to replace 
them with his own ethnic group which formed only 4 percent of the total 
population of the country, while the larger ethnic groups - the Manos and Gios 
were left out.^”
From the foregoing emerged discontent among the population. In a 
country with a population of 2.7 million, comprising of 16 distinct ethnic 
g ro u p s , i t  is evidently clear that ethnic tensions played significant part in the 
country's state of affairs. Opposition from within the military and the populace 
started to gather momentum that between 1980 and 1989 several coup attempts 
were staged, all of which failed to toppled Sgt. Doe s administration. What 
followed was increased repression, human rights violations. To test his popularity 
which he thought he held, he called for an election In 1985 - a year after 
releasing political opponents and lifting the ban on political opponents 
Several parties were formed, including Doe’s National Democratic Party of 
Liberia (NDPL), Amos Sawyer’s Liberian People Party (LPP), Liberian Unity 
Party (LUP) led by Edward Kesselly, the United People's Party (UPP) headed 
by Baccus Matthews, and the Liberian Action Party (LAP) of Tuan Wreh.
^^̂ John Inegbedion (1992), "The ECOWAS Intervention In Liberia; Toward Regional Conflict 
Management In post'cold War Africa?" - a paper he presented at the Summer Workshop on 
International Organizations, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, July 1992, p. 11.
’̂^See Third World Guide 91/92. p. 390.
^̂ T̂hlrd World Guide 91/92. p.391.
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Elections were held on 15 October 1985, and, as can be expected, Does's party 
won by a majority - a majority which was largely attributed to massive rigging by 
the Doe’s party, according to International Press and New Times/'^ A wave 
of criticism on the way in which the elections had been conducted became 
pervasive that an army commander, Doe s comrade and the second most power­
ful man in Liberia, Thomas Quiwonkpa, attempted to overthrow the government - 
a failed attempt which resulted in his death while prominent politicians were 
once again detained indefinitely. In spite continued criticisms. Doe was sworn 
into office as President in January 1986 and pledged to reconcile with other 
parties and repair whatever damages that had been done.^'̂  It is one thing 
to speak of reconciling with political opponents. It is another to put into practical 
terms spoken words. Indeed, no serious attempt was made towards reconcilia­
tion, and it was against this background that the three opposition parties - LAP, 
LUP, and UPP came together to form a "grand coalition." Political struggle 
continued for a prolonged period, that in 1990, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL) - which was behind the initial revolt against General Doe 
and whose troops’ strength consisted mainly of the Gio and Mano tribes of 
eastern Liberia - stepped in forcefully. These two tribes had been victims of 
savage acts of torture, and murder at the hands of elements of the Krahn tribe 
from which General Doe came. Taylor was not deterred by past failures to
^^^Revealed by Africa Watch. Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 5-6. 
^^hbld. p. 6.
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topple Doe as he turned to full-scale war with the ultimate objective of bringing 
down the despotic rule of General Doe, replace it within six months by an 
elected multiparty democracy. Within a short period, Taylor who was heavily 
armed by Libya,̂ ^  ̂ had captured almost 92 percent of major towns and villages 
of Liberia, almost paralysing General Doe's forces loyal to him. Meanwhile 
Taylor’s former comrade, Yormie Johnson broke away to form his Independent 
Patriotic Front (IPF) with the same goal as Taylor's - to bring down General Doe. 
With the intention of inspecting his loyal forces, Doe himself met his doom when 
he met Taylor face to face, as he mistook the letter's forces for his. Doe was 
summarily machine-gunned, but his forces continued to wage war with both 
Taylor’s and Johnson's forces.^^^ Thousands of civilians were killed in the war 
waged by various factions that were engaged in the war.
It was against this background that in 1990, a group of West African 
nations under the auspices of the ECOWAS took an unprecedented step of 
sending a peacekeeping force into Monrovia. This force, known as the Economic 
Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), had Its goal of bringing 
peace to the country. Its intervention succeeded In temporarily stopping 
the bloodshed and ethnic killing. Hence, it is therefore regarded by many as a 
model of regional conflict resolution.However, ECOMOG has not integrated
^^°Afrlca Watch, p. 8.
^̂ Âfflca Vtfatch. (1993) "Liberia: Waging War to Keep Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and 
Human Rights," Vol. S, No. 6. June. pp. 2-4.
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human rights protection and promotion into its activities, and this has proved to 
be a serious shortcoming. Pursuing peace without recognizing the centrality of 
human rights has left ECOMOG embroiled In a conflict with few immediate 
prospects for resolution, for, in the interest of ending the war and defeating a 
seemingly intractable adversary in Charles Taylor's NPFL, ECOMOG has allied 
itself with other warring factions, which undermines its credibility and therefore 
its ability to bring peace. According to Africa Watch, ECOMOG’s Intervention 
was carried out without clearly stated human rights principles and goals. And 
although it was not a part of ECOMOG’s mandate, concrete human rights 
improvement resulted after it secured control of Monrovia and its environs in the 
second half of 1990, including a halt to the ethnic-based killings and brutality, the 
removal of obstacles to the delivery of relief supplies. Since the NPFL attack on 
Monrovians in October 1992, ECOMOG has unofficially aligned itself with two 
of the warring factions, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the United 
Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which are themselves 
responsible for serious human rights abuses. This has raised questions about 
ECOMOG’s commitment to human rights as well as its ability to act as a neutral 
arbiter of the conflict. Again, ECOMOG has not sought adequately to control the 
abusive behaviour of the forces with which it is nominally allied, or to investigate 
cases of human rights abuses committed by these forces, including killings, 
beatings, systematic looting and harassment of civiiians.^^^
p. 3.
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It is important to note that one success of ECOMOG was the cease-fire 
which it caused to forestall in November 1990 and its efforts to bring about an 
Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) governing Monrovia and its 
environs. It is, however, also important to note that the war tended to divide 
Liberia. Thus while IGNU backed by ECOMOG only governs Monrovia and its 
environs, the NPFL controls approximately 90 percent of the country. The 
problem, however, remains that ECOMOG has not been able to enforce a 
peaceful solution to the crisis, and due to Taylor's intransigence, ECOMOG has 
been dragged into the war and is considered by many to constitute a warring 
faction. Its role has changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcing, and its 
rules of engagement has been more aggressive in that if they feel threatened, 
they can also attack targets that might contribute to a threat against them.^^° 
The most important point to note here is that Liberia, due to political and ethnic 
divisions the country has been ravaged by war by various factions. When the 
present war will end is, in fact, a matter of conjecture.
Niger has had its own share of internal political problems. An attempted 
coup was staged following economic grievances by a greater proportion of the 
population. Instigated by these economic grievances, the army took over the 
state radio station as the first step. In an attempt to proceed further, the putsch 




Very recently, political crisis erupted in Senegal, triggering several deaths 
and subsequent large-scale trial and imprisonment of political opponents. 
According to West Africa, follo\wing violent demonstrations on February 16,1994 
which led to the conviction of two main opposition leaders, Abdoulaye Wade and 
Landing Savane of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and the African 
Party for Democracy and Socialism (PADS) respectively, 73 people were 
charged for "breach against the state security."^”
Indeed, in all countries of the subregion social tensions have been 
experienced some of which resulted from ethnicity, domination of one ethnic 
group over other ethnic groups, religious conflicts particularly in states where 
religious plurality exists. Even the smallest country within ECOWAS, Cape 
Verde, is not spared from political power struggles.'"
The same story can be told of other ECOWAS member-states, be they 
military or civilian regimes. In fact, in most cases, demonstrations against 
government actions, for example, policies on wage freeze, cuts in number of civil 
servants, critics of government policies as a whole, have attracted outright 
imprisonment without trial, torture, killings and immediate banning of 
associations, political parties considered to be a inimical to national
" W w t Africa. 16-22 March 1992, p. 477. 
" ' west Africa. 7-13 March, 1994, p. 405. 
' " M -  p. 405.
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governments.^''̂  In fact, increasing militarization of these countries has not
only impeded development, but has also curtailed the peoples’ participation in
decision-making in matters that are of great concern to them, in addition, the
acquisition of arms from the Western World by countries of the subregion has
so far been detrimental rather beneficial for, the great amount of money spent
on military arsenal could have been directed to development, especially in
programs of strategic importance such as job creation, education, health,
agricultural development or 50 percent of such expenditure could have been
used to repay foreign loans. The Report of the South Commission was not joyful
when it lamented that.
Militarization [by countries of the subregion] has perverse implications 
for development. The diversion of resources to pay for instruments of war 
and repression retards progress in many countries. Just as deleterious is 
the growth of a military culture which is contemptuous of democracy, 
population, human rights, or the principle of government 
accountability.*^®
The South Commission went on to point out the negative effects of 
militarization being the breeding of corruption, the abuse of power, and the 
consequent alienation of the people from the political system.**® Of course,
Nigeria, Togo, Ghana and ivory Coast are example of such countries where demands for pay 
increases, privately owned media criticisms, and demand for equal treatment In employment are not 
tolerated by the ruling regime. See Adamoiekun and Osuntokun, Go cit. p. 39*43. Fantu Cheru 
(1989), The Silent Revolution In Africa: Debt. Development and Democracy. Zed Books, London and 
New Jersey.
**®The Report of the South Commission (1990), The Challenge to the South. Oxford University 
Press, New York, p. 53.
**®ibid.
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nothing can be more true than the foregoing assertion. One important fact 
remains true to a large extent: with the exception of the Gambia, all ECOWAS 
states leaders have, over the years, tended to rule their subjects autocratically 
simply because they are or have been military regimes or simply because they 
have the support of the armed forces.^^^ Experiences of most countries of the 
subregion so far point to the divisive and factional nature of these armed forces 
as opposed to unity among them.
5.3 Inter-State Political Quagmires
Within the subregion problems ranging from border disputes, political 
divisions, and collaboration with political dissidents in neighbouring countries are 
constant occurrences. For example Ghana and Togo have been involved in a 
long standing inter-state problems. Togo became isolated as revolutionary 
regimes were established in Ghana from 1982 and Burkina Faso from August 
1983. Ghana accused Togo of supporting dissidents who invaded Ghana from 
Togo in June 1983. The Ghanaian government was, in turn, accused by Togo 
of masterminding a "terrorist commando unit" which was alleged to have crossed 
over from Ghana and attacked a number of targets in Lome, including the 
military barracks where President Eyadema lives. Further clashes occurred
^^^Myron Weiner, Political Change, p. 38.ln relation to the growth of autocratic regimes, see 
Clifford Qeertz, "The Judging of Nations: Some Comments on the Assessment of Regimes In the 
new States," European Journal of Sociology. Vol. 18, No, 2 (1677); pp. 248*61. See also Jackson 
and Rosberg, (1682) Personal Rule In Black Africa: Prince. Autocrat. Prophet. Tyrant. University of 
California, Berkeley.
^̂ N̂ew African Yearbook 1691*62. p. 355.
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along Ghana-Togo border and not less than thirteen people were killed. Here
again, the Ghanaian government denied of any complicity, and It was cleared of
any Involvement after a subsequent clash showed that supporters of former
Togolese President, S. Olympio, were the dlssldents.^^® Over ten years after
this particular Incident, accusations and counter-accusations and threats and
counter threats of aggression between the two countries have continued
unabated. The degree of this crisis manifests In the recent mounting tension
between the two countries, following the killing of 12 Ghanaians when Togolese
soldiers bombarded the border post of Aflao after Togo accused Ghana of
backing an apparent attempt to overthrow the Togolese government on January
6, 1994. As If this particular Incident was not enough, the Togolese naval
officers went further to abduct seven Ghanaian fishermen who were on a fishing
trip for no apparent reason.̂ ^° In May 1994, the war of words between the two
countries continued with Togo accusing Ghana for being responsible for the
presence of bombs in Togo - a report the Ghanaian government spokesman
denied, noting that:
If the government of Togo says it has evidence about the transportation 
of bombs across the border, it Is In a better position to know the Identity 
of the couriers, and to whom they were delivered.
Africa Yearbook 1991-1992 (1992). 1C Publications, London, pp. 136-38.
^ °̂West Africa. "Ghana and Togo at Daggers Drawn," 24-30 January, 1994, p. 129.; See aiso
the issue of 7-13 March, 1994, p. 221.
" W est Africa. 23-29 May, 1994, p. 918.
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The spokesman added that the Ghanaian government will continue to finds ways 
and means of resolving the long standing confrontation between the two 
countries and that the country will adhere strictly to international law and the 
principle of good neighbourliness in its relation with Togo.” *
In neighbouring Ivory Coast, several Ghanaians living in the country were 
either killed or maimed for flimsy excuses by the authorities who claimed that the 
Ghanaians ganged up with its citizens to create instability In the country.*”
A long standing border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali over a 
strip of land with its potential wealth, flared again in 1985. Though the matter 
was referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague and was under 
the supervision of neighbouring states which formed Non-Aggression Defence 
Aid Agreement (NADAA), tension rose in the later half of 1985. On 25 
December 1985, the then head of state of Burkina Faso, General Thomas 
Sankara, sent his troops across the border to occupy some Malian villages. 
Malian forces responded immediately and drove Sankara’s men back but not 
before over 40 people had been killed in the fight that ensued and in Malian air 
raids on Burkinabé villages. It was through NADAA's and the International Court 
of Justice’s intervention in 1986 that led to a peaceful settlement.**^
Inter-state disputes have not been limited to a few countries of the
***M. p. 918
*” See West Africa. 24-30 January, 1994, p. 129, 
**^!bid. p. 204.
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subregion. For several years, for example, there was a ferocious border dispute 
between Mauritania and Senegal and it was only in 1989 that the two countries 
were able to settle their differences. This settlement was, however, temporary 
as Mauritania continued to accuse Senegal of supporting "subversive activities" 
by Black Mauritanian refugees in Senegal while in reality the Blacks "were 
running away from their home country to avoid extermination."^®®
Inter-states disputes of various kinds have occurred between several 
countries, including Sierra Leone and Guinea, Mauritania and Mali, between Mali 
and Burkina Faso, and the latest one is that between Nigeria and Cameroon, 
although the latter Is not an ECOWAS member. In most cases these disputes 
have resulted to deaths of citizens of countries involved in inter-state disputes. 
Under these circumstances, can economic cooperation succeed, given the fact 
that some of these disputes arise from struggle for ownership of portions of land 
known to have mineral deposits? For example, the dispute between Nigeria 
and Cameroon arose because of mineral deposit found in the Bakassi peninsula, 
a Nigerian town. Located in an area close to the border between the two 
countries, both countries have asserted their authority over the ownership of the 
peninsula, by deploying hundreds of soldiers to patrol their borders. In fact, 
several inhabitants of Bakassi have been killed, their houses burnt, and 
properties looted by Cameroon soldiers before the arrival of Nigerian troops in
^®®George 0 . Davies, Oo Cit. p. 1346,
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Bakassi.” ®
Notwithstanding the E C O W A S  protocol which provides citizens o f nations 
o f the subregion freedom  of m ovem ent and the right to reside in E C O W A S ' 
country o f individual choice, in January 1983 Nigeria shocked the world by 
ordering millions of unskilled foreigners working in the country to  leave within tw o  
w eeks, by 31 January 1993, including one million G hanaians.
In fact, the problem  o f the sixties which has rem ained till to  the early  
19 90 s  in the W est African subregion as  a  w hole is not th e  decline of dem ocratic  
institutions, the rise of autocratic regim es, but the continued instabilities of 
regim es which is an outcom e of political and ethnic rivalries which them selves  
h ave  led to limited effectiveness o f states. In spite o f all these, no significant 
p eas an t uprisings have erupted, not to mention peasant revolutions. M assive  
urban growth and urban crowding notwithstanding, neither the urban poor nor 
th e  urban industrial proletariat have turned against their governm ents. M oreover, 
class politics have not replaced ethnic politics in W est Africa. M any regim es  
h ave been  unstable in W e s t Africa, but the instabilities can  be attributed m ore  
often to intra-elite conflicts than to th e  im balance betw een  political participation  
and political institutionalization.” ® Indeed, even  m odernization em barked  upon  
following independence has not led to the expected m assive growth of dem ands
^®®Bola Olowo, "Nigeria-Cameroon: No War, No Peace," in Weat Africa, 7-13 March 1994, p. 
397. See also West Africa, 14-20 March 1994, p. 464.
” ^New African Yearbook, p. 261.
” *Weiner, Oo Cit. p. 57.
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for popular participation and the expected demise of autocratic governments. 
Instead, there have been a number of significant trends in Africa in general and 
West Africa in particular.̂ ^®
The first is the critical role of human capital which is often overlooked, the 
importance of states in providing political order, the ability of states in extracting 
resources and using them effectively for education, health, and basic 
infrastructure for development, the effectiveness of government policies in 
inducing market-oriented behaviour.
The second significant trend, according to Weiner, has been the 
entrenchment of personal autocratic rule in many of the African states, without 
the underpinnings of strong political parties, effective bureaucracies and popular 
support. Moreover, states have intruded into the economy not with the goal of 
inducing market-oriented behaviour, but of transferring resources from one social 
class to another, and often from those who pay taxes to those who control the 
states.^"" Corruption - which is a 'lubricant of African economy has - in the 
words of Weiner:
supplied more than the grease for making the bureaucracy work, the 
cream for satisfying the personal tastes of top officials or the spoils of 
patronage for strengthening a political party...It has also led to a massive 
transfer of wealth to those who control the state.̂ ^^
" W  P 58.
^̂ °lblcl. pp. 68-59. See also Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa’s Weak 
States Persist; The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," In World Politics. Vol. 35, No. 1. 
(October 1982): pp. 1-24.
Weiner and Huntington, Go Cit. p. 59.
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Accordingly, as the ruling elites increasingly extracts wealth from societies,
and as it becomes the till from which political elites extract for their own gain,
those who seek to improve their personal well-being turn to politics. In this
highly politicized atmosphere, perhaps with few alternative nonpolitical means
for improving status quo and income, the struggle for power becomes acute,
often violent, and both institutional development and market-oriented growth
policies are precluded. In this sense it is appropriate to speak not only of the
stagnant economies of much of the ECOWAS member states, but also of the
stagnant political systems as well.̂ '*̂  After all, the former ECOWAS Executive
Secretary, Abbass Bundu, stated that;
ECOWAS remains essentially an economic grouping that has as its basic 
focus and objective the integration of the economies of the 16 member 
countries. That was how it was perceived, conceived, and that is hew I 
believe it is going to go on and prosper. But as I keep saying, you cannot 
hope for much success in economic integration unless political stability, 
on which such success is predicated, it also considered as an essential 
part of the whole integration process.
Therein lies the problems. As economic integration is important, so also 
is political integration. Political integration itself must be preceded by peaceful 
co-existence both within each of the countries of ECOWAS as well as between 
member-states of the organization. If these countries continue to face internal 
political, economic, and social instabilities, can they perform effectively in a 
subregional organization? This question can only attract a negative answer
'̂‘^Weiner, Political Change, p. 59
interview with the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, A. Bundu, See West Africa. 1-7 July 
1991, p. 1086.
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since they will be more preoccupied with domestic affairs, especially on how to 
maintain their position in power.
5.4 The Need for Political cooperation Among ECOWAS Member-States
For reasons given In the preceding sections, It will be observed that 
ECOWAS scheme has not met the economic objectives It set for itself nineteen 
years after its establishment. It has recorded limited economic progress In some 
areas while in others it has stagnated to some degree for reasons that can 
rightly be attributed to both internal and inter-states conflicts, which themselves 
are a direct result of authoritarian nature of these regimes. Nevertheless, 
internal and inter-state disputes in, and between some member-states remain 
potent, and the urge for one ethnic group or individuals to hold onto power 
perpetually has tended to economically choke the m a s s e s . T h e  question 
one would ask is, why economic integration at this time when most countries of 
the subregion have not been able to maintain domestic and inter-state stability? 
Why should not ECOWAS countries begin by integrating politically and then use 
the medium of political integration as a springboard for economic integration? 
Perhaps the answer to these questions lies In the fact that these nations are 
'new' In the sense that 98 percent of these countries became politically 
independent less than 35 years ago, and perhaps, attempt to understand
for example, "Nigeria: Democracy Derailed," in Africa Watch. Vol. 5, No. 11. August 27,
1993, p. 9.
143
implications of economic integration have not been made. Neither have member- 
countries learnt lessons from the East African Community which collapsed in 
1976^^̂  or the long-established economic units globally. It appears member- 
states did not make any serious attempt to research the various implications of 
an economic integration before springing into it. How then could concrete results 
emerge from ECOWAS undertakings? This Thesis recognizes the importance 
of political integration and this is what ECOWAS must seriously look into. The 
type of political Integration being suggested is not, indeed, political unification of 
the West African subregion for one obvious reason: different colonial heritage. 
It is a realistic political cooperation which must be institutionalized formally by the 
current ECOWAS member states. Such institution must have an established 
goal, objectives, guiding principles on how such a body should operate. Since 
peaceful co-existence between nations is an important prerequisite for an 
institutionaiized system, a principle of intervention rather than non-intervention 
in member-states's domestic problems must be incorporated in the case of 
interstate disputes and even serious internal dispute in countries of member- 
states. At least, ECOWAS has learnt a lesson from the Liberian war which 
arose because of ethnic antagonism. This must be preceded by states' and 
inter-states’ political stabilities. When peace is pervasive in member-states, not
^^^D.A.K. Mbogoro, "Regional Grouping and Economic Development; Some Lessons from the 
East African Integration Scheme," in W.A. Ndongko, ed. (1985), Economic Coopération and 
Integration In Africa. Codesria Books, Dakar, pp. 229*51. See also Rolf J. Langhammer (1992) 'The 
Developing Countries and Regionalism," Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. XXX, No, 2, June, 
pp. 211-231.
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only will domestic progress emerge, but countries will be In a better position to 
contribute towards a result-oriented economic Integration. It Is recognized that 
this will take time to achieve. For instance, two long-established economic units, 
the European Community and the Latin American Free Trade Association, both 
of which are dealt with below, began with political cooperation several centuries 
before economic Integration emerged as a consequence. In fact, experience has 
shown that political stability and regional security contribute substantially to the 
success of economic Integration. As well, economic growth and sound national 
policies are prerequisites for a successful integration process.
5.5 Evolution of Two Economic Integration Schemes; The European 
Community and the Latin American Free Trade Association
The purpose here is to trace the evolution of two distinct economic
integrations - one from the so-called First World or the area the South
Commission Report referred to as "the North,” and the second from the Third
World, renamed by the South Commission as "the South
a) The European Community
One of the first economic integrations emerged in Europe, the most 
important one being the European Community (EC). According to Pollard, this 
community did not emerge overnight. Rather, it took an historical process which
Courier. No. 134, July-August, 1992. p. 78.
Report of the South Commission (1990) The Cheiienoe to the South. Oxford University 
Press, New York. p. 1.
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evolved over a period of two centurles.̂ ^® Prior to 1815, repeated calls for a 
unified Europe under a political sense were made under the banner of the 
common humanity of the Enlightenment. The frequency and the power of such 
calls increased between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. As Pollard 
revealed, the prevailing calls at the time, particularly those of Abbe de Saint- 
Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Benthem, all advocated for two 
approaches. The first was the establishment of a European senate or parliament, 
while the second was the establishment of a European army both of which were 
considered important in achieving a political unification of the continent. Their 
main reason for this was essentially the need for the unification of economic 
policy-making for the benefit of the whole of Europe. These two factors had one 
thing in common; whiie economic integration was not the actual intention of this 
policy initiative, it was to emerge as a consequence of technical and economic 
progress. By far, the greatest consequence of the whole process was political 
unification.^''̂  As we can observe, all these were outcomes of improved 
technology and economic growth, and the major means through which this 
process came into place was the British Industrial Revolution which later made 
both possible the opening up large internal markets of the major European 
states, the moderation taxation, the development of national education systems, 
the unification of currency and banking policy, and provision of comprehensive
*^®Sidney Pollard (1981) The Integration of the European Economy Cnca 1816. George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd, London, p. 13.
' " W  p. 14.
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rights of citizenship to all citizens within the national borders. Throughout this 
phase of history, which lasted until in the 1870s and beyond, the development 
of nation states and of economic cooperation evolved and these processes re­
inforced each other.̂ ®° The European experience is, therefore an essential 
part of history of a movement from political cooperation toward economic 
inttstation from 1815 through to the present except, of course, during the World 
Wat periods and the Great Depression years of the 1930s when economic 
instability predominated the lives of European citizens.*®  ̂ Even the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) established in April 
1948 by sixteen European countries, contained provisions not only for 
economic, but also for political, and cultural cooperation through standing 
committees and a central organization. The establishment of OEEC, which was 
replaced in 1960 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in which the United States, Canada and Japan became 
full members, was preceded by the signing in March 1948 the Treaty of Brussels 
by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. While this treaty 
was a military alliance ostensibly directed against a revival of the German threat, 
it also contained provisions for political, economic and cultural matters.'®^ In 
fact, after the Second World War, several treaties most of which were politically
p. 15. 
p. 39.
^®^See Peter Calvocoreesi (1985) Vtforid Politic# Since 1945. Fourth Edition, Longman Inc., New 
York, pp. 141-42.
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motivated were signed in Europe. The ideological underpinnings for these 
treaties were dictated by several factors, and an example was the military 
alliance already mentioned above. By far, the greatest influence for these 
treaties were both political stability and cooperation and eventual European 
union. The desire for the latter, according to Calvocoressi, was repeatedly 
stated by the then British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who called for the 
establishment of a Council of Europe in 1948. Having persuaded countries of 
Europe during a 1948 convention at The Hague, this council was set up, 
consisting of signatories to the Treaty of Brussels, and Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Eire and Italy. Shortly thereafter, Greece, Iceland, Turkey, West 
Germany, and Austria, all became members. A constitution was established, 
among others, requiring member-countries to respect the rule of law and 
fundamental human rights.” ®
In 1950, France proposed a European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), and In April 1951 six states signed a treaty establishing the ECSC 
which came into existence the following year. By the early 1950s, the Council of 
Europe had been joined on the European stage by the ECSC. In 1955, the six 
states resolved to form a European Economic Community (EEC) which is 
frequently referred to as the Common Market and. In March 1957, the treaty 
establishing the EEC was signed In Rome. The organization became operational
p, 163,
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1 January, 1958.̂ ®̂  With this Community In place, economic Integration within 
Western Europe became a reality after over two centuries of the development 
of nation s;ates, two World Wars and subsequent peace, dialogues which led to 
inter-state political cooperations by virtue of a series of treaties aimed at 
maintaining peaceful co-existence with one another,
As a matter of fact, the EEC which is now simply called the "European 
Community (EC)," is a potent and powerful economic organization.̂ ®® It is not 
surprising, therefore, that its importance led to the expansion of member-states 
of the organization from the original six to eleven, and the establishment in 1986 
of the "European Parliament," whose all 518 members are drawn from member- 
countries which include Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Greece, United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Portugal.̂ ®® It is perhaps 
the experience of this organization that inspired the recent formation of North 
American Free Trade Association NAFTA, which embraces Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico.
b) Latin American Free Trade Association
The Latin American case is another classic one. Just as political factors
 ̂ Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945. See especially pp. 161-165; See also Barry 
Braoewell-Mllnes (1976), Economic Inleorallon in East and West. Groom Helm Limited, London; 
Jeffrey Harrop (1989), The Political Economy of integration In the European Community. Elgar 
Publishing Limited, London
^®®Michael Davenport (1992), "Africa and the Unimportance of Being Preferred," in Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Vol. XXX, No. 2, June. p. 234.
®®®8ee Sidney Pollard (1985), The Integration of the European Community, p. 58. Pierre Maillet 
(1977), The Construction of a European Community: Achievement and Prospects for the Future. 
Praeger Publishers, New York.
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led to the form ation of the European Comm unity, so also did political
underpinnings exhibited powerful interplay in the formation o f the Latin Am erican
F re e  T ra d e  Association (LA FTA ). According to Mikesell's analysis, LA FTA  did
not em erged  overnight. R ather, it w as a result of political forces that had existed
for over a  generation that led to the negotiation o f the M ontevideo T rea ty  for a
Latin Am erican Free T rad e  A rea. It w as also political interplays betw een several
Latin A m erican countries that led to a series of treaties for th e  establishm ent of
a com m on m arket. M ikesell’s rem ark is most revealing w hen he stated that:
Although there have been efforts to achieve political integration by various  
groups of Latin A m erican states dating back for o ver a century, serious  
efforts to achieve closer political and econom ic relations betw een  Latin  
Am erican  countries d ate  from  the latter part o f th e  1930s.®®^
It is no w onder, therefore, that the establishm ent o f the Organization of American
States (GAS) in 1 9 4 7  by th e  Rio T rea ty  and its subsequent C harter signed In
M a y  1 9 4 8  by all [Latin] Am erican  Republics in Bogota w as an  expression of
political unity am ong m em ber-states o f the organization. Even the forerunner o f
th e  O A S , the Pan-American Movement which began its first phase in 1826 with
the C ongress o f P anam a, convoked by Sim on Bolivar, and which called for an
alliance o f reciprocal assistance - an early application o f the principle o f
collective security -  w as politically motivated. Noted to  b e  Bolivar's highest
political achievem ent, this first phase lasted until 1889 ."^
Raymond F. Mikesall, "The Movement Toward Regional Trading Groups in Latin America," 




The second phase covering the years 1889-1948 was Inaugurated by the 
First International Conference of American States in Washington, D C. which led 
to the establishment of a permanent inter-American organization, the 
Commercial Bureau of the Amerlcart Republics, which was later designated as 
the Pan American Union. The third phase was initiated with the establishment 
of the OAS in 1948 as noted above, at the Ninth International Conference of 
American States.̂ ®®
The objectives of the OAS were clearly stated as being, inter alia, to 
establish peace and justice on the American^®” continent and to promote and 
strengthen the solidarity and collaboration of its member states. It also made 
provisions to defend their sovereignty, territorial Integrity, and independence. To 
put these principles into practice and to fulfil its regional duties in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, the Organization pursues the following 
purposes;
-To help keep the peace and security on the continent;
-To prevent possible causes of any difficulties which may arise 
and ensure a peaceful settlement among the member states;
-To provide for common action on the part of the member state 
in the event of aggression;
-To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic
“ ®M- p. 6
the sake of clarity, the United States is always referred to by that name and not 
"America," a term that might be misinterpreted, according to Carlos Stoetzer, since Latin Americans 
also consider themselves Americans. See 0 . Carlos Stoetzer (1965), The Oroanlzation of American 
States. Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York. p. vl.
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problems that may arise among the member states; and
•To promote, by cooperative action, their economcic, social, and 
cultural development.
By 1985 several specialized sub-organizations have been established to 
perform specific tasks. Executive and policy-making organs also increased 
beyond the original numbers.̂ ®^
One thing that is easily observable from the foregoing is evidently clear; 
there was no explicitly stated policy on free trade or economic integration at the 
Inception of these two Integrative units. Although prior to 1938, various plans for 
creating a Latin American customs union failed,̂ ®® it was only In September 
of 1957 that OAS expressly stated the need for a Latin American regional 
market. Perhaps what motivated the OAS to express this need was inspiration 
generated by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA's) occasional 
call for a Latin American customs union. For example, In 1948, ECLA adopted 
a resolution regarding the study of a Latin American customs union and a 
payments union. For example, a proposal for a customs union between 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela was passed under the auspices of 
ECLA,̂ ®'* and in 1951, there was another ECLA's resolution launching the
stoetzer, The Organization of American State», p. 12.
^®^See organizational chart in Preston E. James and C, J. Minkel (1986) Latin America. Fifth 
Edition, Praeger, New York, p. 4.
*®®Victor L, Urquldi (1962), Free Trade and Economic Integration In Latin America. University 
of California Press, Los Angeles, p. 129.
130.
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Central American economic Integration program. In fact, between 1951 and 
1957, seven bilateral free trade treaties were signed between countries of 
Central America. In February 1960, following extensive studies by ECLA, 
consultations and conferences, the Montevideo Treaty creating the Latin 
American Free Trade Association of which Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, were signatories.̂ ®® The 
following year the Treaty establishing LAFTA was formally ratified by all member- 
countries. It was from LAFTA that a sub-economic customs union, the Andean 
Pact, was established in 1969 by Chile, Peru and this was later joined by Bolivia, 
Colombia and Ecuador. Members of LAFTA unanimously agreed to replace the 
Association with the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1981. The 
subregional organizations for this body included the Central American Common 
Market (CACM), the Caribbean Free Trade Association (which led to the 
Caribbean Community (CARiCOM),) the Andean Group, and the East Caribbean 
Common Mati<et.^^ Looked from economic integration process LAIA 
continues to operate with immeasurable success compared with ECOWAS 
especially from the area of intra-trade.'®^
'®®M. pp. 130-134.
'®®8ed Rolf J. Langhammer (1992), "The Developing Countries and Regionalism." pp. 214-215; 
The South Commission, The Chalienoe to the South, p. 144; Ian Livingstone and A S. Goodall 
(1962) Economics and Development. Oxfbrd University Press, London and Nairobi, pp. 197-199.
'®\anghammaer, Oo Cit. p. 215.
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5.6 Lessons for ECOWAS
There is no doubt that ECOWAS can learn something from the above 
two integrative organizations. The reason for putting in perspective the evoiution 
of both the EC and LAFTA (LAIA) Is not to show the progress or otherwise 
recorded by each one of them, but to show the stages they had to go through 
in making each of the two organizations a reality. In contrast to these two 
economic units, ECOWAS did not follow the same pattern of political evolution. 
Indeed, there is substance in the political factor. The political arguments are 
well-known: subregional or regional bargaining power is stronger than national 
bargaining power in international negotiations; moreover, subregional or regional 
cooperation can help build confidence among neighbouring countries and 
prevent the development of animosities. In addition, there is little doubt that 
political stability is one of the most important factors for foreign private investors 
wishing to invest not only in the West African subregion, but also in sub-Saharan 
Africa in general. As already pointed out above, the integration of Europe, which 
began In serious terms, the decade after the Second World War, was motivated 
by both economic and political considerations. On the political level, solidarity 
was needed to avoid the threat of new conflicts, by incorporating West Germany 
into a stable framework. On the economic front, Europe had to be reconstructed 
after the devastation of the war. Today, the European experience is widely 
referred to as one of the few examples of successful integration schemes. After 
all. The Courier pointed out recently that, if economic integration is considered
154
solely without political integration, then the case for economic integration may be 
weak. The reason being that in social, political, and in economic terms, the 
effects of cooperation and integration extend far beyond static trade gains. 
Recent studies by the International Trade Centre on sub-regional trade 
promotion In Africa Indicate that the potential for intra-African trade expansion is 
much larger than it appears at first sight. For example, it was estimated that 
US$4-5 billion worth of sub-Saharan African imports from other regions could be 
obtained from other countries in the continent which exports similar proucts.̂ ®® 
Even then, how can this happen with the continuing pervasive internal and inter­
state political instabilities? Perhaps a miracle has to happen before effective 
intra-subregional and intra-African trade will become a reality. This work is not 
an attempt to hold a pessimistic view of the current ECOWAS scheme. Neither 
does it advocate for its scrapping. In fact, ECOWAS should continue to exist, 
moreso since changes have been introduced by virtue of the revision of the 
Treaty and the expansion of the protocols. Besides, political considerations 
which, hitherto received little or no attention, should be given priority. This 
means member-countries must, of necessity, keep their various countries in a 
stable political order, and at the same time work toward forging cordial inter-state 
relations between one another. The existence of internal and inter-state stability 
is essential for effective implementation of the various protocols embodied in the
®̂®The Courier. "Prjmoting Regional Cooperation and Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa," No. 
134, July-August, 1992, pp, 76-83.
p. 78.
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new Treaty. Without this, the future of ECOWAS as an Integrative scheme will 
be questionable especially with intra-African economic integration being 
envisaged by the year 2035 as already mentioned in Chapter Four.
Within Africa the defunct East African Community was the most 
progressive economic integration because member-countries, namely, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda had established political and institutional cooperation 
before and after independence. The demise of this institution was occasioned 
by the overthrow of President Obote of Uganda by Idi Amin whose repressive 
rule led to destabilizing effects not only among Ugandans, but also relations 
among the other two EAC member-countries deteriorated over the division of 
institutional apparatus of the community. Such a situation could have been 
avoided if Amin had refrained from his dictatorial, tyrannical, and repressive 
stance and especially the seizure of community’s institutions located in his 
country.^^°
5.7 Summary
In this Chapter, an attempt has been made to reveal the prevailing social 
and political instability in ECOWAS member-states arising from constant coup 
d’etats throughout West Africa. Most vexing is the military and authoritarian 
regimes which have seemingly resolved to remain in power perpetually once 
they gain control of state apparatus, especially in the present world that is
^^°See Livingstone and Goddall, Op Git, p. 182.
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constantly changing from authoritarianism to democracy. Military regimes that 
have indicated their willingness to relinquish power have not kept their promise. 
Moreover, hegemonic relations resulting from ethnicity has made it impossible 
for leaders of ECOWAS states to recognize the importance of both political 
factor and loyalty to the states they control. Rather, leaders are self-centred as 
they are only concerned with what they can get through corruption, nepotism, 
and other devices they use to amass wealth from the public treasury. In the 
process, the interests of the masses they pretend to safeguard are relegated to 
the background of ruling elite’s minds. The urge to enrich oneself through 
corruption becomes more important than human, infrastructural, resource, and 
institutional development. The underlying cause of these is the 
underdevelopment of political system that will allow citizens’ participation in 
matters that directly affect them. Instead, military regimes have become more 
pervasive throughout the West African subregion, making it difficult for citizens 
to make input in the art of governing. Added to this is the autocratic nature of 
military regimes in West Africa. To challenge their policies or attempt to expose 
corrupt top military officers is occasionally misconstrued to mean treason against 
the state, leading to imprisonment without trial.
There is also the problem of inter-state disputes which must be overcome 
by ECOWAS member-states. One way of achieving this, as articulated in this 
thesis, is for member-states to institutionalize without delay a process that will 
lead to political cooperation which, in turn, will enable member-countries to make
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effective Input In the development of ECOWAS as a an Important Institution. 
Two cases of successful economic Integration - the European Community and 
Latin American Integration Association - that began with political cooperation and 
then Integration have been highlighted above. There are several things 
ECOWAS could learn from these two economic organizations. There Is 
substance In the popular saying that Rome was not built In a day.’ The earlier 
ECOWAS member-states put their organization on a better footing, the better 
things are likely to be for their peoples. This, however, cannot be done in an 
atmosphere of fear, Imprisonment of political opponents, outright killing of those 
who reveal their leaders’ corruption, and several other activities considered 
inimical to progress or the development process. Lastly, ECOWAS should be 
made to operate In accordance with the alms, principles, objectives, and 
protocols embodied in the new Treaty, while efforts should be directed towards 





An examination of economic integration assumes that it Is a healthy 
phenomenon specifically for the West African countries and for the rest of Africa 
in general. The subregion being the most economically backward area of the 
Third World, economic integration is one of the most vital strategies for 
development especially if backed by total commitment toward serious economic 
cooperation by member-countries involved in the integration process. It should 
be noted that the motive for economic integration is the desire to maximize 
social, economic, and political potential, and to tap human and material 
resources necessary for multi-sectoral industrial development whose gain will be 
evenly shared among the various peoples of the subregion. Because most 
member-countries of the organization are economically powerless, and unable 
to keep pace with economic competition with industrialized countries for various 
reasons outlined in this work, ECOWAS seemed to be the only viable strategy 
that can make their impact felt in the global economic system. It is also one of 
the various strategies through which member-countries can utilize their 
productive resources to address their economic problems, thus the generating 
of overall development which they lack.
That the trauma of decolonization remains active cannot be ov - 
emphasized. Africa's present realities, particularly the entrenchment of the 
various nations into the global economic system, makes this statement more
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true. As pointed out, some people In these countries would probably have 
preferred to remain colonized given the present socio-economic and political 
realities. The orthodox arguments advanced by neoclassical economists for 
International trade did not favour the subregion’s trade with the rest of the world, 
as experience has shown. Despite the fact that some ECOWAS countries are 
well endowed with natural resources, paucity of capital did not allow effective 
use of these resources to generate income for development several years after 
independence.
The theoretical exposition by various economists and development 
economists on the gains of economic integration were cited. Viner’s argument 
on trade creation and diversion assumes a healthy phenomenon for the 
participating nations. So also are the analyses of Harrop, Bracewell-Milnes, 
Caves, et al. Mikessell, Meade, Lipsey, Belassa, Cooper and Massell embodied 
in this work. Against the opinion of the above are Under, Hazlewood and 
Vousden. While Linder and Hazlewood regard Viner’s theory as inappropriate 
for the Third World for the simple reason of the Third World’s inability to 
generate adequate productive capacity, Vousden’s objection is grounded on the 
possibility of "bribery" playing a greater role (See Chapter Three). In this 
regards the general consensus is for economic integration, primarily due to the 
overall welfare gains accruing to participating countries.
While ECOWAS member-countries may or may not have been guided 
by the theoretical underpinning for economic integration, it is important for one
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to assume that the impetus for the formation of this integrative body in the 
subregion is the probable hope that economic integration would create an 
expanded market, greater scope of opportunities in intra-regional trade enabling 
countries to increase exports of goods and services, increased employment of 
labour, factor movement, industrial expansion, leading to over-all development 
in each of the countries involved in the integrative process. Economic 
development was thus an important goal in the formation of ECOWAS.
ECOWAS member-states are currently confronted by a number of 
problems such as low labour productivity, low agricultural productivity, capital 
shortage, increasing external debt, limited technical progress, high population 
growth rate, low intra-export capacity, and, most significantly, the adjustment 
programs imposed on them by both the IMF and the World Bank. The 
consequence of SAP continues to be felt by over three quarters of the population 
in each of ECOWAS states implementing such programs. As elaborated in the 
subsection dealing with SAP, the inter-relationship between structural adjustment 
programs and economic integration cannot be subjected to any serious debate. 
It was clearly stated that both have the inseparable goal of promoting economic 
growth and development, particularly since the two involve actions on the same 
macroeconomic and sectoral variables. It was also emphasized that without any 
conscious attempt to link SAP and economic integration programs, a policy in 
one particular area necessarily has implications for actions in the other area. 
This means that in examining the inter-relationship between the two, the crucial
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issue must be how to ensure that SAP policies and integration objectives are 
mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting.
The revised ECOWAS Treaty is praiseworthy given the fact that the 
organization has broadened its objectives and protocols to include tourism, the 
environment, joint production enterprises, joint ventures, and the harmonization 
of investment codes. Of equal importance is the protocol which provides for the 
establishment and promotion of relations among rural populations, women, 
workers and trade unions and the adoption of a population policy - all of which 
were absent in the old Treaty. It now remains to be seen how long it will take 
for concrete results to emerge, given political instabilities in most countries of 
member-states and persistent Inter-states problems.
In addition to the above, ECOWAS must overcome the weak economies, 
characterized by limited markets and low productivity in the countries constituting 
the organization. It is indeed a reality that development programs have, in the 
last years been punctuated for various reasons highlighted in this study, and this 
is not an exaggerated phenomenon.
The cost of financing major development programs is enormous and 
none of these countries has the wherewithal to generate adequate capital 
needed for effective development without outside support. The basic economic 
indicators of these countries shown on Table 1 gives only a partial picture of the 
current economic climate of each country, as data provided is inconclusive 
because of manipulation by governments, and the fact that some data are never
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accounted for. With the exception of three countries - Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, 
and Senegal - which fall within the middle Income bracket, the rest are among 
the World's poorest nations.
The early 1970s witnessed an unprecedented downtown in the 
economies of these countries, caused by both world recession and the oil shock 
of that period. This poor economic situation was exacerbated In global recession 
of the early 1980s and subsequent debt crises among nations of the subregion. 
The establishment of ECOWAS In 1975 was an attempt to ameliorate the 
economic conditions of these nations in order to allow for the development of 
their economies. While most of these problems have been attributed to 
exogenous factors, such as the absorption of these countries' economies Into the 
global economy through various mechanisms highlighted In this Thesis, there 
have also been endogenous factors such as deep-rooted ethnicity, persistent 
military seizures of power, and authoritarian regimes.
The alarming number of coup d'etats - 64 In West Africa alone between 
Independence and July 1994 - goes to substantiate Kposowa's and Jenkins' 
penetrating study with regard to military regimes vIs-a-vIs political Instabilities In 
West Africa. The number of coup d'etats In the subregion points to an Important 
conclusion: the Institutionalization of military regimes In most countries of the 
subregion. From this study, one can conclude that there Is a strong link between 
ethnic dominance and military coups that have taken place In the past. The vivid 
nature of ethnic diversity Is well known. In fact, the numerical strength of ethnic
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groups has acted to aggravate both economic and political situations, and in 
most cases, has become a major factor leading to the repression of some ethnic 
groups, massive killings, detention without trial of political opponents as the 
dominant groups tend to shut minority groups out of the apex of authority as 
demonstrated in this work. Consequently, hegemonic rather than 
accommodative ethnic politics characterize the newly independent states of West 
Africa. Thus the proliferation of military and authoritarian regimes can rightly be 
seen as an outcome of this ethnic domination, indeed, Connor’s assertion that 
ethnic domination has been that of nation-destroying rather than nation-building 
captures the real issue. The number of coup d'etats in West Africa, and the 
repressive nature of these regimes go to substantiate Connor's assertion.
Factors leading to coup d'etats were identified as hegemony arising from 
deep-rooted ethnicity, military and political factionalism among the elites, political 
crisis rooted in the tension between an increasingly disenchanted citizens over 
the role of the state and weak political institutions. There is also political 
centrality of the military rooted in its resources and organizational cohesion, and 
lack of citizens' participation the political processes in various West African 
countries due to the dictatorial nature of these states.
The need for political cooperation among the ECOWAS states was 
clearly stated. In fact, this is more important now than ever, particularly with the 
presently changing world order. I stated that political factor is important in that 
it is the key element in making ECOWAS succeed in its integrative endeavours.
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If African countries were able to form a unified poiitical unit through the long- 
established Organization of African Unity, this author believes that ECOWAS can 
equally do the same thing. Establishing political cooperation in the subregion will 
have the effect of strengthening ECOWAS, at least, in the long term.
Besides political cooperation, there are also cultural, language, and 
institutional differences between the Francophone and Anglophone countries. 
Culturally, ECOWAS has more than two distinct cultural backgrounds - the 
French speaking countries and the English Speaking countries both of which are 
dominant, and one Portuguese speaking country, Cape Verde - within the 
subregion. Because of the different colonial backgrounds among the three group 
of countries, each group automatically introduced the culture and values of their 
colonial powers before and after independence. Thus while we have the 
Francophone countries adopting the French culture and language, the 
Anglophone countries adopted the British culture and language, whereas Cape 
Verde took to Portuguese culture and language. This cultural milieu will have 
to be overcome if change is be recorded. With three distinct official languages 
in ECOWAS member-countries, this makes the learning of languages important, 
and this can be achieved by meimber-countries making it mandatory for 
educational institutions to incorporate at least the dominant ones such as French 
and English in schools' curriculum beginning from high schools. This is more so 
since ECOWAS involves the movement of peoples across national boundaries 
and communication is vital in both business and commerce as well as exchange
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of ideas. In fact, Immediate action Is needed In addressing this cultural milieu, 
at least for the benefit of future generation of ECOWAS leaders. In this 
study, a brief look at two existing Integrative organizations, namely the European 
Community and Latin American Free Trade Association, was made with the 
ultimate goal of tracing their respective historical evolution from political 
cooperation through to economic Integration. In the case of the EC, it was 
clearly pointed out that Its evolution took several centuries with repeated calls 
before and after 1815 for a unified Europe. From the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries on, the frequency of such calls by notable personalities such as Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau, Abbe de Saint-Pierre, and Jeremy Benthem Intensified, all 
advocating for a European senate or parliament and a European army both of 
which were considered Important In achieving a political unification of Europe. 
Winston Churchill of Britain repeatedly echoed similar call for a political 
unification through the establishment of a Council of Europe which, Indeed 
emerged In 1948 through the Treaty of Brussels. Over this period several 
treaties were signed by European countries for cooperation with regard to 
military, political and economic aspects. Some of the outcomes of these treaties 
were the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community In 1951, and 
the European Economic Community In 1957. The latter, as I have mentioned 
earlier, has since become Europe's most powerful economic organization.
As analyzed In this study, the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA) Is another classic case of an economic unit which evolved over several
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centuries. I pointed out that just as political factors led to the formation of the 
European Community, so also did political underpinnings exhibited a powerful 
influence in the formation of LAFTA. I indicated in Chapter Five that member- 
nations of LAFTA unanimously agreed to replace the Association with the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA) in 1981. To avoid ambiguity, it was also 
noted that the organization is generally referred to as the Central American 
Common Market (CACM). Since then the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(which influenced the establishment of the Caribbean Community (CARiCOM),) 
the Andean Group, and the East Caribbean Common Market have been 
established as sub-units of LAIA. To date LAIA continues to operate with 
immeasurable success compared with ECOWAS. And there is no way the latter 
could equate its achievements with those of both the EC or LAIA. As revealed 
in Chapter Five, the EC and LAIA evolved gradually from political cooperation 
respectively before moving into economic integration. Through this method 
inter-state stability had been fully established. Perhaps this accounts for the 
reason why these organizations have been successful in their development 
initiatives.
ECOWAS can learn a lot from the experience of these two organizations. 
But have the organization's leaders the will to do so? Can they refrain from 
dictatorial tendencies or eliminate ethnic tensions? Are the military ready to 
relinquish power and give in to democracy? I believe answers to these few 
questions can be answered affirmatively. There are certainly few leaders who
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are 'clean' and who place the Interests of their people at heart. In reviewing the 
past efforts of ECOWAS over the last nineteen years, that is, since its inception, 
it is clear that progress has been limited. Its yearly gathering provides an 
avenue to exchange ideas or rhetoric which are hardly translated into pragmatic 
terms. The authors who prepared the new Treaty were drawn up by elites who 
have little or no knowledge of the plight of the marginalized poor. Even those 
knowledgeable of the plight of the poor exhibit an 'I don’t cans' attitude. To make 
matters worse, women who are supposed to have special consideration in 
development projects are hardly thought of, perhaps because of chauvinistic 
tendencies of African leaders.
What is important, however, is for the nations of the subregion to give 
consideration to political order and peaceful co-existence, not only of individual 
countries, but also in inter-state relations. Of paramount importance is for the 
subregion to give thought over political cooperation - a condition which is vital 
for an effective economic integration. Otherwise the purpose for which ECOWAS 
was established would have been defeated and its demise is likely to have 
occurred just as it had in the East African Community.
Finally, the expanded principles, objectives, and protocols embodied in 
the new ECOWAS Treaty are an attempt to revamp the organization. This study 
does not, therefore, advocate for the scrapping of the organization. Rather, the 
organization must be made to work effectively while, at the same time, member- 
countrles must create atmosphere for internal and inter-state stability throughout
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all countries of the subregion constituting the Economic Community of West 
African States. It Is only under politically stabled conditions can member- 
countrles make meaningful contribution to the development of their respective 
countries and subsequently, the development and growth of the organization.
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